DAMACHI: OBASANJO FAVORS ODILI, TURNS UP THE HEAT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI
SUBJECT: DAMACHI: OBASANJO FAVORS ODILI, TURNS UP THE HEAT
ON ATIKU & IBB


Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) On September 7 Professor Ukande Damachi, long-time
advisor to Former Military President Ibrahim Babangida (IBB)
and an established Mission contact, told the Consul General
that President Obasanjo was intent on garroting Babangida,s
presidential ambitions but Babangida was adamant about
running. According to Damachi, Obasanjo was angling toward
Rivers State Governor Odili as his successor. Furthermore,
Damachi attributed recent EFCC investigations into
Babangida's son's finances to the President's belief that
Babangida, and to a lesser extent Vice President Atiku,
choreographed the demise of the third term amendment.
Damachi also reported that Obasanjo's publication of the EFCC
report on Atiku was precipitated by the desire to have Atiku
out of the way before the party convention in December. END
SUMMARY.

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OBASANJO SHOWS IBB, ATIKU THE MAILED FIST
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2. (C) Damachi stated the rift between Ibrahim Babangida and
President Obasanjo was nigh irreparable. While Obasanjo and
Babangida had danced a subtle minuet since 2003 around
Babangida's presidential aspirations and Obasanjo's support
thereof, the failed third term amendment attempt transformed
this tricky posturing into a street brawl, Damachi exclaimed.
According to Damachi, Obasanjo was convinced Babangida used
his vast fortune to bribe National Assembly members,
torpedoing Obasanjo's third term desire. Reverting back to a
military mindset, Obasanjo saw this as a stark betrayal by an
officer less senior, maintained Damachi. Babangida's
apparent duplicity in regularly meeting Obasanjo yet
sandbagging his third term offensive enraged Obasanjo,
Damachi believed. Thus, Obasanjo has set out to reciprocate
-- to destroy Babangida's presidential ambitions.


3. (C) Knowing that Obasanjo was seething and wounded after
the third term defeat, Damachi advised IBB to mend the breach
by visiting Obasanjo, declaring his intentions for the
presidency, promising to continue Obasanjo's programs, and
seeking the latter's support. The meeting was arranged, but,
in hindsight, it was one Damachi wished never occurred.
Obasanjo was like stone throughout the session, then when
Babangida declared his intention to run, Obasanjo flew into a
rage, then storming out of the room, revealed Damachi.
Mutual friends intervened. Weeks later, the two met again.
The result was less combustive but leagues away from the
cordiality of the past. Two days after this second session,
Mohammad Babangida, IBB's eldest son, was detained by the
EFCC. It was NOW Babangida,s turn to be incensed, Damachi
recounted. Babangida took Mohammad,s arrest as a personal
affront and a public humiliation, asserted Damachi. By this
act, Obasanjo has crossed the Rubicon in Babangida,s mind,
Damachi stressed.


4. (S) In response to Obasanjo's actions, Babangida convened
a council of his most trusted allies -- several retired
generals -- to discuss President Obasanjo,s insult. As this
meeting began, General John Shagaya assailed Babangida for
ignoring his warning about Obasanjo in 1999 when Babangida
literally engineered Obasanjo's successful presidential bid.
Shagaya said he warned Babangida that Obasanjo was a
malevolent ingrate who would turn on Babangida but Babangida
discarded the warning, expressing confidence in Obasanjo's
fidelity. After that initial exchange, the generals settled
down to discuss next steps. Afterwards, the vocal Shagaya
captured the spirit of the session, stating "We've been
ambushed, and when ambushed, you do not retreat, you push
forward." Damachi claimed the military allusion was more
than a general using the terminology of his trade.
Babangida's coterie may be inching closer to the point of
considering the tried and true method of removing an
unpopular leader in Nigeria. If Obasanjo pushes much harder,
these generals may plan a coup, Damachi forecasted.


5. (C) Regarding Obasanjo's recent publication of the EFCC
report against Vice President Atiku, Damachi said his sources
within Obasanjo's camp told him Obasanjo wanted to move
decisively against Atiku to make the Vice President a virtual

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non-factor before the PDP national convention in early
December. Obasanjo had gotten wind of Atiku's plan to
undermine the convention by seeking to nominate weak
candidates for important posts, then leave the PDP in a
disheveled state while seeking the nomination of another
party. Thus, Obasanjo decided to launch a pre-emptive strike
against Atiku to relegate him Vice President to the PDP
sidelines and scatter Atiku's his allies prior to the PDP
confabulation.

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IF NO THIRD TERM OR EXTENSION, ODILI MIGHT DO
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6. (C) Despite the third term defeat, Obasanjo still pined
to remain in office after May 29, 2007, argued Damachi.
Obasanjo could resurface the third term amendment in
November, Damachi suggested. By successfully containing
Babangida and Atiku, Obasanjo would have neutralized the
third term,s two most formidable opponents. Also, Obasanjo
has more leverage over National Assembly members than he did
in May. With party primaries and conventions around the
corner, the legislators will be preoccupied with their own
futures. To retain their party nomination, PDP lawmakers
will need Obasanjo's imprimatur. If he seeks to table to
third term again, he will almost assuredly draw a linkage
between their support for his stay in office with his support
for theirs, predicted Damachi.


7. (C) If another term is not in the cards, Damachi believes
Governor Odili of Rivers State will be Obasanjo's choice as a
successor. First Odili has cultivated Obasanjo for years.
Odili also reportedly siphons off a nice chunk of his
State,s monthly pecuniary allotment to give to Obasanjo,
claimed Damachi.


8. (C) Damachi also finds Odili well positioned regionally
and ethnically. As a south-south candidate, Odili only has
two rivals, Governor Attah of Akwa Ibom and Donald Duke of
Cross River, who can be convinced to stand aside, thought
Damachi. The plan would be for Obasanjo to tell Attah -- he
apparently is the new owner of one of the best hotels in
Barbados -- and to offer Duke the Nigerian Embassy in
Washington as Duke's wife is an ardent Amero-phile who does
not like living in Nigeria. Moreover, Odili can exploit his
Igbo roots to gain support in the south-east. Thus, being an
Igbo governor of a south-south state, Odili is the only
governor with strong organic connections to two of the three
southern political zones. In order to make a presidential
candidate from the south palatable to northerners, Damachi
thought Obasanjo would support the Governor of Kaduna State
for vice president. However, Damachi theorized that should
Obasanjo throw his support to Odili, Babangida, Atiku, and
other northerners would ally against Obasanjo,s decision and
this would greatly exacerbate the north-south political
divide.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Damachi epitomizes the Nigerian political survivor.
On one hand, he is Babangida's long time advisor. But he is
also getting close to Governor Odili. The cagey Damachi can
do this by telling both masters that his good relations in
each camp is their best protection should the other man win.
No one can accuse President Obasanjo of such
prestidigitation. His decisive moves concerning Atiku and
Babangida are subject to but one interpretation: he opposes
their presidential bids. Damachi may well be right that the
die has been cast. If so and no rapprochement is possible,
then Nigeria is in for tumult as these three mammoths and
several other lesser titans vie for the ultimate political
prize. END COMMENT.
BROWNE