FIRST MEETING WITH EVO AS PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 000451 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA A/S T.SHANNON AND PDAS C.SHAPIRO STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI MCC FOR A.ROSSIN AND J.HEWKO USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD TREASURY FOR S.GOOCH AND R.TOLOUI NSC FOR D.FISK E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR ECON PINR EAID BL SUBJECT: FIRST MEETING WITH EVO AS PRESIDENT Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a nearly two hour conversation with the Ambassador at the Presidential Palace on February 18, Evo Morales would not be pinned down on details of eradication but showed interest in at least limited cooperation on broader counternarcotics and anti-corruption issues. The Ambassador admonished Morales to keep in check gratuitous slaps at the USG for local political gain, pushed hard for clarification on eradication, interdiction and alternative development policies, and laid the blame for declining military support on the GOB's grandstanding on Article 98. The chemistry between Morales and his Vice President, Alvaro Garcia Linera (also at the meeting) seemed cooler than in previous encounters. Garcia Linera closed the meeting by saying he hoped to attend the Microsoft-sponsored Government Leaders Forum in Washington March 14-15. The Ambassador advised him to apply for a visa via diplomatic note. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE POTUS-MORALES PHONE CALL -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, Econ/Pol Counselor, and the Embassy's declared intelligence chief met at our request with President Evo Morales for almost two hours at the Presidential Palace on February 18. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera and Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon de la Quintana were also present. Morales opened by thanking the Ambassador for the congratulatory phone call received from President Bush on February 1, but worried that a translator error left the impression that his regime was moving toward socialism rather than clarifying that "Movement Toward Socialism" was the name of the governing party. The Ambassador assured Morales that he had clarified any misunderstanding, but noted that it appeared to be a distinction without a difference as some form of socialism appeared, in fact, to be the guiding ideology of the president's party. Morales did not reply. -------------- COUNTERNARCOTICS--A USG PRIORITY -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador underscored the USG's commitment to democracy in Bolivia, our interest in Morales succeeding within that framework, and our willingness to work collaboratively where possible. Morales broke in almost immediately to suggest that he and the Ambassador make a joint trip to the Chapare--ground zero in the drug war--an idea the Ambassador acknowledged might be interesting, but only after we reached agreement on the broad counternarcotics agenda, including continued aggressive eradication, and a coordinated set of talking points. The Ambassador went on to remind Morales that the drug agenda had consequences in almost every area of our cooperation and that it was important for the GOB to be clear in its policies. He reiterated our confusion over cocalero demands, apparently supported by the presidential spokesman, that all USG agencies and their counterparts leave the Chapare, and said that we could pull all of our multi-million dollar programs from the country immediately. The Ambassador also warned Morales that his strident rhetoric ( "..twisting the arms of the Yankees on the cato of coca...") may score points in the Chapare, but did not play well in Washington, and that, if it came to it, we knew something about arm-twisting. Finally, the Ambassador noted that we had discussed earlier the cocalero declaration with Quintana and had received his assurances that eradication would continue, that the GOB would respect the 3200 hectare limit for coca in the Chapare LA PAZ 00000451 002 OF 005 enshrined in the cocalero-Mesa Government agreement pending the results of the EU-financed demand study, and that the DEA would continue working in Bolivia. -------------- EVO RESPONDS -------------- ¶4. (C) After thanking the Ambassador for his good wishes and declaring the importance of a cooperative relationship with the USG, Morales said he was baffled by the cocalero declaration, noting that it was never discussed in his presence and admitting that the GOB was having trouble controlling its message. At the same time, he side stepped the 3200 hectare limit in the Chapare and launched into a false debate (made publicly on recent occasions) in favor of allowing one cato (sixth of a hectare) of coca per federation affiliate rather than per family as a means to reduce cultivation in the region. Morales recounted that he had wanted the original agreement with the Mesa government to allow 4,000 hectares, but GOB had revised the number downward. When the Ambassador asked if the current administration intended to continue with the 3,200 hectare limit, Morales replied that this was the goal but that the final number following negotiations with cocaleros could be more flexible. The Ambassador reminded Morales that, although the U.S. was not a party to the agreement, Morales' signature was on it and that we did not care about cocaleros' internal debates -- what mattered was the bottom line and we would watch with consequential interest for the eventual outcome. ¶5. (C) Morales responded by delving into the details of his Chapare strategy, including sending Vice Minister of Social Defense Felipe Caceres to fly over the Carrazco National Park to finally demarcate its boundaries. Morales said the cocaleros had agreed the previous day to prohibit cultivation in the park and to cooperate with military conscripts to eradicate coca already there. Morales repeated that the federations themselves would enforce the one cato per affiliate limit and kick out any farmer that exceeded it. Reving back a bit, Morales added, "That is where I want to get in our negotiations, though as yet I do not have their agreement for this proposal. But when these federations make an agreement, they are honored." Again, the Ambassador reminded Morales that the USG would conduct its annual certification review and that paltry eradication numbers, so far around just 5% of previous results, would not be understood. He reiterated that the challenge was to arrive at a coordinated strategy which assured that eradication continued at a satisfactory pace. ¶6. (C) On a lighter note, and by way of explaining why DEA needed to change its tactics, Morales said that in 1997, on a bus ride back to the Chapare after a day of beer drinking, he asked the driver to pull over so Morales could relieve himself. In mid-stream, two burly DEA agents grabbed him by the shoulders and spun him around, apparently thinking they were stopping him from running away with narcotics. Chuckling as he told the story, Morales said he had no problem with the DEA remaining in the Chapare, as long as there were some (unspecified) adjustments in the way they worked. He alluded as well to an incident several years ago in which a DEA agent allegedly supplanted local police at a checkpoint -- commenting at the same time that such an action might have been a necessary counter to endemic police corruption. -------------- ARTICLE 98 -------------- LA PAZ 00000451 003 OF 005 ¶7. (C) Responding to local news articles citing a New York Times piece erroneously characterizing a cut in military-to-military assistance as a slap at the Morales administration, the Ambassador sounded a strong note of caution. He reminded Morales that the Embassy had been silent on Article 98 for some time and accepted the new regime's opposition to an agreement. At the same time, he warned that continued inflammatory statements from Morales and GOB officials claiming the U.S. wanted impunity through Article 98 for its troops to commit wanton murder--especially when we had troops actively at war in other regions--were damaging to our relatioship and completely ignored our own integrity and dignity (favorite one-way themes for the Morales team). The Ambassador suggested Morales seek a higher plane, and one based on facts, from which to launch criticisms. ¶8. (C) The Vice President interjected to lament the Bolivian armed forces' professional disarray and asked if we could reconsider cutting our military assistance. The Ambassador said the decision to sacrifice aid to what we considered misguided principle was the GOB's. He reiterated that, absent ratification of an Article 98 agreement, Bolivia would lose about USD 33 million in military assistance over the next three years and suggested the GOB revisit the issue. (Comment: Garcia Linera's aversion to U.S. military presence in Bolivia is well known. His urging for more help may reflect direct armed forces' concern or that Venezuelan and Cuban assistance may not be in immediate prospect. End comment.) -------------- POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶9. (C) Introduced by the Ambassador, the Embassy's declared intelligence chief offered Morales an agency coin (which Morales at first regarded with puzzlement, but later with considerable interest) and offered a rudimentary explanation of our cooperation with intelligence units in the National Police, focusing on international terrorism, crime and drug trafficking. The intelligence chief noted that military intelligence units were poor, but that the Directorate for National intelligence under the Police had competent professionals. He added, however, that these units had not been exploited by the Morales administration perhaps because of perceived "gringo" influence. ¶10. (C) After initial skepticism, Morales warmed to the idea of cooperating on at least some intelligence matters--mainly corruption and commercial issues--and quipped that, while he did not understand well the workings of intelligence agencies, he was accustomed to being followed by them. He added that he discounted the GOB's intelligence units. relying instead on "comrades ("companeros") all over Bolivia who give me information." Quintana added that the GOB wanted to create a civilian intelligence service that worked for the state, and not for the police, and acknowledged Morales' direction to discuss areas of cooperation with the intelligence chief. (Comment: Quintana has avoided contact with the Embassy's declared intelligence officer since taking office and did not follow up after the meeting. Garcia Linera also remained cool to overtures on intelligence cooperation. End comment.) -------------- DEVELOPING A WORKING RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶11. (C) When asked how to develop a bilateral LA PAZ 00000451 004 OF 005 counternarcotics relationship, Morales suggested that the Embassy continue meeting with Vice Minister Caceres. He also recommended that we meet other ministers and vice-ministers on other issues. The President stated a desire to work with us on controlling precursor chemicals and developing a zero cocaine strategy, "which is really the best way to eliminate excess coca." Interestingly, he acknowledged that cocaine trafficking propped up the price of coca leaf. He also said he hoped to develop voluntary reduction programs in the Yungas (Caranavi). At the same time, he lamented that Bolivia had lost to Peru the opportunity to export coca leaves legally to the United States. (Note: We understand the only company in the United States legally allowed to import coca leaves is Stepan Company in Maywood New Jersey which produces cocaine for medical uses. End Note.) The Ambassador replied that Bolivia's cocaleros were the country's greatest neo-liberals, always looking for new export markets. Morales smiled. ¶12. (C) Morales went on to say he wanted to optimize the efficiency of the alternative development (AD) in the Chapare, suggesting that a soccer field that can be built by the mayors for 30,000 bolivianos would cost 90,000 bolivianos as part of an AD program. Morales believed that road infrastructure program was the most effective AD program in the Chapare. ¶13. (C) Finally, upon hearing of the Ambassador's upcoming trip to Washington, Morales asked to convey his best regards to President Bush and to Secretary Rice, carefully pronouncing her first name. -------------- THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S INTERVENTION -------------- ¶14. (C) After 75 minutes, and with the conversation winding down, Garcia Linera asked Morales for permission to speak. The Vice President then embarked on a twenty-minute monologue, starting by saying that this GOB had not declared itself an enemy of the USG. "We don't want to create problems. We agree on much but differ on some things." Areas of agreement included democracy, counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, and counternarcotics. The Ambassador observed that we could offer model legislation on money laundering, precursor chemicals and conspiracy that the GOB might find helpful. Garcia Linera thought such input would be useful. ¶15. (C) On the other hand, the Vice President acknowledged that coca would remain an irritant. "You ask for exact numbers (about coca cultivation and eradication)," he said, "but we are a very ambiguous society." He assured that the GOB would proceed with its coca strategy, making adjustments as needed. Garcia Linera recognized that addressing the coca issue in the Yungas would be especially complicated. ¶16. (C) The Ambassador commented that he understood that the Vice President had taken some shots at the USG the previous day at an economic forum on free trade agreements (see septel). Garcia Linera vehemently denied the charge, stating that his remarks had evidently been mischaracterized to the Ambassador. "I carefully avoided mentioning any countries, and any implicit criticisms were meant for the Europeans," he said. (Comment: At the economic forum, the Vice-President's attacks were clearly directed against U.S. trade policy. His unusually defensive reaction-never seen before-may be due to the fact that this issue was raised in the presence of Morales. End Comment.) ¶17. (C) Garcia Linera mentioned that he would like to go to LA PAZ 00000451 005 OF 005 the Microsoft-sponsored Government Leaders Forum in Washington March 14-15 but claimed not to know if he had a visa. The Ambassador suggested that the Foreign Ministry send a formal request and that the Embassy would proceed with processing his visa application with the Department. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) Following the sometimes tense discussions about coca and Article 98, Morales began to relax and show an engaging sense of humor. Clearly more at ease telling stories than discussing policy, he jumped from topic to topic and was most comfortable when talking about the subject he understands best--coca in the Chapare. As the Vice President stated during the meeting, the President is spending a lot of his time personally trying to negotiate with the cocaleros. For Morales, this is one of his most difficult challenges--walking the tightrope between succumbing to U.S. demands and upsetting his key political power base in the Chapare. ¶19. (C) There seemed to be tension between Morales and Garcia Linera during the meeting. The two rarely looked at each other or supported the other's points. The Vice President's intervention at the end of the meeting seemed unnecessary and forced, almost as if he believed his job was to put an intellectual sheen on Morales's statements, or, more ominously, insert himself as a buffer to a direct relationship between the Ambassador and the President. Morales paid little attention to Garcia Linera's words. ¶20. (C) Once again, most of what Morales said could be interpreted as reassuring. But one month into his administration, his capacity for doublespeak, or else his incapacity to forge internal consensus, is as disturbing as it is impressive. GREENLEE