Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ859
2006-03-28 14:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:
CONTINUED GOVERNMENT INSINUATIONS OF U.S. ROLE IN
VZCZCXRO4377 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #0859/01 0871400 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281400Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8635 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5728 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3006 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6878 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4115 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1428 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1368 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3683 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4070 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8602 RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000859
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET SOCI ELAB PTER BL
SUBJECT: CONTINUED GOVERNMENT INSINUATIONS OF U.S. ROLE IN
DEADLY BOMBINGS
REF: LA PAZ 815
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000859
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET SOCI ELAB PTER BL
SUBJECT: CONTINUED GOVERNMENT INSINUATIONS OF U.S. ROLE IN
DEADLY BOMBINGS
REF: LA PAZ 815
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b.
1. (C) Summary: Bolivian Government officials, including
President Morales, have continued to suggest a possible USG
role in the deadly La Paz bombings March 21 (ref). While
Morales has persisted in professing ignorance about any
formal expression of U.S. displeasure, March 26 news articles
outlined the concrete steps the Embassy has taken to
underscore our concern. Bolivia's Ambassador-designate to
the U.S. Sacha Llorentty told us the president's accusations
were exacerbated by his having been branded a terrorist by
the U.S. in the past, but denied that Venezuelan and Cuban
advisors had any hand in shaping them. Embassy interaction
with the GOB remained largely frozen last week, though the
Ambassador will likely resume ministerial-level contacts this
week. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Following his initial polemical accusations of
official U.S. involvement in the bombings that killed two
people and injured a number of others last week in downtown
La Paz (ref),President Evo Morales and other high-level
government officials continued to suggest a possible
behind-the-scenes U.S. role in the crime. In a March 24
meeting with international donors, Morales reportedly
emphasized the "suspicious" circumstances of the crime and
said that treating it as an isolated incident was
inconceivable. In a late March 24 meeting with Vice Foreign
Minister Mauricio Dorfler, Ecopol counselor reiterated
official U.S. concern, and asked how the government planned
to respond. He was then shown the text of a draft communiqu
that called for a full investigation into the facts but also
clearly left open the possibility of U.S. involvement.
Following notice of our objections to the draft, the MFA
decided not to release the statement. Over the March 25-26
weekend, other GOB officials, including Minister of the
Presidency de la Quintana, likewise have refused to retract
earlier accusations or move to limit further damage.
3. (SBU) At the same time, Morales and other high-level
government officials have persisted in professing ignorance
about any formal expressions of U.S. displeasure in
connection to the president's remarks. According to news
reports, De la Quintana said he had heard nothing from the
U.S. Embassy, but added that if any message was passed, it
would amount to an attack against the government.
4. (SBU) News reports on the issue suggest that government
officials are playing dumb. One full-page March 26 article
in the La Paz-based newspaper La Prensa outlined the concrete
steps the U.S. Government had already taken to express its
displeasure. These were: canceling a planning meeting for
the Vice-President's proposed trip to Washington; sending no
representative to the March 24 international donors' meeting
with Morales (a clear message from Bolivia's number one
donor, the article emphasized); sending a lower-ranking
representative to Bolivia's "Day of the Sea" celebrations (in
which Bolivia's officialdom reaffirm the country's historical
claim for an outlet to the sea); and calling in Bolivia's
Charge d'Affaires in Washington to request formal
clarification of the president's comments. The article
failed to note the Ambassador's March 22 telephone call to VP
Garcia (ref). (Comment: All told, it is certain that Morales
and his key Ministers have received the messages but have
chosen to feign public ignorance about them for internal
political reasons. End Comment.)
5. (SBU) During a March 25 social dinner attended by poloff,
Bolivia's Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Sacha Llorentty
speculated about the president's deeper motives in straining
bilateral relations at this time, offering a cautious
LA PAZ 00000859 002 OF 002
psychoanalytic mix of "I don't know, but you must
understand." He said that violent, high profile crimes like
these were rare in Bolivia, and therefore rocked the
political environment disproportionately. Moreover, that
this bombing had occurred at the outset of Morales' term fed
his view that he -- and his new government -- had been
explicitly targeted. Llorentty said that Morales remained
resentful about his prolonged ostracism, and his having
(allegedly) been branded a narco-terrorist, by the U.S.
government, and that this feeling had exacerbated his
reaction. Poloff responded that this explanation could
convince a person inclined to feel sympathetic, but would not
hold water with many others, including in Washington.
Llorentty disagreed that Venezuelan and Cuban advisors within
the government had helped shape the tone and content of the
President's public remarks, emphasizing that Bolivia would
maintain its many friendships but submit to no foreign power.
6. (C) Embassy interactions with the GOB have remained
largely frozen. The Ambassador, however, will likely attend
meetings with the Minister of Hydrocarbons (March 28) and the
Minister of Mining (March 31). We have made our point and as
of now are on the high ground. As we move forward, we will
continue to adjust to--but also try to influence--this
turbulent political environment.
GREENLEE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET SOCI ELAB PTER BL
SUBJECT: CONTINUED GOVERNMENT INSINUATIONS OF U.S. ROLE IN
DEADLY BOMBINGS
REF: LA PAZ 815
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b.
1. (C) Summary: Bolivian Government officials, including
President Morales, have continued to suggest a possible USG
role in the deadly La Paz bombings March 21 (ref). While
Morales has persisted in professing ignorance about any
formal expression of U.S. displeasure, March 26 news articles
outlined the concrete steps the Embassy has taken to
underscore our concern. Bolivia's Ambassador-designate to
the U.S. Sacha Llorentty told us the president's accusations
were exacerbated by his having been branded a terrorist by
the U.S. in the past, but denied that Venezuelan and Cuban
advisors had any hand in shaping them. Embassy interaction
with the GOB remained largely frozen last week, though the
Ambassador will likely resume ministerial-level contacts this
week. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Following his initial polemical accusations of
official U.S. involvement in the bombings that killed two
people and injured a number of others last week in downtown
La Paz (ref),President Evo Morales and other high-level
government officials continued to suggest a possible
behind-the-scenes U.S. role in the crime. In a March 24
meeting with international donors, Morales reportedly
emphasized the "suspicious" circumstances of the crime and
said that treating it as an isolated incident was
inconceivable. In a late March 24 meeting with Vice Foreign
Minister Mauricio Dorfler, Ecopol counselor reiterated
official U.S. concern, and asked how the government planned
to respond. He was then shown the text of a draft communiqu
that called for a full investigation into the facts but also
clearly left open the possibility of U.S. involvement.
Following notice of our objections to the draft, the MFA
decided not to release the statement. Over the March 25-26
weekend, other GOB officials, including Minister of the
Presidency de la Quintana, likewise have refused to retract
earlier accusations or move to limit further damage.
3. (SBU) At the same time, Morales and other high-level
government officials have persisted in professing ignorance
about any formal expressions of U.S. displeasure in
connection to the president's remarks. According to news
reports, De la Quintana said he had heard nothing from the
U.S. Embassy, but added that if any message was passed, it
would amount to an attack against the government.
4. (SBU) News reports on the issue suggest that government
officials are playing dumb. One full-page March 26 article
in the La Paz-based newspaper La Prensa outlined the concrete
steps the U.S. Government had already taken to express its
displeasure. These were: canceling a planning meeting for
the Vice-President's proposed trip to Washington; sending no
representative to the March 24 international donors' meeting
with Morales (a clear message from Bolivia's number one
donor, the article emphasized); sending a lower-ranking
representative to Bolivia's "Day of the Sea" celebrations (in
which Bolivia's officialdom reaffirm the country's historical
claim for an outlet to the sea); and calling in Bolivia's
Charge d'Affaires in Washington to request formal
clarification of the president's comments. The article
failed to note the Ambassador's March 22 telephone call to VP
Garcia (ref). (Comment: All told, it is certain that Morales
and his key Ministers have received the messages but have
chosen to feign public ignorance about them for internal
political reasons. End Comment.)
5. (SBU) During a March 25 social dinner attended by poloff,
Bolivia's Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Sacha Llorentty
speculated about the president's deeper motives in straining
bilateral relations at this time, offering a cautious
LA PAZ 00000859 002 OF 002
psychoanalytic mix of "I don't know, but you must
understand." He said that violent, high profile crimes like
these were rare in Bolivia, and therefore rocked the
political environment disproportionately. Moreover, that
this bombing had occurred at the outset of Morales' term fed
his view that he -- and his new government -- had been
explicitly targeted. Llorentty said that Morales remained
resentful about his prolonged ostracism, and his having
(allegedly) been branded a narco-terrorist, by the U.S.
government, and that this feeling had exacerbated his
reaction. Poloff responded that this explanation could
convince a person inclined to feel sympathetic, but would not
hold water with many others, including in Washington.
Llorentty disagreed that Venezuelan and Cuban advisors within
the government had helped shape the tone and content of the
President's public remarks, emphasizing that Bolivia would
maintain its many friendships but submit to no foreign power.
6. (C) Embassy interactions with the GOB have remained
largely frozen. The Ambassador, however, will likely attend
meetings with the Minister of Hydrocarbons (March 28) and the
Minister of Mining (March 31). We have made our point and as
of now are on the high ground. As we move forward, we will
continue to adjust to--but also try to influence--this
turbulent political environment.
GREENLEE