UKRAINE: TARASYUK ON COORDINATING FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 004175

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TARASYUK ON COORDINATING FOREIGN POLICY
IN UKRAINE, OUR UKRAINE'S INDECISION

REF: A. KYIV 4155

B. 05 KIEV 5100

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. A tired FM Borys Tarasyuk saw Ambassador
late October 31 after returning from Estonia and Finland. He
diagrammed the current players in Ukrainian foreign policy
formulation, stating that his role as the fulcrum was to
prevent encroachment by PM Yanukovych's team onto
Presidential prerogative. On domestic politics, Tarasyuk,
who is also party leader of Rukh and board member on the Our
Ukraine (OU) bloc political council, said that Yushchenko's
party People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) was still wracked by
internal crisis. On foreign policy, he reiterated Ukraine's
commitment to a settlement in Transnistria but also his fears
that Russia would use Kosovo independence as a precedent for
frozen conflicts, regardless of the U.S. line that there
should be no precedent. Looking forward to the planned visit
by PM Yanukovych to the U.S. in early Qcember, Tarasyuk made
a pitch for us to push Yanukovych to make positive actions
prior to the visit, rather than allowing him a free pass.


2. (C) Comment: Tarasyuk's comments offer fascinating
insights into current dynamics in policy making and politics,
but they also demonstrate how much slippage there has been
for Yushchenko's team in the past three months since
Yanukovych became Premier. Four OU-affiliated ministers
resigned in late October, with two being replaced November 1
(ref A). While Yanukovych told the Rada November 1 that
Tarasyuk and Interior Minister would remain in place based on
his understanding with Yushchenko, the Regions-led Rada
majority passed a resolution November 2 to investigate
Lutsenko and call for his temporary suspension, followed by a
November 3 resolution obliging Tarasyuk and Defense Minister
Hrytsenko to present a report on their performance November

14. Yanukovych warned Ambassador November 2 that if
Yushchenko did not cooperate, he could see his other
appointments replaced in the near future (septel). The steady
ramp up in pressure and steady replacement of Yushchenko's
ministers was predicted by most observers in early August
when Yushchenko consented to appoint Yanukovych PM with a
hybrid Cabinet but neglected to secure a new coalition
agreement between Regions and Our Ukraine prior to the August
vacation. At the time, most observers suggested Tarasyuk
would be the first of the holdover orange ministers to go.
For now, he remains. End Summary and Comment.

Diagramming Ukrainian Foreign Policy Makers
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3. (C) In a throwback to pre-Orange Revolution practices,
Tarasyuk drew a diagram to represent figures and pointed to
the boxes avoid mentioning names (note: in a one-on-one
meeting in his Ministerial office. End note). He placed
Yushchenko as President in the upper left corner and
Yanukovych as PM in the upper right; he was in the middle a
level down, with lines drawn to both. Deputy Presidential
Secretariat head Chaliy fell further on the left under

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Yushchenko, with four circles for the advisers (Hryshchenko,
Zlenko, Orel, and Fialko) under Yanukovych. Tarasyuk noted
that the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) should
play a coordinating role for foreign policy, but it was not
doing so yet (note: new NSDC Secretary Haiduk has indicated
he will make energy security his main priority).


4. (C) Using the diagram, Tarasyuk stated that he formally
answered to both Yushchenko and Yanukovych, but ultimately
his role was to protect Presidential constitutional
prerogative in foreign policy formation from encroachment
from the PM's team. Chaly, who had served as Tarasyuk's
First DFM for European Integration from 1997-2000 before
embracing a "neutrality" strategy the past two years, was now
"back on board" with Yushchenko,s vision of
Euro/Euro-Atlantic Integration, according to Tarasyuk.
Tarasyuk was pleased that ex-FM Hryshchenko had been
designated as his primary PM office POC; Hryshchenko had
worked for him on arms control (from 1997-98),and they
maintained decent relations (note: Tarasyuk's relations with
the other three PM advisers, most notably Orel, are much
worse. Both PM Chief of Staff Lyovochkin and Hryshchenko
himself have told Ambassador that Hryshchenko is the primary
PM foreign policy adviser. End note).

Transnistria, Kosovo, WTO
--------------


5. (C) Hryshchenko,s floated proposal to raise the GOU,s
profile on tackling Transnistria by having Yanukovych name
DPM Kluyev or Zlenko (another ex-FM) as lead was a "bad
idea," said Tarasyuk. Apart from Presidential prerogative,

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"our clear intent is to reach a settlement," and there would
be better chances with a Presidential lead than via the
PM/Cabinet of Ministers. Tarasyuk repeated the standard
Ukrainian "Moldova is hard to help" line, mentioning
Moldova,s raising the freight rates after Tiraspol's
self-blockade led to trains taking a more circuitous route.
Tarasyuk endorsed the enhanced EU involvement along the
border (EUBAM) as a net plus, noting he wished it could be
expanded to Ukraine's northern/eastern border (i.e., with
Russia).


6. (C) Hewing to the line he had maintained since December
2005 (ref B),Tarasyuk characterized the U.S. line that
Kosovo independence would not be a precedent for frozen
conflicts such as Transnistria as weak, "because the Russians
will use it as a precedent regardless." Ukraine wanted to
achieve a negotiated settlement on Transnistria, but Kosovo
independence would undermine that effort.


7. (C) Tarasyuk agreed with Ambassador that the handling of
the estimated 21 pieces of WTO-required legislation would
serve as the first serious indicator of a European direction
for the Regions-led government and parliamentary majority
(note: Septel reports that on November 2 and 3, the Rada
overwhelmingly passed two of these drafts in the second
reading, and a further eight in the first reading.). While
he felt that there should be no Ukrainian synchronization
with Russian entry, he did not dismiss worries that it might
happen, claiming PM Yanukovych's comment that Ukraine's
accession could be considered by the WTO in February
indicated a willingness to let the previous end of year
deadline slip. (Note: many, including Presidential
Secretariat Deputy Chief Yatsenyuk and former Finance

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Minister Pynzenyk, have speculated the GOU is deliberately
slow rolling WTO action at Russia's request in exchange for
securing lower natural gas prices for the upcoming winter
season.)

OU still in crisis, Yushchenko still dithering
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8. (C) While noting that his travels meant that he was not up
to date on the latest developments, Tarasyuk confirmed that
Yushchenko's PUOU party remained in internal crisis, claiming
the old split between "Petro (Poroshenko) and Roman
(Bezsmertny)" continued to play out. A second lingering
issue remained whether Yushchenko would take an active
leadership role of the party. Tarasyuk suggested that
Yushchenko and Yanukovych were to meet early Nov. 1 to
discuss whether a coalition was still possible or not.
Tarasyuk,s Rukh party (one of six in the OU bloc) was
adamantly against going into coalition with the Socialists
and Communists, but wanted Tarasyuk to stay as FM.


9. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor