(C) KRG INTERIOR MINISTER ON SECURITY CONCERNS, RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000148 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PREL PTER IZ TU IR, KDEM SUBJECT: (C) KRG INTERIOR MINISTER ON SECURITY CONCERNS, RELATIONS WITH BAGHDAD REF: BAGHDAD 00000358; KIRKUK 00000134, 135, 136, 143, 144, 147 KIRKUK 00000148 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: Minister of Interior (MOI) for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),Karim Sinjari, said on August 10 that nearly non-existent liaison relations with the MOI in Baghdad would have an impact on security in the Kurdistan region and throughout Iraq. He said a meeting with all the heads of security from the KRG, the federal MOI, and Coalition Forces was necessary to discuss urgently needed security reforms. The merger of the two KRG security forces was a complicated procedure and would not occur for more than a year; the merger of the separate KRG Asayish and intelligence services would take even longer. The KRG leadership was under great pressure from the Kurdish public to implement Article 140 on time, making a delay of the referendum on Kirkuk impossible. At stake was Kurdish confidence in the central government and federal constitution. KRG security forces continued to monitor Islamic parties in the Kurdistan region because they provided the breeding ground for future terrorists. Taking action against the PKK was difficult since they were hiding in the mountains; only a general amnesty would solve the PKK problem. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. (C) NEED FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN FEDERAL, KRG MOI -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) KRG Minister of Interior, Karim Sinjari, told IPAO on August 10, 2006, that there was almost no coordination between the KRG and Baghdad MOIs, and that this relationship must be improved to prevent security from deteriorating in the Kurdistan region and throughout Iraq. He said that each of the five or six past ministers had visited his office, but that adequate relations were not established on a continuing basis. He said that the KRG had very good cooperation with the last MOI on passport and immigration issues but that the new MOI had not yet visited the KRG office and had re-imposed "Saddam-style" regulations. As an example, Sinjari said the new MOI had limited passport issuance locations to Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah. Sinjari successfully argued for an extension of passport services to Erbil on the grounds that the security situation made travel to the other locations difficult. However, Sinjari wanted to expand passport offices to all of the provinces and sent liaison representatives to Baghdad on three separate occasions to discuss this proposal without success. (C) CALL FOR REFORMS AND A MEETING OF SECURITY HEADS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Sinjari said he was trying to organize a conference with federal MOI and Coalition security experts to discuss a three-year plan to address urgently needed security issues. The top priority he claimed was creating a national database for ID cards, vehicle plates, and drivers' licenses, a system that had been delayed now for three years and must be started immediately. Sinjari added the Kurdistan region had a database to conduct a required security background check for those who entered on a visa and wanted to remain in Kurdistan; this was not the case for the rest of Iraq. He would like to establish a national identification card or assign social security numbers, and to authorize each of the governorates to issue passports to assist in setting up this national database. (C) KRG MOI MERGERS DELAYED FOR YEAR OR MORE -------------- ¶4. (C) Sinjari claimed that while simpler ministries, such as Agriculture, had encountered few problems and had merged successfully, the KDP and PUK Interior Ministries were far more complex and the two separate KRG security forces likely would have to wait for a year or more to merge completely (See para. 10). He said the MOI was "working its way up" and had started by merging the local police forces, but that even this first step could take up to a year. Merging the Asayish and intelligence services, he added, would take even more time. Movement of personnel between stations and fluctuating security requirements presented the greatest challenges. He said the MOI had established committees to move the merger forward and that these were due to meet again on August 20, 2006, to discuss the next steps in the process. (C) SECURITY PROBLEMS LIMITED TO MIXED AREAS ON KRG BORDER -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Only those areas in the Kurdistan region with mixed KIRKUK 00000148 002.2 OF 003 ethnic groups along the KRG borders experienced security problems, according to Sinjari. He said those Iraqi Police (IP) forces that were predominately Kurdish, such as in Dibis in northern Kirkuk Province, had few security incidents. He said IP forces with a large Arab presence had been infiltrated with insurgents and former Ba'thists. Sinjari claimed that all IP in these border areas, which would include those regions to be covered in the upcoming referendum, were hired and paid by the central government, not the KRG. (C) KRG LEADERS UNDER PRESSURE, NO DELAY FOR ARTICLE 140 -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Sinjari said the KNA would not agree to postponement of the referendum on Kirkuk's final status because Kurdish leaders were under pressure from the Kurdish public to push Article 140 forward according to the timeline in the constitution. Citing a public survey from last December in which a majority of the Kurdish people voted for independence, Sinjari said the leaders were consumed with convincing the general public that participation in a federal Iraq was in the Kurds' best interest. (Note: An ad hoc survey was held to coincide with the general and provincial elections in December, 2005, in which about 98 percent of the Kurdish voting public allegedly chose "independence" from two options, the other being to remain part of Iraq. Anecdotal reporting would indicate the KDP and PUK had a role in sponsoring the survey and have since cited the poll at various points to gain political leverage during negotiations. End note.) Sinjari claimed that KRG leaders had no problem with Kirkuk having a "special status" but that the people of Kirkuk alone, not the entire nation, must decide this for themselves and only after normalization was complete. He asserted that normalization would take care of the security situation in Kirkuk, since those who came to the area under Saddam's "Arabization" program were supporting the insurgents and would leave as part of the normalization procedure. (C) ISLAMIC PARTIES "BREEDING GROUND" FOR TERRORISTS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The KRG MOI continued to monitor Islamic parties closely, Sinjari claimed, in particular the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Kurdistan Islamic Gathering, and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement. He said these political groups previously received funding from foreign donors in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere and had used these funds to educate and indoctrinate youths, but that the KRG gradually had halted these funds (Reftel. Kirkuk 00000143, 144). According to Sinjari, most of the terrorist suspects in the Kurdistan region confessed to having been former members of these political parties but had since joined terrorist groups, such as Ansar al-Islam (AI). Sinjari claimed 150 members of these Islamic political groups had been expelled from the Kurdistan region and currently worked with AI in Mosul. He said these political parties were very active in mosques and universities, where they promised help for unemployed Kurds and students worried about their future. The Islamic political groups targeted students in universities by distributing free school supplies and headscarves, while the KRG bore the bulk of educational expenses with no appreciation from the students or general public. He said although Islamic parties had been more successful than expected in the last provincial elections and were growing in popularity, they were not large enough to present a political challenge at this time. (C) ONLY GENERAL AMNESTY WILL SOLVE PKK PROBLEM -------------- -- ¶8. (C) The KRG had no plans to remove the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, formerly KGK/Kongra Gel) members from the Iraqi Kurdistan region, Sinjari claimed, since it was difficult to remove them from their mountain locations. He claimed the Erbil office of the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, a PKK front party, was closed a month ago and did not present any problems currently (Reftel. Kirkuk 00000134). He said that a political solution was necessary to solve the PKK problem and that only with a general amnesty from Turkey would the approximately 12,000 Kurdish Internally Displaced Persons residing in Makhmour refugee camps return to Turkey. (Note: The Makhmour camps reportedly have been recruiting grounds for the PKK. (Reftel. Baghdad 00000358.) End note.) He claimed 70 to 80 percent of PKK members would come down from the mountains and return to Turkey, if a general amnesty were offered. (C) BIOGRAPHHIC NOTES -------------- ¶9. (C) Karim Sinjari: Born in Sinjar, 1950; MOI in the unified cabinet since May 7, 2006; previous MOI for KRG-Erbil KIRKUK 00000148 003.2 OF 003 administration from 2001 to 2006; received degree in Law from Baghdad University in 1971; was a practicing lawyer before becoming a senior KDP Politburo member. (U) COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Sinjari's claims about the extended merger timeline for KRG security forces contradicts reports from a separate meeting with the KRG Minster of Peshmerga, who estimated Peshmerga would be merged within six months (Reftel. Kirkuk 00000147). From separate meetings with the heads of KDP and PUK Asayish in Kirkuk, post believes Sinjari's estimates to be more accurate, since there are many obstacles that will need to be overcome before any real merger can be accomplished, perhaps most important being the building of mutual trust between the leadership of the two security forces. It is worth noting that post was not able to meet the Asayish heads simultaneously and had to schedule separate meetings due to "political sensitivities" between the two leaders. (Reftel. Kirkuk 00000135, 136.) JBIGUS