SOUTH AMERICAN SUMMIT: ALL HYPE NO SUBSTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003355 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: SOUTH AMERICAN SUMMIT: ALL HYPE NO SUBSTANCE REF: LA PAZ 3324 Classified By: Ecopol Chief Andrew Erickson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On December 8-9, Cochabamba played host to the Second Summit of the South American Community of Nations (CSN). Despite Bolivia's current political turmoil (reftel), nine presidents attended the conference. Cochabamba's lack of experience hosting such a high-profile event was obvious, but press coverage was favorable. The summit's declaration contained little substance beyond priorities discussed at previous CSN summits. In addition to the formal summit, regional indigenous peoples and leftist groups from around the world -- co-opted by Castro, Chavez, and Morales supporters -- held an alternative summit to re-enforce and broaden Morales' image and message. For maximum public relations exposure, Morales choreographed the closing of both summits at a massive rally in Cochabamba's soccer stadium. In his closing speech, Morales focused on domestic issues, attacking his political opposition, "oligarchs," wealthy landowners, the media and the United States (although his anti-U.S. comments were restrained compared to those of Hugo Chavez). While lacking in substance, the summits were yet another public relations coup for Morales. End Summary. -------------- Attendees -------------- ¶2. (U) Despite Bolivia's current political turmoil (reftel), the presidents of Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Guyana, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela attended the summit. Argentina and Ecuador sent their vice-presidents, Columbia sent its foreign minister, and Suriname sent a low-level delegation. Presidents-elect Correa of Ecuador and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua attended as observers. Mexico, Panama, and various international organizations sent lower-level observer delegations. -------------- The Official Summit -- Morales' Media Savvy -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Cochabamba's lack of experience hosting such a high-profile event was obvious, but press coverage was favorable. Presidents were dispersed in hotels throughout city and complained about accommodations (mostly because President Chavez's delegation occupied the nicest hotel). Morales' opening speech was unusually restrained and aimed at projecting an air of statesmanship. With the TV cameras rolling, President Morales asked his summit colleagues if they would be comfortable having their working session televised. None of the presidents refused so the entire working session was aired live. -------------- The Cochabamba Declaration - Substance Free -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Cochabamba Declaration, the main product of the summit, outlines thirteen objectives, each largely a reiteration of priorities from previous CSN declarations. The objectives, short on details, include such themes as integration of energy, infrastructure, financial mechanisms, and industry. Other themes include economic and defense cooperation, migration, South American citizenship, cultural identity, as well as environmental protection. The Declaration calls for a commission of high-level officials, based in Rio de Janeiro, to work on an executive plan for implementing the objectives. It also contains a Brazilian proposal regarding the possible establishment of a South American parliament. -------------- Parallel Summit -------------- ¶5. (SBU) In addition to the formal summit, regional indigenous peoples and leftist groups from around the world -- co-opted by Castro, Chavez and Morales supporters -- held an alternative summit to re-enforce and broaden Morales' image and message. The alternative summit consisted of Bolivian artisans selling crafts, various groups giving away or selling propaganda and multimedia (Cuba and Venezuela had their own booths),and workshops with titles such as "Solidarity in the Integration of South America in the Fight Against the Imperialists." Emboffs attended parts of several workshops. The speakers at the workshops were mostly foreigners, typically Cuban, Venezuelan, and European. The "students" were largely Bolivian peasants. -------------- The Closing Ceremony and the Hugo Factor -------------- ¶6. (SBU) For maximum public relations exposure, Morales choreographed the closing of both summits at a massive rally in Cochabamba's soccer stadium. Approximately 35,000 of Morales' indigenous supporters and another thousand or more foreigners attended. While most of the presidents had already departed Cochabamba, Argentina's Vice-President Daniel Scioli, Daniel Ortega, Hugo Chavez, and Evo Morales spoke. Hugo Chavez, as expected, ranted against "neoliberalism," free trade agreements, and the "North American empire." He drew parallels between Bolivia's current political crisis and the situation in Venezuela in 2001-2002. He menacingly warned the Bolivian military against coup plotting, and promised that Venezuela stood ready to Morales' revolution, declaring Venezuela's unconditional, including military, support for Bolivia's struggle against "the oligarchs." ¶7. (SBU) In his closing speech, Morales focused on domestic issues, attacking his political opposition, "oligarchs," wealthy landowners, the media and the United States (although his anti-U.S. comments were restrained). Railing against opposition hunger-strikers, he argued that they were rich because they stole from Bolivia and that their strikes were merely a tactic to retain their privileges. Morales managed to take credit for the passage of ATPDEA, without actually naming the trade benefits as ATPDEA or mentioning the United States. He praised Cuban and Venezuelan humanitarian assistance but omitted any mention of U.S. aid. While the multitude appeared to enjoy the speeches, one Emboff who was in the crowd noted that the people clapped and chanted when it was appropriate as if following orders, but mostly sat passively. (Note: Indigenous Bolivians sat in the stands, but foreigners had the good seats near the stage. End Note). The crowd became truly animated when Morales prematurely announced that Cochabamba would host the future South American parliament. (Note: The summit declaration does not include any text regarding the location of the parliament. End Note). -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) To the public eye, Morales played the dual roles of regional player and domestic political streetfighter. He was showered with praise from his presidential peers for hosting the summit; meanwhile, he attacked the opposition and energized his base at the closing ceremony. Behind the scenes the summit was considerably less successful. Morales' rather naive push to televise the entire proceeding essentially guaranteed that little substantive work could occur and in the end Chile and Peru offered defenses of pro-U.S. positions. While lacking in substance, the summits were a partial public relations coup for Morales, garnering two days of positive press which overshadowed stories about the domestic political situation. Yet, the Cochabamba Declaration contained no mention of Morales' main goals -- depenalization of coca and access to the sea. End Comment. GOLDBERG