MORE PROTESTS AHEAD IN NORTHERN IRAQ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000080 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR POL, PAO, ROL COORDINATOR, NCT, IRMO, USAID E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2016 TAGS: PINS PGOV KDEM KCOR KISL PINR IZ IR SUBJECT: MORE PROTESTS AHEAD IN NORTHERN IRAQ REF: (A) Kirkuk 78 , (B) Kirkuk 79 , (C) Kirkuk 69 KIRKUK 00000080 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Acting Regional Coordinator, , REO Kirkuk, DoS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. A freelance press interpreter says some who participated in the violent Halabjah protests could now be inclined to become KRG insurgents because the PUK is giving them few other options. Our contact said he had heard reports that some protestors had fled to the mountains or Iran; he said that this was the first time protestors against the KRG had sought refuge in the mountains. He said the PUK's response to the Halabjah events reminded the Kurdish public of the former regime. Students from the PUK-administered territory were likely to stage future protests, especially in Kalar and across several cities when school was out. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) This is the third in a series of cables reporting an in-depth look at the March 16 violent protests in Halabjah. This cable discusses prospects for violence elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region. The other two cables (refs A and B) reported on the events leading up to and during the day of the protests and on the subsequent security crackdown. RC(A) and IPAO on March 28 met with Yerivan Adham Sa'id, a free lance press interpreter and native of Halabjah, who was present during the entirety of the Halabjah events and supported the demonstrations. Sa'id was the freelance interpreter for the March 17 New York Times story, a subsequent National Public Radio story and was a major source for reftels. Hard Response Creating Dissidents -------------- ¶3. (S) Sa'id said that some of those who participated in the Halabjah protest could now be inclined to become KRG insurgents because they had few other options. The students were ambitious and politically active, yet the KRG was now branding them as criminals, prohibiting them from gaining jobs in the future. Sa'id said he had heard reports that some protestors had fled to the mountains or Iran; he said that this was the first time protestors against the KRG had sought refuge in the mountains. The PUK appears to be pursuing a tough response to the protestors. Sa'id said PUK officials during a March 22 or 23 press statement had used words like "revenge" and "severe punishment." Sa'id said such language reminded people of the Saddam Hussayn regime. Sa'id said that KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani further angered people in Halabjah by publicly saying on March 27 that the KRG had nothing to do with Halabjah reconstruction: the Iraqi Government was responsible for compensating Halabjah victims and rebuilding the city. Protests Likely Elsewhere -------------- ¶4. (C) When we asked Sa'id what was inciting Kurdish university students to protest, he said students saw the differences between those who benefited from the government and those who did not. He said most Kurdish students attended college in the big cities where, often for the first time, they experienced upgraded services and came into contact with family members of government leaders driving new cars. The students then returned to their homes with nothing to do and angered at the economic bifurcation. ¶5. (C) When asked where we could anticipate more demonstrations, Sa'id pointed to Chamchamal and especially Kalar because services were poor, and students from there spoke of protesting. Sa'id said he had heard reports of students' wanting to demonstrate around April 7 or 8, during the commemoration of the former regime's 1988 Anfal campaign. Kalar students demonstrated on September 14 - the day before Kurdish universities' first day of classes - and Sai'd said they were determined to regroup because the situation had not improved. He thought the cities of Ranya (two hours northeast of As Sulaymaniyah, near the Iranian border) and Darbanikhan (45 miles west of As Sulaymaniyah) also were vulnerable because the government had neglected services there, due to corruption. Sa'id said students were likely to demonstrate during their June-August summer break. PUK Students More Politically Active -------------- ¶6. (C) When asked why the majority of student demonstrations were occurring on PUK-administered territory, Sa'id judged that PUK supporters viewed the PUK as more corrupt than the KDP. PUK supporters were upset that Barzani and the KDP were taking control of all of the Kurdistan Region, while Talabani remained KIRKUK 00000080 002.2 OF 002 in Baghdad. Sa'id said that the students saw the PUK as more corrupt than the KDP: PUK officials were taking as much as they could now because they feared losing their positions to the KDP. The KDP also had been more diligent in providing services, roads, and buildings than the PUK. PUK supporters had expressed frustration that their legal system was unclear and inconsistent. For example, the KRG in As Sulaymaniyah had a law that sanctioned the death penalty when people destroyed state property, yet Talabani refused to sign Saddam's death sentence. ¶7. (C) Moreover, Sa'id said the PUK had more internal problems than the KDP. The Kurdish people referred to the PUK as the "Three Emirates": Jalal Talabani, Nushirwan Mustafa, and Kosrat Rasul. Sa'id thought that if the PUK eliminated its corruption, the party would split. People had hoped Barham Salih would end PUK corruption, but that hope had faded after his move to Baghdad. Nushirwan Mustafa was the PUK leader most inclined to eradicate the party's corruption; Rasul was more traditional. Talabani, Mustafa, and Rasul as of March 28 had said nothing publicly regarding the Halabjah incident. Comment -------------- ¶8. (S) We often have heard that a new graduate must have a party affiliation to get a professional job in the Kurdistan Region. However, we cannot confirm Sa'id's claim that some protestors now may feel their hopes for a career are over, and they must head to Iran or permanently oppose the PUK and KDP. If true, that would be significant, but it is probably too early to judge how ham-fisted the parties choose to be. ¶9. (C) We doubt the PUK expects the KDP to take over the KRG or is basing actions on that. We suspect Sa'id thinks the grass is greener in KDP areas. In reality, the lack of protests in KDP areas may simply reflect that the KDP has been more effective at preventing or suppressing dissent. Sa'id's comments confirm what we have heard from senior PUK staffers that some party supporters resent Talabani's role as Iraqi President and his lack of focus on the north. Sa'id's take that Kurdish universities are training grounds for political activism is plausible. ¶10. (C) We since have heard that any protests may come on various anniversaries later in April, rather than April 7-8. University breaks (which come, e.g., for commemorations) probably have as much to do with these protests as location or lack of delivery on services; we therefore can anticipate more demonstrations in the summer when students return home from school. ORESTE