FREEDOM AGENDA AND THE KUWAITI SUCCESSION:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000285 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, NSC FOR ABRAMS AND RAMCHAND, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KU SUCCESSION FREEDOM AGENDA SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA AND THE KUWAITI SUCCESSION: SOMETHING TO CHEER ABOUT REF: KUWAIT 259 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) The Freedom Agenda took a step forward this week as Kuwait's parliament played a vital role in the constitutional removal of one Amir and the appointment, scheduled for confirmation on January 29, of another. In the flurry of commentary about the Hamas electoral gains, the significance of this constitutional, Parliament-driven change in leadership in Kuwait has escaped broad international notice. This triumph for democracy, albeit modest, was univerally welcomed in Kuwait and should be duly recognized by the USG. ¶2. (C) When internal ruling family negotiations over leadership broke down, Kuwaitis turned to their constitution and National Assembly to resolve the dispute, setting a precedent for greater parliamentary involvement in decision-making that is likely to have a lasting impact within Kuwait and possibly beyond. Kuwaiti media and commentators, proud of their constitution and National Assembly, have been trumpeting the vitality of their democratic institutions, tending to gloss over the very traditional central role played by the ruling family. Arguably, the Sabah family role was reaffirmed by the manner in which the succession took place. Nonetheless, Parliament's role illustrates that functioning checks and balances and respect for rule of law can thrive within the conservative Arab heartland. ¶3. (C) At a lunch hosted by the Ambassador on January 28, a group of very politically engaged Kuwaitis were unanimous on at least one point: the succession, because it was done transparently (with loads of press coverage) and in accordance with the constitution, was legitimate. The diverse group included female activist Rola Dashti, advisor to the Prime Minister Yousef al-Ibrahim, wealthy investor Faisal Mutawa, university administrator Moudhi al-Hamoud, political science professor Nada al-Mutawa, economist Amer Tamimi, and GCC political consultant Abdullah Bishara. The group held differing views on next steps, but all agreed that the National Assembly had been central to the process and would remain relevant no matter what direction the country took. Several mentioned the pride they felt in having had a voice in selecting the Amir through the elected members of the National Assembly. ¶4. (C) Starting what proceeded to be a relatively transparent process, the ruling Sabah family met on January 20 to engage in the traditional closed process of achieving an internal consensus on succession. That was an important step in making Shaykh Sabah the Amir, but it was not the final word. When the family failed to reach consensus, the majority, which supported Shaykh Sabah, had no choices but to follow constitutional and legal procedures to remove Shaykh Saad from his position and transfer authority to Sabah. It was not always this way. When faced with opposition in 1976 and 1986, the Amir disbanded Parliament by extra-constitutional means and the government ruled by Amiri decree. Such an act would be unacceptable today. The ruling family proved willing to rely on constitutional and parliamentary procedures, even if that meant surrendering exclusive control of the succession process. ¶5. (C) On January 25th, local papers publishing the news of the deposition of Shaykh Saad and the nomination of Shaykh Sabah as Amir by the Council of Ministers, gave equal prominence to photos of two figures on their front pages. One was Shaykh Sabah, the other was Speaker of the National Assembly Jassem Khorafi. It is hard to imagine Shaykh Sabah, an Amir whose authority now so clearly derives from constitutional procedures and parliamentary approval, acting in a way that undermines those institutions. Exactly how this will affect his approach to political and economic reform will be the subject of further analysis after a new prime minister is named and a cabinet is formed. But for now, we are on safe ground is saying that an established system of constitutional division of power and rule of law has been shown to serve the needs of the people of Kuwait well. The Freedom Agenda took a significant step forward this month in Kuwait. ¶6. (C) From media coverage elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula, it appears that Kuwait's successful democratic resolution of the succession crisis has attracted attention. Kuwait's neighbors followed the succession machinations closely, likely with an eye on implications for their own KUWAIT 00000285 002 OF 002 ruling regimes. Some GCC commentators have drawn unfavorable comparisons with their own countries' practices, concluding that there are lessons to be learned from the Kuwaiti experience. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website ********************************************* LeBaron