BOLIVIAN-VENEZUELAN MILITARY AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 002732 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN-VENEZUELAN MILITARY AGREEMENT REF: LA PAZ 2726 Classified By: Ambassador Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Bolivian senate suspended its October 10 vote on a Bolivian-Venezuelan military agreement signed by Presidents Morales and Chavez May 26, postponing further debate to the week of October 16. The agreement provides for a wide range of military cooperation, including high level political visits, a joint military working group, "democratic control of the armed forces," coordination regarding arming and disarming, information and communication systems, education and training, as well as "standardization and interoperational ability" and "other areas of mutual agreement." Reaction from the opposition, as well as from Bolivia's neighbors, has been strong. While the agreement provides further concrete evidence of the growing ties between Bolivia and Venezuela, the opposition has taken advantage of the opportunity to secure extensive negative press regarding Venezuelan meddling in Bolivian internal affairs. End summary. -------------- SENATE DEBATE POSTPONED -------------- ¶2. (C) The Bolivian senate suspended its October 10 vote on a Bolivian-Venezuelan military agreement signed by Presidents Morales and Chavez May 26, postponing further debate to the week of October 16. The agreement is intended to "complement" the 1973 defense treaty between the two countries. According to Foreign Minister Choquehuanca, the Bolivian military provided input for the agreement and approved the final version. The lower house already approved the treaty; it has been pending in the senate since September 28. Press reports indicate that the senate will resume debate after its defense committee has an opportunity to prepare a report on the treaty. -------------- THE TREATY'S SPECIFIC TERMS -------------- ¶3. (C) The agreement provides for a wide range of military cooperation. Its goal is to "establish mechanisms of technical cooperation between the parties to improve and complement the defense capacity of each country, with the purpose of contributing to the integrated development of both peoples." It provides for high level political visits (both civilian and military authorities); establishment of a joint military working group; military cooperation regarding both militaries' legal framework and organization; and cooperation on crisis management, information and communication systems, education and training, control of chemical and biochemical agents, arming and disarming, defense and budgetary plans, and search and rescue missions (as well as humanitarian missions). The agreement also refers to cooperation regarding the "democratic control of the armed forces," "standardization and interoperational ability" and "other areas of mutual agreement." The treaty further provides for the exchange of information and for construction of a military "port" in Quijarro (Santa Cruz department) and a military base in Riberalta (Beni department). Press reports that the treaty provides for construction of more than twenty military bases along Bolivia's borders are unfounded; the agreement only mentions construction of the two military bases along Bolivia's border with Brazil. -------------- STRONG OPPOSITION REACTION -------------- ¶4. (C) Reaction from the opposition, as well as from Bolivia's neighbors, has been strong. In fact, concerned by Venezuelan Ambassador Montes' recent declarations that Venezuelan blood would be shed if the Bolivian revolution LA PAZ 00002732 002 OF 002 were threatened, even leading MAS deputy Javier Zavaleta, president of the lower house's defense committee, criticized Venezuelan interference. The principal opposition party, Podemos, has described the agreement as "vague" and "unsettling and risky" for Bolivia's national security. Podemos' main concern pertains to the "standardization and interoperational" language, which could be used to justify the use of Venezuelan troops in an internal Bolivian conflict. Similarly, Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile have expressed concern regarding the agreement (Chile initially said the agreement could impact Bolivia's access to the sea, but President Bachelet later said Bolivia has the sovereign right to sign defense agreements). -------------- COMMENT: MORE MEDDLING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS -------------- ¶5. (C) While this agreement provides further concrete evidence of the growing ties between Bolivia and Venezuela, the opposition has taken advantage of the opportunity to secure extensive negative press regarding Venezuelan meddling in Bolivian internal affairs. The treaty, along with the Venezuelan ambassador's October 7 comments (reftel),are dragging Venezuelan designs on Bolivia into the open. The senate's postponement of debate on the treaty is a positive sign and an opportunity for the opposition to attempt to limit Venezuelan military influence in Bolivia. We welcome comments from Santiago, Asuncion, Lima, Buenos Aires and Brasilia on how their countries are viewing this development. Press reporting here has alleged significant concern from neighboring states. End comment. GOLDBERG