ANAMBRA STATE GOVERNOR LOSING CONTROL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001083 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W STATE FOR INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV NI SUBJECT: ANAMBRA STATE GOVERNOR LOSING CONTROL REF: A)ABUJA 1960 B)LAGOS 873 Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for Reasons 1.4 (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Despite the fanfare surrounding his three year judicial battle to claim the seat he won in the 2003 gubernatorial election, Anambra State Governor Peter Obi's brief tenure has been marred by instability and violence (reftels). The apparent triumph of justice over power has faded as violence continues to erupt between militias and groups sponsored by Obi's rivals. The sole All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) governor, Obi is in no-man's land, politically. He carried a reformist mantle but does not have the political power to achieve his aims. Security in the State is controlled in Abuja, where Obi's foeman in the People's Democratic Party (PDP),namely Chris Uba, have much more clout than he. Uba wants the 2007 election and will actively undermine Obi's administration. Obi's predicament brings into full relief the travails of an opposition reformist who does not have the means to fight the disruptive, often criminal plans of rivals in the ruling party. End summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Peter Obi has an impressive resume. He served as Chairman of Fidelity Bank, and attended several advanced management courses in leading universities including Columbia, Harvard, and London School of Economics. The All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) Party candidate was sworn in as Anambra State Governor on March 17, 2006 after a three year court battle to capture the seat taken from him by significant PDP vote rigging in 2003. Anambrans hoped he would usher in a new day for their troubled State. However, his brief stint, thus far, has been characterized by a downward surge toward violent disorder. -------------- Obi Lacks Organizational Structure -------------- ¶3. (C) Many of Governor Obi's wounds result from his naivet in bucking Anambra State's political power structure. Obi made the fundamental mistake of assuming, once in power, his opponents would allow him to govern peacefully. He also erred in thinking he could, as governor, develop his own agenda and do what he wanted instead of doing what he must, which initially would have been to rein in their thugs. Obi thought he would be treated as undisputed leader in the State, not realizing that such an enviable position was only reserved for those governors who also control the formal and informal security mechanisms in their states. As an opposition governor with scant organizational structure, Obi was woefully short of that description. (Comment: Obi's party APGA is an ensign for Igbo political identification, and thus the average voter in Anambra voted for APGA -- not necessarily for Obi -- more often than not in 2003. However, APGA is not a strong political party organizationally. Although Obi won the election because of the electorate's ethnic identification within the Party, he lacked the political structure to convert that victory into day-to-day control of the State. End comment.) ¶4. (C) Coming into office, Obi was swiftly wedged between Scylla and Charybdis. On one hand, there stood former governor Chris Ngige and his informal security apparatus. On the other hand, loomed PDP strongman Chris Uba, his goons and his strong ties to the Presidency. Additionally, Uba had his gaze on the 2007 gubernatorial election to install himself or his brother in the seat that Obi newly occupied. -------------- Obi Chooses Principle Over Pragmatism; Suffers the Consequences of His Choice -------------- ¶5. (C) Obi was faced with a choice between acting as a pragmatist or acting on principle. A pragmatist would have aligned with Chris Ngige as the lesser of two evils to keep Chris Uba from further political encroachment in the State. Basing his decision on principle, Obi decided to oppose both Ngige and Uba and to end the State's subvention of both their militias. ¶6. (C) However, such an expression of principle divorced from the possession and exercise of power needed to enforce this decision, proved quixotic and counterproductive. Obi had no LAGOS 00001083 002 OF 002 security force to contain Ngige's and Uba's miscreants. Given Uba's influence in Abuja, the Nigerian police force turned a blind eye to Uba's criminality in the State. His men have acted with impunity. Consequently, they have kept the State on the edge of chaos with their violent activity. Obi has been reduced to verbal protests and the announcement of curfews which remain at the will and whim of the police to enforce. Obi has appeared exceptionally ineffective in containing disorder in Anambra. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) With basically one year to serve as governor, Obi tried to forge a new path in Anambra but was impractical in his approach. Obi thought by virtue of occupying the overnor's seat, he could wish away his adversaries and their militias. He failed to realize these other actors are not constrained by his notions of propriety and that they see the contest for control of the State as a street fight, not one governed by the rule of law. Obi is now in a predicament. It is uncertain whether he can extricate himself and his political future. Obi's travails warn of the difficulties an opposition political figure faces in trying to reform the existing political power structure at the state level. End comment. BROWNE