GOVERNMENT FORMATION: KDP GRIPING ABOUT TALABANI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000053 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR POL, NCT E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/5/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ IR SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION: KDP GRIPING ABOUT TALABANI REF: (A) 05 KIRKUK 268, (B) BAGHDAD 620 KIRKUK 00000053 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo Kirkuk, Department of State . REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. RC met separately on February 28 with Falah Bakir, a close aide to the KRG-E PM (and future unified KRG) PM Barzani, and with Fadil Mirani, Secretary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party's Politburo. On Baghdad government formation, Bakir downplayed Talabani's role in favor of Barzani's representing the Kurds. The new national government should include the 4 major parties from the elections: the UIA, the Kurdish Alliance, National Accord Front, and Al-Iraqiyya. The Kurdish Alliance could accept Ja'afari as PM. The Kurds did not want to be held back by being seen as a war zone like the rest of Iraq. Mirani charged foreign fighters were responsible for the Samarra bombing: Iran had a hand. He charged Talabani was close to Tehran and was "hasty." Chalabi was taking bribes from Iran and was part of the problem. Mirani thought it would be good to rotate jobs among ethnic groups as they did in Lebanon. Mithal al Alusi would be a better defense minister than current Interior Minister Bayan Jabr or current Defense Minister Sa'adun al-Dulaymi. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On government formation, Bakir said: -- KRG President Barzani, not President Talabani, represented the Kurdish Alliance in Baghdad government formation negotiations. Barzani would be KRG President for the next 4 years. Talabani was just a Baghdad candidate on the Kurdish Alliance list and its candidate for whatever national job the alliance would get. (COMMENT: That national job is the Presidency. Bakir is very close to the Barzanis, and his attitudes probably reflect President Barzani's. This highlights the animosity still present between the two main parties, and shows the limits of a merger of the two KRGs. END COMMENT.) -- The new national government should include the 4 major parties from the elections: the UIA, the Kurdish Alliance, National Accord Front, and Al-Iraqiyya. -- The Kurdish Alliance had no red lines: it could accept Ja'afari as PM. Rather, the Kurdish Alliance would judge candidates for PM on the basis of policies -- such as federalism, human rights, democracy and the status of Kirkuk -- and their policy priorities. (NOTE: The Kurdish Alliance has since asked the Shia Coalition to revoke Ja'afari's nomination to be PM, citing their inability to work cooperatively with him toward a national unity government. END NOTE.) -- Real discussions began only after the election results were officially confirmed, and the Samarra bombing had then set them back. Everyone was refusing to admit their community had committed violence because then, if they could stop later violence, it would show they could have stopped the earlier violence. -- Unlike the Sunnis or Shia, the Kurds were only interested in certain issues: they did not want to rule the whole country. The Kurds did not want to be held back by being seen as a war zone like the rest of Iraq. A new Iraqi transport ministry announcement about RPG's as a threat on landing -- which was not true in the Kurdish Region -- had caused Austrian Airlines to push back the start date for its flights to the KRG. (NOTE: Bakir repeated his complaints about western travel advisories, reported ref A. END NOTE.) -- Governments existed to provide security, assistance or services. If they could not provide these, it raised the question as to why have them. The KRG paid for oil, but suffered when the Iraqi government then failed to pay Turkey for it and oil imports to the KRG stopped. ¶3. (C) Mirani (AMCIT) said: -- Foreign fighters were responsible for the Samarra bombing. Iran had a hand. Syria and Iran wanted to solve in Iraq their problem with America. Iran wanted to show it was influential in Iraq. We should press Syria, Lebanon and Iran. -- Talabani was saying there was no Iranian influence in Iraq, but he was in fact close to Tehran. Chalabi was taking bribes from Iran and was part of the problem. -- People had been "negative" after the bombing, but had now pulled back. KIRKUK 00000053 002.2 OF 002 -- Sa'dr's role was a question mark: he was asking foreign powers to mediate in Iraq. -- The Kurds depended on the GOI for peace and economic development: "If the whole house collapses, your room cannot be safe." The fact Kurdish leaders were in Baghdad showed Kurds cared about Iraq. -- President Talabani was in "too much of a rush," but his temperament was unchangeable. The Sunnis thought Talabani pro-Shia. -- It would be good to rotate jobs among ethnic groups as they did in Lebanon. -- The Kurds needed to be treated as the second largest group (read; vs. Arabs),rather than the third (versus Sunnis and Shia). -- Ministers needed to be nonpartisan. Mithal al Alusi would be a better defense minister than Bayan Jabr or Sa'adun al-Dulaymi. ¶4. Comment. Bakir is unhappy that security problems in the south tar KRG efforts to attract foreign investment. He has often argued that, with our help, Kurdistan could become a possible model for the rest of Iraq. However, his comments carried much less of a secessionist flavor than those two days earlier by Kamran Karadaghi of the national Presidency Council (ref B). Indeed, Mirani -- unasked -- went out of his way to stress the Kurds' commitment to the government formation process. We report Mirani's other comments for what they are worth: he offered no explanation or examples of how Talbani was "hasty" or close to Iran. ORESTE