KUWAIT'S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003071 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC, INR/EC, DS/ITA, NEA/ARP FOR JACKSON LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016 TAGS: PREL KCIP KU PTER EPET SUBJECT: KUWAIT'S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY REF: A. STATE 110159 ¶B. KUWAIT 4400 Classified By: CDA Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On July 10, 19, and 23, EconOff met with lead security officials from Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC),Kuwait Oil Company (KOC),and Oil Sector Services Company (OSSC). EconOff conveyed the USG desire to help Kuwait to secure its critical energy infrastructure and requested an overview of security conditions and activities at key sites in accordance with Ref A. All three officials expressed their appreciation for the USG offer to assist, but said that further security assessments were not their most pressing need. The GOK and Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC) have received numerous assessments and recommendations from private-sector security contractors. Kuwaiti security officials emphasized that security at critical sites had become a clear priority receiving close attention from the highest levels of KPC, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Interior. They cited significant enhancements that had been implemented in recent months, especially at the critical Mina Al-Ahmadi facilities. These included improved access control systems, installation of additional surveillance equipment, and extension and reinforcement of perimeter fencing. All three officials said the problems of greatest concern are now vulnerability to attack from the sea and poor dissemination of relevant, actionable intelligence from the ministerial level down to the working level. The officials from KOC and OSSC specifically asked if the USG could use its influence with the GOK to facilitate improvements in these areas. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) Comment: The rejection by these KPC officials of USG offers of assessments and recommendations did not seem to indicate intransigence or a fear of scrutiny. All three officials seemed open in their responses and eager to cooperate in moving forward. They showed an excellent command of the key issues of concern and although EconOff met with each official separately, their comments were remarkably consistent. Maritime security and information sharing clearly represent their areas of greatest concern and frustration. End Comment. GOK Acting on Recommendations from Previous Assessments -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) EconOff met separately with KNPC Security Manager Fahad Al-Dihani, KOC Security Manager Mohammed Al-Fodari, and OSSC Deputy Chairman Ali Ahmed Al-Obaid on July 10, 19, and 23 respectively to discuss the points provided in ref A. (Note: All three of these companies are subsidiaries of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC). KNPC is responsible for refining and marketing in Kuwait and manages the Mina Al-Ahmadi facilities; KOC is responsible for exploration and production; OSSC has overall responsibility for security across Kuwait's oil sector. End note.) All three security chiefs expressed thanks for the offer of assistance and said that in recent months significant progress has been made in enhancing physical security of key infrastructure, especially the Mina Al-Ahmadi location identified in Refs A and B as a critical energy facility. Recent enhancements directly respond to gaps identified in independent security assessments conducted by British, American, and Australian private-sector security contractors, including Global Village Strategies and AustroConsult. Enhancements include construction of triple-layered perimeter fencing, extension of perimeter fencing 100 meters into the sea, expanded buffer zones between installations and adjacent private and/or public property, installation of CCTV cameras and motion detectors, a much-improved badging and access system, establishment of detailed emergency response plans, creation of a centralized security control center, increased patrolling, and an improved training and qualifications system for oil sector security personnel. EconOff toured the Al-Ahmadi perimeter and saw firsthand that a number of previous deficiencies identified in ref B had been corrected. KUWAIT 00003071 002 OF 003 Overall, security officials said that coordination among all the relevant parties was still insufficient but improving significantly. Stronger Progress and Coordination Driven from the Top -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) All three KPC security officials expressed appreciation for the USG offer to assist with security assessments but said that recent assessments conducted by private-sector security contractors already provided a clear and comprehensive picture of security deficiencies as well as prioritized recommendations to address these deficiencies. All were confident that KPC was making progress in implementing the necessary solutions but said the gradual reassignment of overarching oil sector security responsibilities to OSSC was proceeding slowly. (Note: OSSC was only established in August 2005 to assume overall security responsibility for all of the KPC subsidiaries. End note.) During the transition to full OSSC control, security improvements are principally being driven by the Vital Oil Installations Group (VOIG),headed by the Director General of Kuwait State Security and comprised of representatives from various GOK ministries and KPC. The VOIG reports to the Council of Ministers on the security of oil infrastructure. The KPC security officials said the VOIG had been highly effective in forcing cooperation among government entities and overcoming political obstacles to the implementation of security enhancements. However, they emphasized that the Kuwait Coast Guard was the one key stakeholder that had not been adequately brought into the process. ¶5. (S/NF) Security officials recognized that there is still much room for improvement in physical security, but said that they now had much greater confidence than they did a year ago that efforts to enhance security had been rationalized and that the momentum for improvement was being driven from the top down. They cited high-level involvement of the Ministries of Interior and Energy in addition to the senior leadership of KPC. KPC's training institute is now graduating 100-150 security personnel every three months with specific training in oil sector security. KPC security recognized that large portions of the Kuwaiti oil sector remain relatively vulnerable including pipelines, gathering centers, tank farms, terminals, and offshore facilities. However, they noted that critical, non-redundant facilities, for which terrorist attacks could cause the greatest supply disruption, were properly being addressed first. Greatest Weaknesses: Maritime Interdiction, Intel Sharing -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) According to these security officials, the most significant gaps in security are now vulnerability to attack from the sea and inadequate dissemination of relevant intelligence and threat information. They suggested that the USG could be most helpful by sharing intelligence and threat information with KPC directly or by using its influence with the GOK to improve the flow of relevant intelligence from the Ministerial level to the working level. All three also said the problem with maritime security was not surveillance and detection, but enforcement and interdiction. They said the installation of radar and sonar systems and the establishment of a maritime exclusion zone allow security personnel to recognize potential seaborne threats but the Coast Guard fails to provide a ready and robust capability to intercept and/or neutralize these threats once they are identified. Deputy Director Al-Obaid of OSSC suggested this could be remedied by having the MOI establish a corps of Oil Sector Marine Security personnel who would be seconded to KPC for training, management, and operational control. (Note: The Deputy Director has not yet forwarded this proposal through official channels. End note.) Maritime security responsibilities currently rest with the Kuwait Coast Guard which, according to KPC, lacks the resources, the capability, and the will to play an effective role. KUWAIT 00003071 003 OF 003 ******************************************** For more Embassy Kuwait reporting, see: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Or Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ******************************************** TUELLER