STRATEGIC INVESTMENT INITIATIVE: THE CURRENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000167 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR D, C, EB AND NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2016 TAGS: EAID EFIN PREL KU SUBJECT: STRATEGIC INVESTMENT INITIATIVE: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY IN KUWAIT REF: A. 05 KUWAIT 3585 ¶B. 05 KUWAIT 3850 ¶C. 05 KUWAIT 4318 ¶D. 05 KUWAIT 4459 ¶E. 05 KUWAIT 4624 ¶F. 05 KUWAIT 4980 ¶G. 05 KUWAIT 5063 ¶H. KUWAIT 87 Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) The GOK's initial reaction to the Strategic Investment Initiative (SII) proposal has been positive but guarded. SII was introduced by Secretary Rice at the recent Forum for the Future conference in Bahrain; A/S Wayne and Treasury DAS Ahmed Saeed briefed GOK and Kuwaiti aid officials during their follow-up work in Kuwait on January 7, ¶2006. Kuwaiti officials are receptive to, and agree with, the USG view that financial investment will bolster the region's stability and is crucial. However, the GOK views the four proposed beneficiaries, i.e., Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority (PA),as requiring unique approaches. The GOK may be hesitant to group them together under one institutionalized approach. For example, the GOK does not provide direct aid to the PA because of concerns about corruption, and prefers to work through the Islamic Development Bank; they see Lebanon's political crisis as the major problem there, not economic need; aid to Afghanistan, they note, is hampered by the GOA's arrears on an unresolved 1977 loan; and aid to Iraq is constrained by GOI inefficiency, a poor security environment, historical suspicion, and previous loan arrears. ¶2. (C) Perhaps the more important factors shaping Kuwait's aid levels and projects for the four proposed SII beneficiaries are the widely varying political goals and the nature of the bilateral relationships underpinning Kuwait's assistance. The GOK is unwilling to readily relinquish control over its aid projects, and thereby its political agenda for them. The Kuwaitis need reassurance and further clarification of the benefits to a common approach. It will not be an easy sell getting the GOK to cede control over its case-by-case approach. The aid bureaucracy (Kuwait Fund) here is effective; it has decades of experience with a project-based approach in recipient countries, and the GOK regards the Kuwait Fund as an agent of its political goals in the region. A proposed January 30-February 1 visit by Counselor Zelikow and Treasury Deputy Secretary Kimmitt, soon after A/S Wayne's visit on the SII, could nevertheless prove effective if the USG convincingly addresses and overcomes GOK political reservations. We must show what is in it for them and be prepared to get into more detail about the administration of a strategic investment fund and how political oversight will work. At a minimum, we believe that greater coordination can help overcome current obstacles, and free up some resources already available. ¶3. (C) A consistent theme of A/S Wayne's meetings was the need for closer coordination between the USG and both bilateral and regional Arab and Islamic Funds. The multilateral, Kuwait-based Arab Fund is the single largest aid donor in the region, disbursing $1.2 billion in 2005 alone. The Kuwait Fund is a 45 year old organization with a significant project portfolio, financed by concessional loans. A precursor to the SII will need to be greater understanding of the priorities, methodologies, and resources of the Kuwait Fund, Arab Fund, and any similar funds in Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. (See Refs A-G for more detail on the Kuwait Fund.) ¶4. (SBU) The following paragraphs contain a summary of GOK-based aid to Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the PA as described to Embassy and US-based interlocutors. Kuwaiti reservations, and what the GOK sees as obstacles with regards to these countries, are also discussed. (See Ref H for further details on the GOK's position.) -------------- Aid to Iraq -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Kuwait announced $1.5 billion in bilateral aid to Iraq at the Madrid Conference, and counted $1 billion of that as already-delivered in-kind assistance in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Of the remaining $500 million, the GOK committed to $440 million in concessionary loans for power sector projects, and $60 million in grants for education and health projects. In supplement to its 2002 Madrid pledges, in June 2005 Kuwait committed an additional $60 million for health and education programs through the Kuwait Fund. In addition, the GOK has provided $10 million to the UN-based International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI),and $5 million in medical aid also through the HOC. ¶6. (C) From December 2002 - December 2004, Kuwait provided over $2 billion in free fuel for U.S. and Coalition Forces use in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and as Assistance in Kind (AIK) for Kuwait-specific activities under the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Kuwait continues to provide fuel at a concessionary rate, saving the military and U.S. taxpayers millions of dollars a year. It also provides AIK support, estimated at $1-2 billion annually, for the U.S. military presence in Kuwait. Kuwait's support facilitates the U.S. military's missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which efforts are supported by over 22,000 troops stationed in Kuwait. ¶7. (C) A/S Wayne discussed the SII and Kuwaiti assistance to Iraq during his January 7, 2006 meetings in Kuwait (Reftel). Foreign Minister Al-Sabah said that Iraq is "of special interest" to the GOK, but stated that Kuwait is "still waiting for Iraq to get its house in order" before much of the promised project funds can be released. Commerce Minister Al-Taweel stated that private investment is crucial to post-conflict reconstruction, but that investments outside of the logistics sector have been hampered by the security environment. Finance Minister Al-Humaidhi addressed the Iraqi debt issue, saying that the GOK is adopting a "wait and see" attitude for now on this touchy domestic issue. Al-Hamad noted that the multilateral, Kuwait-based Arab Fund has not financed any projects in Iraq since before the 1990 invasion, and that Iraq is currently in a "frozen position" because of its $65 million in arrears to the Arab Fund. Kuwait Fund DG Al-Bader said that GOI changes and differing priorities expressed by different officials had made disbursing aid difficult, and that he had learned from experience to only deal with Barbara Saleh and key officials of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning. -------------- Aid to Afghanistan -------------- ¶8. (SBU) At the 2002 Tokyo Donors Conference, Kuwait pledged $30 million in grants to the GOA to be administered by the Kuwait Fund (GOA claims that the pledge was $45 million, while the Kuwait Fund contests the GOA claim as inaccurate). At this time, there is no bilateral assistance, pending the resolution of GOA arrears of $19 million on a 1977 loan for a sugar factory. The Kuwait Fund has offered to reschedule the loan pending GOA approval, and the issue is expected to be resolved after settlement of Russian debt claims with the GOA. (NOTE: Treasury is looking into expediting this process.) The Council of Ministers has the authority to commit to new GOK grants to the GOA despite the arrears with the Kuwait Fund; the Council of Ministers employed this route in 2002 and channeled the money through the Asian Development Bank and World Bank. We believe the key to unlocking more resources at this time will be resolution of the outstanding debt to the Kuwait Fund. -------------- Aid to Lebanon -------------- ¶9. (C) Since 1966, Kuwait has provided more than $445 million in loans and $78 million in grants to Lebanon. The GOK sees Lebanon's problems as essentially political, not economic, and seems reluctant to group Lebanon into the same category as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the PA. In his meeting with A/S Wayne, Foreign Minister Al-Sabah argued that political stability must come first, because financial aid during a time of crisis may not have much of an impact. ¶10. (C) On January 7, Arab Fund Director Al-Hamad told A/S Wayne that he expected to receive documentation for new projects soon, but the $500 million pledged for these at the Paris donor conference has not been disbursed because project sites need to be identified and "we need to wait for the political situation to calm down." Al-Hamad said that an earlier pledge of $700 million was already allocated to projects with $100 million of it committed so far. Projects under consideration for future loans include: repairs of the extensive water and sewage network; a highway in northern Lebanon; investing in public administration development, including computerization efforts; and construction of a new campus for Tripoli University. -------------- Aid to the Palestinian Authority -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Since 1993, Kuwait has provided $171 million to the Palestinian Authority through the Islamic Development Bank, $25 million through the World Bank's Peace Fund, and $25 million through the Arab Fund. There is a real reticence in the GOK to help with the PA's short-term budgetary shortfalls. According to its by-laws, the Kuwait Fund cannot provide assistance to the PA because it is not a state. GOK suspicions about PA corruption make it unlikely to embrace a common approach towards aid for the PA. Kuwaiti-Palestinian relations have some of the same "baggage" as relations with Iraq and we must expect from Kuwaitis a caution that borders on the irrational when it comes to discussion of investing in a future Palestinian state. ¶12. (C) In his January 7 meeting with A/S Wayne, Arab Fund Director Al-Hamad noted that the Arab Fund refused to work with Arafat, and even now does not allow the PA control over assistance funds. This suspicion of PA corruption has meant that the only bilateral aid the GOK now provides is through small grants for individual projects. All other assistance is distributed through a rather opaque process by the Islamic Development Bank. ********************************************* Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website ******************************************** LeBaron