Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KYIV4138
2006-10-30 15:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: OUR UKRAINE HAMPERED BY DISORGANIZATION

Tags:  PGOV PREL UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4182
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #4138/01 3031549
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301549Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0214
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 004138 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: OUR UKRAINE HAMPERED BY DISORGANIZATION
AND INFIGHTING

REF: A. KIEV 3919

B. KYIV 4133

C. KIEV 3570

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 004138

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: OUR UKRAINE HAMPERED BY DISORGANIZATION
AND INFIGHTING

REF: A. KIEV 3919

B. KYIV 4133

C. KIEV 3570

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary: President Yushchenko has begun to respond to
attempts by the Yanukovych/Regions team to tip the balance of
power in its favor. He has brought in a more professional
senior team to the Presidential Secretariat and taken steps
to counter policies he does not support. However, the
uncertain future of Yushchenko's political force,
particularly the People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) party, and
continued disagreements between the President and Our Ukraine
leaders over whether to cooperate with Yanukovych in a broad
coalition or go into opposition have undermined and
distracted the presidential team. Yushchenko's own
indecisiveness, including whether to be an active party
leader rather than a nonpartisan president, simply compounds
this problem, which was on too evident display October 21 at
a truncated party congress, suspended after Yushchenko's
opening speech left party leaders uncertain how to proceed.


2. (C) Comment: The October 21 party congress would have been
a good time for Yushchenko to exert some leadership over the
future direction of his political force, or at least give the
party's executive council advance warning of his speech so
that they could have tried to work out the disagreements
before the congress. Instead, he left after giving his
speech, missing the chaos and disgruntled constituents that
were caught on camera. Yanukovych's Regions has been
persistent and organized in its campaign to nudge the nascent
post-constitutional reform political system in its favor; so
far, Our Ukraine has done little to effectively counter this
dynamic. That First Deputy Presidential Secretariat head
Yatsenyuk is now being pushed into the party
leadership--Bezsmertniy announced on October 24 that
Yatsenyuk would run the working group to develop policy ideas
before the resumed congress--even though he is not even fully
registered yet as a party member, suggests that Yushchenko is
looking for new party leaders who will more effectively
support his point of view. End summary and comment.

Gearing for "War"...
--------------


3. (C) Yushchenko has strengthened his team in the last five
months, appointing competent professionals over party
loyalists and close friends. These appointments include
Vitaliy Haiduk at the NSDC, Viktor Baloha, Arseniy Yatsenyuk,
Viktor Bondar, and Oleksandr Chaliy at the Presidential
Secretariat, and Oleksandr Zinchenko as a presidential

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adviser (reftel A). At the same time, Yushchenko removed a
number of his "dear friends" (advisors seen by many as
corrupt) from his roster of advisers.


4. (C) In an October 17 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy
Head of the Presidential Secretariat Yatsenyuk likened the
situation between the President and Prime Minister to a cold
war arms race, each side equipping themselves with an arsenal
of high level advisers. Yatsenyuk added that Yanukovych's
people think the PM is the number one person in the country,
but he (Yatsenyuk) planned to convince them they were wrong.
During an Oct. 18 meeting with Congressional staff members,
Oleksandr Sytnyk, the head of the Our Ukraine Rada faction
secretariat, used the same military phrasing--that Our

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Ukraine had "an arsenal of weapons" to use against Regions.


5. (SBU) After a long period of silence in August and early
September, Yushchenko also began to criticize the Cabinet
when it diverged from agreed-upon policies or encroached on
his constitutionally-prescribed powers. For example, after
complaining that the Yanukovych government was dragging out
Rada consideration of WTO legislation, Yushchenko introduced
WTO legislation on his own on October 19. He also threatened
to veto the 2007 budget if the Cabinet and Regions-led Rada
majority did not prepare a well-balanced one. Yushchenko
responded quickly (and negatively) to Yanukovych's September
14 speech at NATO, in which Yanukovych said Ukraine was not
ready for a Membership Action Plan (MAP),a stated goal of
Yushchenko's (ref C). Yushchenko blocked an attempt by the
Cabinet to insert a Regions' nominee as the head of state
arms exporter UkrSpetsExport and may have helped Defense
Minister Hrytsenko block another Regions attempt to replace
the head of the MOD's department in charge of real estate
(ref B).

...But Suffering from Organizational Distress
--------------


6. (SBU) However, the prematurely truncated PUOU annual party

KYIV 00004138 002 OF 003


congress October 21 underscored everything that seems to be
wrong with Yushchenko's team right now. Disorganization,
lack of communication and leadership, and last-minute
waffling torpedoed the session. Yushchenko kicked off the
congress with a speech in which he acknowledged that the
party was in crisis and needed a shake-up in leadership;
dispelling recent rumors that he would abandon PUOU for a new
political force to be formed, he reiterated that PUOU would
remain his party base. Yushchenko suggested that the
congress might function better in two segments--the first
with working groups to develop policy and the second for
taking decisions. Party leader Roman Bezsmertniy then stood
up and dismissed the congress, calling for it to reconvene in
three weeks. The party hall erupted into boos and calls of
"shame, shame."


7. (SBU) As had happened at a similar critical party
congress in November 2005, Yushchenko departed after
delivering his speech, missing the subsequent dynamics (in
this case, the booing). The party delegates, many of whom
had traveled from all over Ukraine to be there, began to
chant for Mykola Katerynchuk to speak. Katerynchuk, who is
stridently opposed to any deal with Yanukovych and advocates
rebuilding the party from the grass roots with Yushchenko as
an active party leader, finally got up and calmed the crowd.
Afterwards, party staffers and Katerynchuk himself told us
that the decision to postpone the congress was a complete
surprise. Some speculated that it was a sign of the ongoing
debate within the party over whether to go into opposition.
Others suggested that it reflected a power struggle for
control over the party between Katerynchuk and brand-new
party member Yatsenyuk.

Katerynchuk: Force for Reform within OU
--------------


8. (SBU) Katerynchuk suggested to us October 27 that the
congress postponement was a result of Yushchenko's
frustration with the party's lack of focus on delivering on
campaign promises. He acknowledged that there were still
differences of opinion over whether to cooperate with Regions
or go into opposition, but added that the OU faction in the
Rada already decided on opposition regardless of how the
party decided. Katerynchuk's vision for the party was to
become a center-right opposition party with a
well-articulated, pro-European agenda and Yushchenko as an
active party leader. He said that he recently visited 15
western and central oblasts and that while Tymoshenko was
picking up supporters, the bulk of people were searching for
leadership or a party they could support. Katerynchuk
acknowledged that his is the minority view of the party's
future and Yushchenko's role, but he argued that it is the
only way to avoid ceding leadership of the opposition to
Tymoshenko. Katerynchuk also said he had no problem with
Yatsenyuk moving into a leadership role, because Yushchenko
needs a reliable manager running the party.


9. (C) Note: Katerynchuk is a young, charismatic politician.
He spoke with passion for his ideas of a functional Our
Ukraine. He has been a vocal advocate of reform both within
Our Ukraine and in the country in general, and is outspoken
in his opposition to cooperation with Regions. Political
insiders continue to speculate as to when Katerynchuk will
become fed up with Our Ukraine's internal politics and form
his own party. When the disappointed party congress
attendees chanted his name, he could have seized the
opportunity to increase his personal standing. Instead, both
at the congress and at the subsequent meeting with us he
appeared steadfastly loyal to Yushchenko as the leader of his
party.

Yushchenko's Personality Plays a Role
--------------


10. (C) Comment: Yushchenko's aversion to confrontation may
be contributing to his desire to continue negotiations with
Regions at a time when his party has decided to go into
opposition. Since his time as Prime Minister under Kuchma
(1999-2001),Yushchenko has expressed the view that it is
better to work within the existing political system than to
fight. Baloha echoed this philosophy to the Ambassador on
October 17, saying that "a weak peace is better than a good
war." Political observers whom we have talked to, however,
have criticized Yushchenko since August for not standing up
to Yanukovych when their policy views diverged.


11. (C) A proxy indicator of Yushchenko's intentions
vis-a-vis Yanukovych is the possibility of revisiting
constitutional reform. Several of the authors of the
December 8, 2004 compromise, including former Rada Speaker
Lytvyn and former Rada MP and Medvedchuk ally Nestor

KYIV 00004138 003 OF 003


Shufrych, have said that there are sufficient grounds for the
Constitutional Court to undo the reforms based on procedural
violations. For now, however, Yushchenko seems to still hope
that gentlemanly agreements with Yanukovych will be
sufficient to hold the current balance of power intact and
allow them to cooperate on policymaking, despite the robust
institutional jostling in evidence since August.


12. (U) Visit Embassy KYIV's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor