SIGNS OF EVO'S AUTOCRATIC BENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000336 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ELAB BL SUBJECT: SIGNS OF EVO'S AUTOCRATIC BENT REF: A. LA PAZ 240 ¶B. LA PAX 229 Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The MAS government has moved to control a range of institutions, including nominally independent ones, and many observers believe President Morales plans to use the Constituent Assembly (CA) to consolidate this control. Other worrying signs include the substantial halting of forced eradication of illegal coca and reports of increasing Venezuelan and Cuban activity in Bolivia. Morales' first two weeks in office reveal an autocratic bent, and the early invocation of phantom conspiracies, to consolidate power in the face of internal opposition. End summary. Consolidating Control -------------- ¶2. (C) In his first two weeks in office, President Morales has moved to consolidate his control over a range of institutions. The MAS's unprecedented victory on December 18 enabled it to take over the executive branch of government wholesale, bypassing the traditional backroom bargaining with other parties. To some analysts, Morales has gone further, exerting a more direct "personal" control by appointing ministers exclusively for their loyalty to him rather than for their links to powerful constituencies or for their technical expertise. Many observers also believe that Morales has pushed for lower government salaries, including in the judicial and legislative branches, in order to purge MAS rivals from those institutions (see reftel). One opposition congressman told us that his MAS colleagues would receive "other" financial compensation to offset salary reductions, while those from other parties would not. An opposition senator also told us that the MAS steamrolled the opposition and seized control of key congressional committees in violation of internal regulations. Some in the congressional opposition have told us their concern is compounded by the fact that Morales won't take their calls. ¶3. (C) The MAS government has also moved to take over autonomous social sector organizations. Contacts in the Santa Cruz regional labor confederation (COD) told us recently that a number of sitting regional labor leaders, accused of favoring "Podemos" during the electoral campaign, have been the object of a MAS-led smear campaign for "representing the interests of the multinationals, not the people" and targeted for purging from their posts. These leaders were legitimately elected according to their organization's internal statutes and are only several months into what is supposed to be a two-year term. There have been sketchier reports of similar (presumably) MAS-led pressures in a broad range of organizations, including the original Sole Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) led by Morales rival Felipe Quispe. Constituent Assembly -------------- ¶4. (C) Morales appears to be gearing up to use the Constituent Assembly (CA) to secure MAS power for the long term. On February 7, Morales presented to Congress the executive's legislative proposal for the CA. The proposal provides for three assembly representatives per legislative district, two for the party of the top vote-getter and one for the second place finisher (assuming no party wins an outright majority). The potentially significant caveat is that the "winner takes all" three seats if the first place finisher wins by more than 50 percent. Analysts and social sectors speculate that the government is banking on winning an outright majority in the key western departments (La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca),and thereby gaining absolute representation in the CA for those areas, while also grabbing representation from the remaining departments. Should this happen, the government would have far more than the two-thirds majority needed to control the process and to "refound" Bolivia as it sees fit, while the minority would have virtually no representation or influence LA PAZ 00000336 002 OF 003 at all. ¶5. (C) Some observers believe that Morales abandoned his previous proposal, which included a set number of representatives for "indigenous" groups, because the MAS's unexpectedly decisive victory on December 18 led him to believe he would be better off with a strict "one person - one vote" approach. Still, a 2/3 majority of the combined congress is needed to pass the CA proposal into law, and the MAS falls short of that number by 21 representatives. Aware of this, Morales has threatened that "if congress doesn't pass his law, the social sectors will." Morales has also indicated he wants his bill passed "as is," but many congressional insiders believe that that won't be easy. According to several opposition legislators, non-MAS representatives will push for a law that better reflects the interests of Bolivia's political minority, and none are likely to vote to give the MAS a "blank check." Civic committees of the "media luna" (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando) have already publicly rejected the Morales proposal. This early balking at the executive's proposal will lead to an inevitable give and take, and probably include the consideration of other CA proposals as well. Labor leaders in Cochabamba for example, told us they didn't support the MAS proposal because it would exclude the very people the government purports to represent. Several indigenous leaders and former MAS (dissident) deputies told us Morales aimed to control the selection of assembly representatives outright. Congressional debate is scheduled to begin on February 10 and is likely to last at least one month. The election of representatives is slated for July 2, and the GOB plans to convene the CA on August 6. Eradication Halted -------------- ¶6. (C) Another disturbing trend is the suspension since January 24 of most forced eradication of illegal coca (ref B). While the new Minister of Government Alicia Munoz and her Vice-Minister Felipe Caceres (septel) have affirmed the GOB's commitment to our three-pronged approach -- interdiction, eradication and alternative development -- substantive eradication has only partially resumed. We received reports that a small amount of eradication occurred February 9, but faced considerable community resistance. President Morales is scheduled to meet with the Chapare cocalero federations this weekend (February 11-12), reportedly to formalize the "cato" agreement and to reach consensus on the resumption of eradication of coca exceeding that one cato per family limit. Several Embassy contacts worried that if the current policy confusion continues unresolved, the Chapare could soon become a "no man's land." Venezuela and Cuba -------------- ¶7. (C) Additionally, there are reports of increasing Venezuelan and Cuban activity in Bolivia. Embassy contacts have noted the continued presence of Venezuelan security forces in and around the presidential palace and in the Ministry of Defense. Venezuelan TV station "Telesur" has a dedicated channel on Bolivian television, and Telesur reporters are now an integral part of Bolivia's media swarm. Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA) officials are becoming increasingly involved in Bolivian oil matters, with a PDVSA office recently opened in downtown La Paz. Under the umbrella of disaster relief, Cuba sent a team of close to 150 "doctors" to help Bolivians in need, particularly in rural areas, and promised that there were more where those came from. Cochabamba Prefect Manfred Reyes Villa told us that the MAS offered his department Cuban teachers and doctors, but that he had declined the offer. ¶8. (C) Comment: President Morales' first two weeks in office appear to reveal a more autocratic bent, or at least a plan to consolidate power before the early momentum slips away. To this end, the MAS government is focusing on the Constituent Assembly, to the apparent exclusion of other LA PAZ 00000336 003 OF 003 priorities such as changing the neoliberal economic model, reforming Law 1008 (Bolivia's centerpiece anti-drug law) or redesigning the mining code. Many observers believe this is because the MAS government believes it will have free reign on these and other issues once it has the CA in the bag. In seeking to clear the ground toward its kind of assembly, Morales has threatened to mobilize social sectors to pressure the congress. More recently, the president and vice-president have upped the ante, publicly raising the specter of a conspiracy by "transnational companies" to destabilize the government. Most observers see this as a phantom outside threat, used by the government (somewhat sooner than most had expected it would) as a political tool to rally its forces and to forge national unity in the face of the inevitable internal opposition. These are not good signs. On the other hand, Morales, beset by a disruptive airline strike, disastrous nation-wide floods, and discontent over unmet campaign pledges, is beginning to find governance an increasingly hard slog. GREENLEE