Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAGOS1227
2006-09-26 15:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lagos
Cable title:  

FORMER PRESIDENT SEES OBASANJO CLINGING TO POWER

Tags:  PREL PGOV NI 
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VZCZCXRO0795
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHOS #1227/01 2691537
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261537Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7953
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 7847
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001227 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT SEES OBASANJO CLINGING TO POWER


Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for Reason 1.4 (D).

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001227 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W STATE FOR INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV NI SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT SEES OBASANJO CLINGING TO POWER Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for Reason 1.4 (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an early September discussion with the Consul General, former head of state Abdulsalam Abubakar gauged President Obasanjo as unwilling to leave office. Abudulsalam criticized Obasanjo for stoking the North-South political rivalry to sow confusion so that he can remain in office past the appointed time. Abudulsalam attributed part of Obasanjo's reticence to a psychological dread of being jailed by an adversarial successor. Abudulsalam plans to enlist an ECOWAS council of elders to encourage Obasanjo to step down gracefully. Abudulsalam also stated he might ask UN Secretary General Annan to create a special position for SIPDIS Obasanjo as the UN Peacekeeping/Conflict Resolution guru for Africa. End summary. -------------- OBASANJO PLAYS THE ETHNIC CARD -------------- ¶2. (C) During a September 6 meeting with the Consul General, former head of state Abdulsalam Abubakar expressed fear that Obasanjo's ambitions and his combative approach toward realizing this aim had aggravated centrifugal ethnic and regional forces that could sunder Nigeria. Abdulsalam blamed Obasanjo for fomenting these tensions to keep his opponents divided and to purposefully cloud the political scene in hopes of taking advantage of the resultant hugger mugger to find a way to remain in office. ¶3. (C) Abudulsalam complained that conversing with Obasanjo about his political plans had become an ungratifyingly mendacious affair. Regarding the third term debate, Obasanjo shamelessly swore to Abdulsalam he had nothing to do with the campaign and that he steadfastly would obey the constitution. Abdulsalam was stunned that someone whom he helped into the presidency would swear to something that both people in the discussion knew to be a lie or so close to a lie as to be indistinguishable from one. ¶4. (C) At a subsequent meeting, Abdulsalam beseeched Obasanjo to still the ongoing tremors in the Nigerian political system by consulting with other leading figures to identify a successor. Abdulsalam bridled, recounting that Obasanjo's response was to dissemble that he had no interest in who would succeed him. The candida
te the party picked, he would back, Obasanjo proffered. Abdulsalam riposted that he knew Obasanjo was not nearly as disinterested as he avowed. Then Abdulsalam said he tried an appeal to Obasanjo based on their long-standing relationship as former generals. Abdulsalam pleaded with Obasanjo that they had known each other too long and had been together at key moments in Nigerian history for Obasanjo to deflect Abdulsalam's concerns with remarks that were obviously untrue. As a sitting President in an African nation, of course you have a role and interest in picking your successor, Abdulsalam told Obasanjo. He said Obasanjo only looked at him icily, abruptly ending the meeting. This was several months ago. The two have not since spoken. ¶5. (C) Abdulsalam pointed out to the Consul General that the North was more agitated than it has been in a long time. He feared that should Obasanjo devote himself to some contrivance to remain in office or pick a Southern successor, that the North would react vehemently. Abdulsalam said Obasanjo was miscalculating the severity of the opposition against him. Should Obasanjo be guilty of a further miscalculation by trying to control the electoral process, the North's reaction would be so strong as to imperil the unity of Nigeria, Abdulsalam predicted. -------------- ENCOURAGING THE PRESIDENT TO LEAVE -------------- ¶6. (C) Abdulsalam feels that key to Obasanjo's reluctance is his fear of being irrelevant after 2007 and his psychological dread of returning to jail. Therefore, it is imperative to extinguish these fears before irreparable harm is done. Abdulsalam, a member of the ECOWAS group of eminent persons, planned to suggest that the group visit Nigeria to dissuade Obasanjo from tenure elongation or any other misstep. ¶7. (C) Further towards assuring Obasanjo a continued role on center stage after his presidency, Abdulsalam said during his LAGOS 00001227 002.2 OF 002 visit to the General Assembly he would likely raise with Secretary General Kofi Annan the possibility of carving out a SIPDIS special UN-AU position for Obasanjo as a sort of "world emissary" on peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa. Another thought was to form an eminent persons group in Nigeria to ask Obasanjo to step down in order to take over leadership of this Nigerian group. In this group, all former and current presidents and vice-presidents would participate, serving as elder statesmen to guide the new generation of politicians. By joining this group, each member would thus have a gracious way of shelving their presidential ambitions and defusing the rivalries between them that served to unsettle the nation. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Abdulsalam was surprisingly downcast about the prospects for upheaval should Obasanjo seeks to prolong his stay in office. Coming from such a well-placed figure known more for his economy of language than his extravagance thereof, his warnings are strong barometers of the degree of frustration and anger to which many of Obasanjo's former allies in the North now view his government and administration. What Abdulsalam didn't say, is that there are endless strings of around-the-clock meetings among Obasanjo's opponents on how to counteract what they believe is an imminent ploy to keep Obasanjo in power beyond 2007. End comment. BROWNE

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