Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT2394
2006-06-19 14:31:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

FREEDOM AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS IN

pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3493
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKU #2394/01 1701431
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191431Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5279
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002394 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL KU FREEDOM AGENDA ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS IN
KUWAITI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REF: A. KUWAIT 2271 - THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY
FRIEND: SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO
REFORM UNITES POLITICAL OPPOSITES

B. KUWAIT 2150 - FREEDOM AGENDA: GRASSROOTS REFORM
MOVEMENT BLOSSOMS IN KUWAIT'S ORANGE
MOVEMENT

C. KUWAIT 2148 - FREEDOM AGENDA AND JUNE 29
ELECTIONS: PROGRESS ON REFORM DEFINED BY
PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVISM

D. KUWAIT 1638 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART II

E. KUWAIT 1637 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART I

F. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE
VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN
AT "AMERICAN DIWANIYA"

G. 05 KUWAIT 4993 - FREEDOM AGENDA: NOW SHOWING AT
EMBASSY KUWAIT: USING FILM TO PROMOTE
DEMOCRATIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew H. Tueller
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002394 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL KU FREEDOM AGENDA ISLAMISTS SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS IN KUWAITI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REF: A. KUWAIT 2271 - THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND: SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO REFORM UNITES POLITICAL OPPOSITES ¶B. KUWAIT 2150 - FREEDOM AGENDA: GRASSROOTS REFORM MOVEMENT BLOSSOMS IN KUWAIT'S ORANGE MOVEMENT ¶C. KUWAIT 2148 - FREEDOM AGENDA AND JUNE 29 ELECTIONS: PROGRESS ON REFORM DEFINED BY PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVISM ¶D. KUWAIT 1638 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART II ¶E. KUWAIT 1637 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART I ¶F. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN AT "AMERICAN DIWANIYA" ¶G. 05 KUWAIT 4993 - FREEDOM AGENDA: NOW SHOWING AT EMBASSY KUWAIT: USING FILM TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew H. Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: There is a strong possibility that the Kuwaiti Parliament elected on June 29 will include more Islamist members than the previous one. Islamists are well-organized and poised to capitalize on the women's vote. While there are legitimate concerns about the impact this would have on U.S. interests, a more Islamist Parliament should not be viewed as a major setback for our Freedom Agenda. First, Islamists are unlikely to gain a majority in Parliament (33 seats),without which they will be unable to advance their conservative social agenda. With its 16 Ministers and strong bloc of pro-Government MPs, the Government will still be able to control what legislation is approved by Parliament. Second, although they generally cooperate in Parliament and during elections, Kuwaiti Islamists are not a monolithic bloc. Even if more Islamist MPs are elected, there are important differences between Islamist groups in Kuwait; some are far less hostile to U.S. interests than others. Third, the election of more Islamist MPs could increase the chance for political reform in Kuwait. Islamists in the now dissolved Parliament strongly supported electoral
reform and are likely to continue pushing for a reduction to five constituencies in the next Parliament. Without Islamist support, this and other important political reforms have little chance of being implemented. End summary. Increase in Islamist MPs Likely -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) There are several reasons to believe that there will be more Islamist members in the next Parliament. First, Islamists are poised to benefit most from the participation of women in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Islamists are well-organized and enjoy the support of a strong, conservative base whose female members are likely to vote for male Islamist candidates. Second, Islamist MPs in the previous Parliament were quick to join liberal MPs in supporting electoral reform. Islamist candidates are likely to capitalize on their support for reform to attract more moderate voters (ref A). Third, regional events have contributed to a growing conservatism in Kuwaiti society, leading some Kuwaitis to support Islamist candidates whom they believe will protect Kuwait's conservative culture. Finally, the short campaign period benefits Islamists who are better organized and better funded than other political groups. ¶3. (S/NF) According to Post's rough estimate, out of the 96 candidates who have a good chance of being elected to the 50 open seats, 41 are Islamists or supported by Islamists, including two Shi'a Islamist candidates; 40 are Government-leaning; 8 are liberal; and 7 are independents. (Note: There were 15 Sunni Islamist MPs in the recently-dissolved Parliament. End note.) Although there are differences between Islamist candidates, Islamist groups are pooling their resources in an effort to increase overall Islamist representation in Parliament. The 56 candidates believed to genuinely support political reform include all 41 of the Islamists from our short-list of strongest candidates. The Spectrum of Islamists in Kuwait -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Though they often cooperate in Parliament and KUWAIT 00002394 002 OF 003 during elections, Kuwaiti Islamists are not a monolithic bloc. There is a great degree of variety between Kuwait's different Islamist groups, whose political ideologies range from pragmatic and open, to extremist and vehemently anti-American. (Note: For a brief overview of Kuwait's Islamist, Shi'a, and liberal political blocs, see our classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/. End note.) The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM),the political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, is one of the most vocal advocates of political reform in Kuwait and strongly supported recent proposals to reduce the number of electoral constituencies, seen as crucial to limiting electoral corruption (refs D and E). The two ICM MPs in the recently-dissolved Parliament also set a precedent in January by disclosing their financial records, an example no other MP followed. Other Islamist groups, like the Salafi Movement and the Ummah (Nation's) Party, similarly support political reform, which they believe will increase their political influence. In the previous Parliament, Islamist MPs cooperated through the 14-member Islamic Bloc, which showed some signs of division earlier in the year. ¶5. (S/NF) The main difference between Kuwaiti Islamist groups is in how pragmatic they are in pursuing their objectives and the degree of animosity they have against the West. Salafis are generally uncompromising in their policies and strongly anti-American or anti-Western in their rhetoric, though in private meetings some can be friendly and engaging while differing with U.S. policies. The ICM, on the other hand, is extremely pragmatic and, while critical of U.S. policies, supportive of a dialogue with the U.S. on regional issues. Despite their criticisms, few Kuwaiti Islamists actively advocate the departure of U.S. troops from Kuwait or Iraq. Indeed, Kuwaiti Islamists often have to justify their toleration, and even support, for the extensive U.S. presence in the country to their regional counterparts. In addition, many tribal candidates with conservative leanings are supported by Islamist groups, but are ultimately beholden to their tribes rather than a pan-Islamist ideology. When analyzing the results of the elections, therefore, a distinction should be made between the Islamist MPs elected: the election of more Salafis could be seen as a setback for our freedom agenda, whereas the election of more pragmatic Islamists, like ICM members, would be less worrisome to U.S. security and strategic interests. Issues of Concern -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The one issue almost all Kuwaiti Islamists agree on is the need to fully "Islamize" Kuwaiti legislation by amending Article 2 of the constitution to make Islamic Shari'a "the source of legislation," rather than "a main source." In order to amend the constitution, however, Islamists would need the support of 44 out of the 65 members of Parliament. With the Government controlling 16 of these seats, obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority would be practically impossible. (Note: The Prime Minister is required to appoint one elected MP as a Minister, meaning there are always 49 elected MPs and 16 Government Ministers, who serve as ex officio MPs, in Parliament. End note.) In addition, the Amir retains the right to exercise his constitutional right to dissolve Parliament and call new elections if the Islamists push this issue, which is unlikely. ¶7. (S/NF) The greater concern is that Islamist MPs would push a conservative social agenda and/or block important legislation, like the $500 million pledged by the Kuwaiti government to aid victims of hurricane Katrina. Islamist MPs could also obstruct passage of a U.S.-Kuwait free trade agreement that included a provision requiring Kuwait to end its economic boycott of Israel. In addition, Islamists might advocate increasing Kuwaiti assistance to the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority, revising Kuwait's educational curricula to bring it more in line with their conservative values, or introduce other legislation inimical to U.S. interests. One must keep in mind, however, that Islamists are unlikely to win a majority in Parliament (33 seats) and that the Government is still likely to have a clear majority capable of blocking conservative social legislation and passing legislation it supports. It is also important to note that Kuwaiti parliamentarians have an extremely limited ability to shape foreign policy, which is considered the sole purview of the Government. If anything, the Islamists are likely to be just a vocal opposition, but not a real threat to the Government. No Political Reform Without Islamists -------------- KUWAIT 00002394 003 OF 003 ¶8. (S/NF) Ironically, the election of more Islamist MPs could increase the chance for political reform in Kuwait. All 14 members of the Islamic Bloc in the previous Parliament were also part of the 29 MP "orange" bloc whose insistence on grilling the Prime Minister unless the Government adopted five constituencies led the Amir to dissolve Parliament. Since the number of liberal and truly independent MPs is likely to remain unchanged or even decline, the greatest chance for the number of pro-reform MPs to increase is for more Islamist candidates to be elected. This explains some liberals' support for Islamists despite their ideological differences (ref A). On the other hand, some liberal contacts question Islamists' sincerity (ref C),arguing that Islamists' support for political reform is based purely on the calculation that it will increase their political power. Unfortunately, this may be true; but without Islamist support, these reforms are not likely to be implemented in the first place. Next Steps -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Post will continue to attend the election diwaniyas of candidates from all political backgrounds, paying close attention to the rhetoric and support of Islamist candidates and noting any significant differences between them. We will also continue to seek constructive ways to engage Islamists through events like American diwaniyas (ref F) and movie nights (ref G),as well as occasionally nominating moderate Islamists for IVP or MEPI-funded programs focusing on political reform, as suggested in post's report on the ICM (refs D and E). In reporting on the influence of Islamists in Kuwait, we will focus on analyzing both the similarities and differences between Kuwaiti Islamist groups, the alliances that emerge between them, and any potential threats to U.S. interests that emerge from their increased representation in Parliament. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * TUELLER

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -