Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUALALUMPUR2198
2006-11-30 09:10:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Cable title:  

NSD CHIEF DETAILS SECURITY DUTIES, THAI VISIT,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MOPS EAID SENV RP TH MY 
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VZCZCXRO2345
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHKL #2198/01 3340910
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300910Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8045
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2238
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 002198 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS EAID SENV RP TH MY
SUBJECT: NSD CHIEF DETAILS SECURITY DUTIES, THAI VISIT,
DISASTER MANAGEMENT

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 2159 - MFA ON MILF AND THAI UNREST

B. KUALA LUMPUR 1976 - SURAYUD VISITS MALAYSIA

C. KUALA LUMPUR 1812 - DEADLOCK IN MILF TALKS

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DAVID B. SHEAR, REASON 1.4 (B AN
D D).

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 002198 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EAP/RSP E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS EAID SENV RP TH MY SUBJECT: NSD CHIEF DETAILS SECURITY DUTIES, THAI VISIT, DISASTER MANAGEMENT REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 2159 - MFA ON MILF AND THAI UNREST ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 1976 - SURAYUD VISITS MALAYSIA ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 1812 - DEADLOCK IN MILF TALKS Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DAVID B. SHEAR, REASON 1.4 (B AN D D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The head of Malaysia's National Security Division (NSD),Ahmad Fuad, discussed NSD's broad duties, including its disaster management role, and inquired about U.S. technical assistance during a November 29 meeting with the DCM. Fuad said that Thai General Sonthi had used his visit to Kuala Lumpur to request Malaysia's help in preventing the movements of ethnic Malay militants out of southern Thailand. The DCM raised the issue of the GOM moratorium on U.S. training for the Marine Police (RMMP). End Summary. Fuad Describes NSD, MEIO Background -------------- ¶2. (C) The DCM and polchief met November 29 with National Security Division (NSD) Director General Ahmad Fuad bin Abdul Aziz and NSD Principal Assistant Director Hasnan Zahedi bin Ahmad Zakaria. Fuad also serves as Secretary of the National Security Council, a senior grouping headed by the Prime Minister that meets infrequently. Fuad explained that he had taken up his current position in May 2006, after some 31 years in the Malaysian External Intelligence Organization (MEIO). Fuad described NSD as a body, comparable in some respects to other countries' national security councils, that coordinates a broad range of national security issues across multiple agencies. These range from natural disaster management to maritime and border control to cyber security. (Note: An NSD organization chart available on the internet lists 11 NSD directorates. End Note.) Sonthi's Visit -------------- ¶3. (S) Fuad told us that he had joined in meetings with Thai Army Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who visited Malaysia November 28-30. Sonthi had asked Malaysia to assist in ending the violence in Thailand's ethnic Malay/Muslim south by strengthening controls along their common border and preventing the movements of Thai insurgents. Sonthi did not offer Malaysia any role in brokering peace. Fuad described Sonthi as "sincere" in the desire to end the violence in southern
Thailand by meeting the population's legitimate grievances. Neither Malaysian nor Thailand, however, really knew who to deal with in the south, and Fuad raised reports that ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin might be fanning the flames. The NSD Chief reaffirmed that Malaysia would not forcibly repatriate the 131 Thai Malay refugees, and that none had agreed to return at this time. He noted Sonthi's frank public admission that Thai forces had killed some previously returned refugees. He added that one reason that the GOM kept the 131 refugees in a camp (paid for by the NSD) was to protect them from possible assassination by Thai agents. Fuad said Malaysia had offered to send Muslim religious teachers to southern Thailand and to accept ethnic Malay students in an effort to teach the southern Thai how to live in a multi-ethnic society like Malaysia. (Comment: Fuad's comments on Thailand were generally consistent with those of the Foreign Ministry, ref A. End Comment.) ¶4. (C) Fuad explained that the NSD budget paid for Malaysia's deployment to the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao. NSD, however, had no role in facilitating the peace talks between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Manila. Othman Abdul Razak, Fuad's former boss, handled the talks out of a separate office. ¶5. (C) The DCM thanked Fuad for Malaysia's cooperation with the DS/ATA-led Border Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) and NSD coordination of the January 2007 BCAI mission to Sabah. Fuad expressed his satisfaction with the U.S. approach. In response to Hasnan's question as to why we focused on Sabah, the DCM noted the U.S. interest in assisting Malaysia and its neighbors to stop criminals, including terrorists, operating in the tri-border area. ¶6. (C) The DCM raised the issue of the Royal Malaysian Marine Police (RMMP) and its October announcement of a postponement of all U.S. training. Fuad said the KUALA LUMP 00002198 002 OF 002 postponement resulted from concerns over coordination among the various maritime agencies and a GOM desire that foreign governments not approach individual agencies to propose training. He indicated that the NSD-led maritime security policy meetings had taken up the subject. Fuad initially recommended the U.S. formally approach the GOM through the Foreign Ministry; later he said he would pursue the issue in a coordination meeting the following week. On a separate issue, Fuad indicated he did not have knowledge of any decision restricting bilateral military training to peninsular Malaysia. Disaster Management -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Fuad focused much of the conversation on NSD's role in natural disaster management. NSD coordinated annual preparations for Malaysia's flood season (normally November to January) and dispersed the budget to state-level agencies that carried out disaster relief activities. Malaysia had the capacity to house temporarily about 1 million persons displaced by flooding, which normally hits hardest along the eastern coast of peninsular Malaysia. NSD also coordinated Malaysia's response to unhealthy haze resulting from burning forests primarily in Indonesia. Fuad commented that recent discussion with Indonesia on the subject of haze had produced no results, and he appeared pessimistic on progress. He stated that Malaysia was prepared to help Indonesia with forest fires, if asked, but would do so on a bilateral basis, not through an ASEAN coordination mechanism. ¶8. (U) Fuad and Hasnan raised a number of areas for possible U.S. technical assistance, including training on natural disaster management; search and rescue techniques; fire-fighting to reduce haze; and CBRN response training. The GOM intended to construct a search/rescue team training center, which would feature an advanced simulation area. Hasnan noted that cooperation on disaster management represented one element of the U.S.-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, and he asked about U.S. programming. The DCM said that we would inquire with Washington and respond. ¶9. (SBU) In other areas, Fuad expressed interest in the U.S. providing capacity building support for the NSD's new cyber-security office. Fuad expressed thanks for past opportunities for NSD staff to join in APCSS and hoped these opportunities would continue or increase in the future. LAFLEUR

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