SENIOR BAYELSA OFFICIAL SEES MILITANTS AS A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000701 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS DOE FOR DAS JBRODMAN AND CGAY COMMERCE FOR KBURRESS STATE FOR S/CT MTHOMPSON AND JWEBSTER STATE FOR AF/EX, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/MSG, DS/IP/OPO, DS/IP/FPO, DS/ICI/PII, DS/ICI/CR, DS/DSS, DS/IP/ITA, DS/OSAC, CA/EX E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV EPET PINS PTER NI SUBJECT: SENIOR BAYELSA OFFICIAL SEES MILITANTS AS A POLITICAL FORCE Classified By: BRIAN L. BROWNE, CONSUL GENERAL, REASON 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a series of April 28-29 discussions with the Consul General, Bayelsa State Secretary of State Government, Dr. Godknows Igali, described militant activity in the Delta region as an inchoate "civil insurrection" that promised to expand. He emphasized the Ijaw militants responsible for the January and February Amcit kidnappings were motivated more by perceived political and economic marginalization of their ethnic group than by monetary gain. He confessed the militants enjoyed the support of the vast majority of Ijaws. While the militants' tactics were radical, their demands were actually moderate in comparison to those of the hard-line Ijaw politicians. Nonetheless, Igali feared the GON would be dismissive of the militants and their demands. The SSG forecasted additional large-scale disruption of oil production if the militant demands are ignored by the GON. End Summary. -------------- REBELLION IN THE MAKING -------------- ¶2. (U) In a series of late April talks with the Consul General, Bayelsa SSG Godknows Igali depicted the Delta crisis as one with multiple causes but made clear the primary factor was not criminality but rather the feeling of ethnic marginalization among the Ijaw people. Chronic economic underdevelopment mixed with political underrepresentation to generate widespread dissatisfaction. According to the SSG, Ijaws are the country's fourth largest ethnic group and have significant populations in most of Nigeria's coastal states. Because of their number and the fact that most on-shore oil production takes place on Ijaw land, they believe the trio of ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) that have dominated the Nigerian political economy should become a quartet, with Ijaws comprising the new entry. ¶3. (C) The truth of the matter was that Ijaws were woefully marginalized, Igali's asserted. In most coastal states, Ijaws are a significant minority but are virtually shutout of state electoral politics and the lucrative patronage which ensues. This has caused Ijaws in these states to become radicalized to the point of advocating the creation of two new states - with majority Ijaw populations - or even the establishment of a separate Ijaw republic. For now, Ijaws in the other states see Bayelsa as their political home base. As if to underscore the Ijaws plight, the SSG noted that Bayelsa is the only state in Nigeria not linked to the national electrical grid. -------------- MORE THAN BUNKERERS: MEND -------------- ¶4. (C) During the hostage crises and afterward, Igali visited the camps of the hostage-takers several times, he continued. Those who tried to reduce Ekpomupolo and his kith to a mere band of criminals were sorely mistaken, Igali asserted. He claimed Ekpomupolo sincerely saw himself as a champion of the Ijaw cause. Igali sought to distinguish the group's activity from crass bunkering. He explained the group was not a bunkering outfit albeit they indirectly profited from bunkering by charging a toll of at least 100,000 Naira per bunker's barge that passed through the creeks they controlled. Ekpomupolo rationalized he was merely exacting a tax for allowing non-indigenes to take oil that rightfully belonged to the Ijaws. Based on this rationale, Ekpomupolo did not differentiate between bunkerers and the oil companies who took the oil from the Ijaws in the first instance. However, the most telling aspect of this operation was Ekpomupolo did not form his group to make money LAGOS 00000701 002 OF 003 but was making money in order to support his group, Igali maintained. ¶5. (C) The militant's camp had become a sort of Ijaw Mecca, Igali declared. Politicians, retired and active Ijaws in the Nigerian military, and Ijaw intellectuals regularly visited the camp, offering advice and assistance and seeking to gain influence and control over Ekpomupolo. Igali contended on one visit he saw approximately 1000 fighters mustered, most uniformed, all armed and all being trained with the assistance of Ijaw officers in the Nigerian Army. The militants cut a swath that extends beyond the Delta, Igali contended. An Ijaw resident in South Africa was actively procuring weapons for the group. Additionally, for the past two-three years, the militants have also been moving up and down the Gulf of Guinea confiscating weapons, boats and uniforms from the Nigerian military as well as the Cameroonian and Gabonese navies. ¶6. (C) For now, the militants were quiescent and did not want to strike. In fact, Igali argued, the second hostage crises would not have occurred but for the military's attack on locations near the militant camp in Delta State. The attack was not an accident and was ordered at the highest level of the military -- probably the President, Igali confided. The militants realized this and thus seized the hostages as protection against further attacks. The militants were now in a waiting mode, looking to see if Obasanjo's Commission on the Delta would produce results or be another failure in a long line of now moribund commissions established to address the problem in the Delta. ¶7. (C) While the militants were willing to forgo any disruptive action for the time being, they would adamantly oppose oil company or GON attempts to repair pipelines damaged in February. The militants saw the diminution in oil production and electricity generation caused by their attacks as their most effective leverage on the GON. They would not forfeit that leverage without the GON giving something in return. If repair were attempted, the militants would resume their attacks against the oil facilities, Igali warned. ¶8. (C) While radical in his tactics, Ekpomupolo was moderate in his demands, contended Igali. Ekpomupolo actually had withstood pressure from hard-line Ijaw politicians, particularly those from Ondo and Edo states, who wanted the militants to continue to attack oil facilities and not give the GON a respite. These politicians wanted to press the GON to create two new, predominately Ijaw states and they saw the militants as the most likely vehicle to achieve this objective. However, Ekpomupolo has focused his demands on economic development, i.e. various large-scale public works projects and educational/job skills centers. The release of militant leader Dokubo Asari, currently in jail for treason, was also an important demand. Although he gained notoriety before Ekpomupolo, Asari previously had been dependent on Ekpomupolo for both weapons and manpower. Ekpomupolo said he would make sure Asari behaved if the latter were released in his custody, said Igali. -------------- GON MISREADS THE SITUATION -------------- ¶9. (C) The SSG complained a major obstacle to resolving the situation was the GON's (read President Obasanjo's) inability to accept the underlying socio-economic causes of Ijaw dissatisfaction and the militant attacks. Despite his public rhetoric, Obasanjo still saw this as criminality, not a form of protest. The SSG also feared the Nigerian army, stung by the militants' successes, wanted revenge and might try to LAGOS 00000701 003 OF 003 disperse the militants by military force. ¶10. (C) The SSG himself believed an important factor in resolving the conflict was providing meaningful employment and skill training to youths in the region, particularly members of Ekpomupolo's group. The government could mollify the fighters by providing them alternative opportunities to make a living. These training projects could center on public works and traditional economic opportunities in the regional, such as aquaculture. Igali repeatedly entreated for USG assistance. The CG responded Nigeria had sufficient funds to address the problem, provided the funds were deployed properly. Thus, Nigeria should not expect external financial assistance to solve the problem in the Delta. However, the USG might be willing to marry technical expertise with Nigeria's funds to help bring meaningful development to the Delta. The CG added the GON needed to formulate a detailed, comprehensive strategy for economic development, this included lessons learned elsewhere in demobilizing and reintegrating fighters into mainstream society. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Ekpomupolo's group is waiting and watching for the time being. Yet, they will not remain passive indefinitely. There are pressures, internal and external, that will lead them to act if something is not forthcoming from the GON. Among the pressures are the exhortations of Ijaw politicians and radical "intellectuals" who want to use the militants to advance their more ambitious political agendas. For now, the militants appear capable of withstanding the intra-Ijaw political pressure. However, the GON's slowness in showing some genuine change in the Delta will also test the militants' patience. Additionally, Obasanjo's preoccupation with the defeat of his third term agenda and the political enervation the defeat entails portends that Obasanjo may have neither the power nor the will to devote what is needed to give the Delta Commission a reasonable chance to succeed. ¶12. (C) Secretary Igali is caught in the middle of this. Initially sent to Bayelsa as Obasanjo's man among the Ijaws, Igali seems to have imperceptibly changed his role to being the Ijaw's man in Obasanjo's employ. He currently enjoys access and a degree of trust from both sides. Thus, he will have a major role to play in whether Obasanjo will pay sufficient attention and devote the necessary resources to this problem. However, if he takes one awkward step, Igali could quickly forfeit the confidence of both sides. He must dance fast but with finesse. As with most things, the buck ultimately stops at Obasanjo's desk. If he ignores it, the militants likely will return to their disruptive vocation in the not-to-distant future. BROWNE