HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST NAMED BOLIVIA'S AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000196 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND NSC FOR DFISK USCINCSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI BL SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST NAMED BOLIVIA'S AMBASSADOR TO U.S. Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: President Morales will reportedly appoint human rights activist Sacha Llorenti as Bolivia's next Ambassador to the U.S., tasking the new envoy with securing the extradition of former President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada. It is tempting to read an "anti-U.S." message into this reported appointment, but basic bungling, including of protocol, is an equally valid explanation -- for now. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On January 25, unconfirmed reports began to surface that Sacha Llorenti would be appointed as the next Bolivian Ambassador to the United States. On January 26, it was headline news. According to media reports, President Evo Morales named Llorenti as Ambassador to Washington with two specific goals in mind: securing the extradition of former President "Goni" for his alleged crimes in connection to the violence of October 2003 and negotiating the extension of Bolivia's trade benefits and the groundwork for Bolivia's future entry into a "fair and equitable" free trade agreement with the U.S. (presumably different than the one currently under negotiation with the Andean countries.) ¶3. (SBU) Llorenti, 35, is a lawyer by training and a human rights activist by profession. Until last year, he was president of the Bolivian Permanent Human Rights Assembly (APDH); since that time he has been a member of the pre-Constituent Assembly, the semi-official and largely feckless body charged with framing the modalities, scope and parameters of the coming Constituent Assembly. Llorenti has a close association with Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera and with Human Rights Ombudsman Waldo Albarracin, with whom he worked closely in the Human Rights Assembly. Long a MAS sympathizer, Llorenti is his generation's version of the prototypical left-leaning Latin American intellectual: he sees the "neo-liberal" economic model as responsible for Bolivia's poverty and views the U.S. role here with deep suspicion. ¶4. (SBU) Llorenti has also been one of the top crusaders in Bolivia to secure "justice" for former President Goni, making this a 'cause celebre' during his brief tenure as president of the APDH. During that time, he formally petitioned Congress to support the prosecution of Goni and pressed the Supreme Court, Attorney General and other legal entities to push the case forward thereafter; he has continued this passionate pursuit since that time. Believing it useful to reach out across the ideological valley and to show him America first-hand, the Embassy nominated Llorenti as an International Visitor (IV); he traveled on the scholarship to the U.S. in August of last year. On his return to Bolivia, Llorenti promptly repaid the favor by leading several demonstrations in front of the Embassy calling for the immediate "extradition" of Goni and attacking the U.S. for unjustly harboring a fugitive from Bolivian justice. (These actions were probably meant as much to cover his flanks over possible accusations that he had been "bought off" by the U.S. as out of genuine conviction, which he happens to possess in this case.) ¶5. (C) Given Llorenti's interests and ideological proclivities, it is tempting to read this reported appointment as an anti-U.S. signal. According to this more cynical interpretation, it is as though the Bolivian government wished to make the thorny Goni problem, on which we will necessarily disagree, the focal point of bilateral relations -- a fine way to guarantee conflict from the start. But basic bungling by a rookie government cannot be ruled out. In their January 25 meeting, Vice President Alvaro LA PAZ 00000196 002 OF 002 Garcia told U.S. congressional staffers that the future Bolivian Ambassador (without mentioning any names) would enjoy the confidence of the Bolivian government while also being accepted as a credible interlocutor by the U.S. (Llorenti has a U.S. visa after all). Garcia's statement, said in apparent good faith, suggests a limited understanding of an Ambassador's role, and near total ignorance of the realities likely to confront a Bolivian Ambassador in the U.S. on that (narrow) kind of mission. ¶6. (C) That the public announcement concerning Llorenti was made before the government had sought 'agrement' from us, and apparently without the knowledge of new Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca, suggests the misstep had an important protocol dimension as well. Early January 26, Choquehuanca called to seek the Ambassador's counsel. Openly acknowledging his ignorance of diplomatic protocol, Choquehuanca (who, after his January 23 swearing-in, said that Bolivian diplomats would need to be able to speak either Aymara or Quechua) asked the Ambassador how he should proceed to obtain the needed approval (agrement) from our side -- a telling indicator of his uncertain footing in his own ministry. GREENLEE