UKRAINE: CONFRONTATION AND COMPROMISE--A TALE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 004681 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: CONFRONTATION AND COMPROMISE--A TALE OF TWO VIKTORS REF: A. KYIV 4133 ¶B. KYIV 4478 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Two years after the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko's election victory and almost five months into the prime ministership that has marked Yanukovych's triumphant return to the political center stage, the relationship between the two Viktors is rocky and full of mistrust. Although several long one-on-one meetings resulted in settling (albeit sometimes only temporarily) immediate points of conflict, the two Viktors have yet to come up with any other way to address and resolve issues. The conflict between the two is based on badly worded and imprecise constitutional reforms that have created a dual executive and fueled by personality differences--Yanukovych pushing aggressively to gain the advantage and Yushchenko's indecisiveness and preference for compromise repeatedly backing him into a corner. Yanukovych has sought to marginalize the President's powers this fall. Yushchenko has fallen back on his final levers of power, the veto and threats to rework constitutional reform or call new Rada elections. Both sides continue to tell us that they would like to ease tensions and begin to work together productively. Events in the past week indicate that they have made some compromises, but antagonistic actions by members of their teams, a general lack of trust, and a personal dislike will make this process slow and arduous at best. End summary and comment. Two Years of Handshakes and Backstabbing -------------- ¶2. (C) In December 2004, after it was clear that there would be a new presidential election, Yanukovych offered his hand to Yushchenko, the opponent he had just tried to defraud, and said that in the future, one Viktor would be President and the other Prime Minister. Given the circumstances, Yushchenko rejected reconciliation and moved forward with an Orange Government. However, in September 2005, in the wake of scandals and the dismissal of the Tymoshenko Cabinet, Yushchenko turned to Yanukovych and his Party of Regions to strike a deal. Regions agreed to support Yuriy Yekhanurov as Prime Minister in exchange for presidential amnesty for almost everyone who participated in the 2004 election fraud. ¶3. (C) In the wake of the March 2006 Rada elections, Yushchenko obsessed about whether to cooperate with his Orange partners or with Regions in forming the first government under the new political system. At one point he observed to us that both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko were deeply flawed. Regions was clear that it wanted an orange-blue team and on June 20 Our Ukraine and Regions initialed a coalition agreement. Yushchenko immediately changed his mind and renewed talks with Tymoshenko, leaving Regions to woo Moroz and the Socialists with power and money to form the Anti-Crisis Coalition, who took office in early August. Although Regions leaders continue to indicate to us that they still prefer a coalition that includes Yushchenko and Our Ukraine, they have also demonstrated their intention to not be reliant on the indecisive President and to not put themselves in a position where they could lose power again. One story that a Rada MP from Tymoshenko's bloc related to us had Yanukovych in Belarus after the CIS summit in late November saying, "We are here to stay. We will never lose power again." Personalities Defined the Struggle -------------- ¶4. The poorly-worded, ambiguous political reforms may have opened the door to the current struggle for power, but it has been the difference in style of the Yanukovych and Yushchenko teams that has really led to the imbalance and hostility. Yushchenko is confrontation-averse, postpones a search for solutions until the last moment, then looks for compromise. He has brought in a new team at the Presidential Secretariat this fall that is more conversant in Regions' rough style of politics, but his reluctance to take on the Prime Minister's team directly has put him in a weakened position. In contrast, Yanukovych and his advisers have aggressively looked for ways to redefine power in their favor, particularly by proposing provocative legislation that chips away at Yushchenko's authority and challenges his role (reftel A). Rifts -------------- ¶5. (C) Nowhere has the fight between Viktors been more public KYIV 00004681 002 OF 004 and acrimonious than over foreign policy and Foreign Minister Tarasyuk himself. According to the amended constitution, foreign policy remains largely a presidential prerogative and the President nominates the Foreign Minister (although the nomination is confirmed by the Rada). Yanukovych first stepped gently over the line in September when he flew to Brussels and announced a NATO policy without clearing it with the President's office that would include cooperation, but also a "pause" in Ukraine's search for membership for the time being. There then ensued a struggle over whether the President had authority to approve the Cabinet's foreign travel agenda, talking points, and public statements. Regions finally leaped clearly over the line on December 1 when its Rada majority voted to dismiss Tarasyuk. Yushchenko publicly said that Tarasyuk is his man (reftel B). The Yanukovych side refused to let Tarasyuk attend Cabinet meetings on December 6 and 20--the later turning into a shoving match between Regions MPs stationed in front of the door and OU MPs who came to push their way into the meeting--and no longer views any documents he signs as valid. This fight over power and foreign policy was also behind the eleventh hour attempt by the Presidential Secretariat to cancel Yanukovych's trip to Washington at the beginning of December because the Cabinet had not cleared the PM's briefing papers with Yushchenko. ¶6. (C) The fighting has spanned all areas of competency and subject matter. The Rada majority removed Interior Minister Lutsenko, a member of Yushchenko's team, tried to remove Defense Minister Hrytsenko, and has tabled a resolution to remove Prosecutor General Mevedko--the latter two are presidential appointments, according to the constitution. Regions has been trying to remove regional appointees that Yushchenko has the right to name. The Cabinet also demanded the right to countersign presidential decrees. Backed into a corner, Yushchenko vetoed the Rada's first try at a budget. ¶7. (C) Regions has periodically since the summer tabled legislation meant to antagonize and threaten Yushchenko. The most recent example are two bills introduced December 15 and 18 that would restore the Central Election Commission to the composition that declared Yanukovych the winner of the 2004 presidential election. After Yanukovych made vague conciliatory remarks about Tarasyuk, on December 26 First Deputy Prime Minister Azarov said publicly that Tarasyuk was not Foreign Minister anymore. The remarks followed the decision by Regions Deputy Leonid Kozhara to introduce a resolution to officially name First Deputy Foreign Minister Oryzkho as Acting FM. The CabMin also filed four lawsuits against Yushchenko in December, claiming that he was issuing illegitimate decrees and not making decisions when he should be. ¶8. (C) Perhaps to reassert his authority, Yushchenko issued a decree on December 4 that said he had the right to approve all appointments in ministries associated with national security; he then used the decree to try to cancel the CabMin's approval of new Interior Minister Tsushko's nominations for his deputies. The case, like so many others this year, is now before the Constitutional Court, which eventually will need to weigh in to settle at least the institutional disputes between President and Prime Minister. Reconciliation Sought? -------------- ¶9. (C) In the past two weeks, members of the Yanukovych team have reiterated their commitment to seeking accommodation with Yushchenko. On December 15, MP Raisa Bohatyreva, the coordinator of the Rada coalition and the Regions faction leader, told the Ambassador that the "non-radical" part of Regions was concerned that lack of cooperation with President Yushchenko and Our Ukraine was destructive for the country. She said that while it is true that the entourages around the two principals stir up a lot of the conflict, the level of antagonism between the two Viktors also had grown significantly. There was a tit for tat scenario at work affecting a wide range of unrelated issues: the CabMin made appointments that the President didn't like (a reference to new Minister of Emergencies Nestor Shufrych),so Yushchenko vetoed the budget, so the Rada refused to dismiss Drizhchaniy, and so on. Yanukovych,s Chief of Staff Lyovochkin told the Ambassador on December 20 that they were trying to find means of communication and cooperation, but problems in the relationship should not be solved at the Viktor-Viktor level. Instead, he proposed that the main line of communication for all problem-solving should be between himself and Presidential Secretariat Chief Baloha. (Note: In a December 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Yatsenyuk denied that Lyovochkin had a special channel to Baloha, arguing that KYIV 00004681 003 OF 004 Baloha's counterpart was the PM himself. End Note.) ¶10. (C) At a press conference on December 28, Presidential Secretariat Head Baloha, his deputies Yatsenyuk and Chaliy, SIPDIS and NSDC Secretary Haiduk expressed a willingness to work with the Cabinet but laid down markers of where the President's powers lie. Baloha said that the new policy is "competition, compromise, and consolidation" and said the ability to compromise is a sign of strength. However, the team also underscored that Yanukovych is head of the government, but Yushchenko is the head of state, which gave him a broader and higher mandate. They announced Yushchenko will veto the law on the Cabinet of Ministers submitted by the CabMin unless they incorporate his changes. He will also issue a decree that will make it clear he, not the CabMin, is in charge of the appointments of regional officials. Yatsenyuk echoed this theme to the Ambassador December 29. The two Viktors will never like each other and there is still conflict, but Yushchenko is ready to cooperate, albeit on his terms. The choice between conflict and cooperation lies with the Prime Minister. He added that the Viktor-Viktor meetings are only productive when Yushchenko holds a trump card. If Yushchenko seems weak, Regions just ignores him, he concluded. This observation could explain why Yushchenko's threat to veto the budget a second time produced results. ¶11. (SBU) Another concern, which was recently highlighted in the respected Dzerkalo Tyzhnya newspaper, may be that both the Yanukovych and Yushchenko teams are aware of what the squabbling looks like both at home and abroad. Key players on both sides are starting to worry that the squabbling is hurting their efforts to promote an image of Ukraine as a western-style democracy with a functioning and pragmatic government. Although it is difficult to judge whether polls here are valid, both the PM and the President have lost public support and in general, public disillusionment with Ukrainian politics and politicians is growing. Particularly telling are the low marks that Yushchenko has been getting from the public on trust -- a sharp turn-around from public perceptions throughout his two years in office. Baby Steps of Progress -------------- ¶12. (C) Thus far only face-to-face meetings between the two Viktors seem to have paid off with any kind of results. Observers credit the six-hour November 14 meeting between the two with postponing a Rada vote to remove both FM Tarasyuk and Defense Minister Hrytsenko (although in Tarasyuk's case, the agreement was only temporary). Yushchenko and Yanukovych also met, along with the coalition leaders, on December 15; Lyovochkin told the Ambassador this was the first time they had all met together since August. Lyovochkin said the meeting went well and they were working on finding a solution to the Tarasyuk question, but that outstanding problems remained. These included the governor of Sumy, whom Yushchenko fired but Regions was trying to protest; the Rada's refusal to confirm Yushchenko's dismissal SBU Chief Drizhchaniy; and agreement on the budget, which Bohatyreva had said was the main reason for the meeting. However, given the complexities of coalition politics here, it is unlikely that Yanukovych would have had the political leeway to cut deals with Yushchenko on any of these issues in front of his socialist and communist allies. ¶13. (C) The two Viktors met again on December 21, on the eve of the Putin visit to Kyiv. While we have little direct information on what was agreed, there seems to have been some progress and resolution of several of the most immediate problems between the two. Yushchenko signed the budget on December 22, even though the Rada had re-passed it without incorporating all of the President's requested changes. The same day, the Rada approved his request to increase the living wage and minimum wage beginning in April 2007, albeit as a (presumably less binding) resolution, rather than as a part of the budget law. Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat Yatsenyuk told the Ambassador on December 29 that SIPDIS they viewed the resolution of the budget conflict as a victory for Yushchenko. ¶14. (C) In Yatsenyuk's view, the Rada's agreement to dismiss Drizhchaniy, per Yushchenko's request, was part of the deal. Yushchenko also got his way in Sumy--Regions dropped their protests about his replacing the former governor. Most journalists and some politicians have linked the budget signing and the Drizhchaniy dismissal as a quid pro quo agreed on by the two Viktors at the December 21 meeting. The postponement of the Tarasyuk question may also have been included in the deal--Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat Chaliy and the Prime Minister's foreign policy SIPDIS advisor Gryshchenko both told the Ambassador after the KYIV 00004681 004 OF 004 meeting that the Tarasyuk issue had been put off for now, due to "timing issues," possibly also related to Putin's visit. In Chaliy's view, tensions between the two leaders had decreased. Yatsenyuk and Chaliy also told the Ambassador that progress had been made on the issue of how to agree on the appointments of regional officials. ¶15. (C) Comment: With no meetings between the PM and President on the schedule and two weeks of New Year and Christmas holidays ahead, we anticipate no surprise announcements in the near future. However, discussions will continue behind the scenes as both sides seek to find a way to make cohabitation work to their advantage. ¶16. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor