MAS HAS STRONG ADVANTAGE ENTERING THE CONSTITUENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 001322 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL SOCI BL SUBJECT: MAS HAS STRONG ADVANTAGE ENTERING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY CAMPAIGN REF: A. LA PAZ 01317 ¶B. LA PAZ 01254 ¶C. LA PAZ 01265 Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David Robinson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Evo Morales and his Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party will launch their campaign for the 2 July Constituent Assembly election on May 26 riding a wave of popular support for the President's hydrocarbons nationalization decree. The MAS remains the most powerful party nationwide, and Morales, aided by massive media coverage, by far the most prominent political figure. The MAS is well-positioned to compete in every district in western Bolivia, and our contacts say the MAS has built a network of allies among sympathetic smaller political groups in many districts to compete for the delegate awarded to the runner-up. On the other hand, the MAS could be hurt by competition from indigenous and center-left parties in some districts, by declining middle class support in others, and by weakness in the east. (Reftel) Overall, most observers at this stage believe the MAS may win a solid majority of delegates, but fall short of the two-thirds, or 170 delegates, needed to control the Assembly. END SUMMARY. The Dominant Political Force -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As campaigning begins for the July Constituent Assembly election, President Morales and the MAS are riding a wave of euphoria over hydrocarbons nationalization, and are positioned to win a solid majority of Assembly delegates. Observers note that Morales and his party dominate the current political scene with control of Congress, high approval numbers, and the only articulated national agenda. While the opposition struggles to revive existing leaders or to find new leadership, Morales is the clear and popular leader of the MAS government. Our contacts also say the MAS has a sizeable funding advantage and allege that the party is using control of state resources to bolster its campaign. The press reports that the MAS is feeding its coffers further with funds from supporters holding public office--mandatory "donations" ranging from 5 to 30 percent of their salaries. ¶3. (SBU) Broad press coverage of the government has reinforced MAS dominance. Bolivian print and television news media--particularly the main La Paz-based outlets--focus their political coverage almost exclusively on the activities of the President and his top officials, with little room for opposition activities apart from strikes threatened by political and civic leaders in Santa Cruz. One academic contact told poloff that he measured 25 television references to the MAS for every reference to the opposition. Not all the MAS press coverage is positive, but local analysts believe that the constant drumbeat favors the MAS. ¶4. (SBU) Congressional election results from last December also suggest that the MAS will dominate the July election. MAS candidates won 39 of 44 districts in La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Chuquisaca by an average margin of over 30 percent, and won 14 of these districts by more than 40 percent. By contrast, the MAS lost the other five districts by an average of only five percent, suggesting the MAS is competitive in all districts in these departments this time around. In the opposition-dominated eastern lowland "half moon" ("media luna") the MAS won an additional 5 of 26 districts because the non-MAS vote split between several parties. Building Alliances to Win Extra Delegates -------------- - ¶5. (SBU) The MAS has reportedly worked to bolster its Assembly delegate count by forming electoral alliances with smaller parties in districts where the MAS dominates in an effort to win both first and second place. This strategy could allow them to secure the two delegates given to the LA PAZ 00001322 002 OF 002 winner in each district, as well as the delegate reserved for the runner-up. Hugo Moldiz, a key MAS organizer, told the press the "alliance tactic" will allow the MAS to take advantage of its strongholds and offset the electoral rules, which he describes as "too flexible" and generous to the opposition. ¶6. (SBU) The MAS alliance strategy could pay off in various districts in western Bolivia where the MAS won by wide margins. Local contacts say the MAS formed a key alliance with the Bolivian Liberation Movement (MBL),which is running candidates in Chuquisaca and several other MAS-leaning departments. MAS alliances could also perform well in Cochabamba (particularly the Chapare coca-growing region) as well as La Paz (particularly El Alto, the Altiplano, and the Yungas) where the MAS won nine districts by over 50 percent. But Still Difficult to Reach Two-Thirds -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The MAS's continued weakness in the "media luna" is the party's biggest hurdle in its effort to win two-thirds of the Assembly delegates. The party has also alienated various social groups with its autocratic style (ref C),which could open opportunities for center-left and indigenous parties not linked to the MAS to capture a number of delegates. In Potosi, the popular indigenous mayor Rene Joaquino is running a slate of candidates that he told poloff would give the MAS strong competition in key districts in that department. In La Paz, the head of the indigenous party Ayra told poloff he has several candidates that could win second place in districts in El Alto and the Altiplano. The Ayra leader said he formed an alliance with the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (MIP),a long-time MAS rival that won second place in six Altiplano districts last December. ¶8. (SBU) The MAS could also be hurt by a decline in middle class support. Local analysts say middle class support for Morales last December helped his party win several congressional districts--including the wealthy residential neighborhoods of La Paz--and contributed to his large margin of victory. Some analysts argue, however, that the middle class may vote against the MAS in the Assembly elections to prevent Morales from accumulating too much power. If some middle class voters turn from Morales, the MAS could face strong competition in several wealthier districts where the opposition is running popular candidates, such as Miraflores and the Zona Sur in La Paz. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: The MAS has a clear advantage entering campaign season for the Constituent Assembly election and is well positioned to win a majority of delegates, enough to control the direction and tenor of the Assembly. But it may have difficulty winning the two-thirds of the delegates necessary to change the constitution unopposed. Although not the MAS's ideal scenario, the party may still get what it wants--some analysts argue the MAS could employ a divide-and-conquer strategy against the fractured opposition by cutting deals with separate parties on separate issues to ensure passage of its proposals. END COMMENT. ROBINSON