(C) KDP KIRKUK ASAYISH HEAD ON SECURITY, MERGER WITH PUK,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000136 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/2/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PREL PTER KDEM IZ TU SUBJECT: (C) KDP KIRKUK ASAYISH HEAD ON SECURITY, MERGER WITH PUK, KRG ACTION AGAINST PKK REF: KIRKUK 00000135 KIRKUK 00000136 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: KDP Kirkuk Asayish head, Hallo Najat Hamza, told IPAOs on July 25 that the terrorists were getting stronger and were targeting security forces in Kirkuk. Hamza said the open borders of Kirkuk and guards cooperating with the terrorists at checkpoints were primarily to blame. Hamza said the current police chief and poor quality of Iraqi Police (IP) training were also responsible for the deteriorating security situation. He said there were more foreign fighters among the terrorists than previously. Hamza offered suggestions for improving security, including privatization of the security forces in Kirkuk. He was not optimistic about merging PUK and KDP Asayish within the coming year. KDP Asayish were present in all of the liberated, mixed Kurdish areas currently outside the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) borders from Kirkuk to Iran, he claimed. Hamza said Kurdish public reaction to KRG taking action against the PKK would be negative. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. (C) TERRORISTS GETTING STRONGER, TARGETING SECURITY FORCES -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) KDP Kirkuk Asayish head, Hallo Najat Hamza, told IPAOs on July 25, that terrorist operations in Kirkuk had increased in the last two months. He said the terrorists were targeting security forces successfully, which indicated the terrorists were getting stronger. One of the main problems, according to Hamza, was the open borders surrounding Kirkuk, particularly in the southern areas, which provided ideal conditions for multiple smuggling routes. He said Hewija had become a stronghold of terrorists because it shared its borders with Mosul and Tikrit. Terrorists placed bombs in cars outside Kirkuk in one of the many villages from which they operated; the cars were then brought into the city through checkpoints around Kirkuk where, Hamza claimed, the guards did not cooperate with the Asayish security forces. He said the Asayish had recently captured a person from Tunisia who was leading a cell in Hewija and confessed to having extensive financial support and cell branches throughout the area. Hamza said requests for increased Coalition presence in the Hewija area to hinder terrorist movement have been successful but sometimes had an adverse impact on Asayish operations. For example, he said the Coalition Forces recently used a helicopter to monitor area roads, alerting the terrorists into taking a different route and thus avoiding the roadblock traps the Asayish had set to capture them and get more information. (C) POLICE CHIEF'S PERFORMACE RATED "UNDER ZERO" -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Hamza said that he rated the performance of current Chief of Police in Kirkuk, General Sherko, as "under zero" and that some called him "grandfather Sherko," a reference to his age and prevailing sentiment that it was time for him to retire. He said Sherko was first and foremost responsible for the poor security situation in Kirkuk. Hamza claimed the regular police do not respect Sherko's orders and that he did not enjoy good formal, public relations with high profile leaders or important ethnic communities. He said Sherko had good "informal" relations with important groups and their leaders, but this was not enough to command wide respect. Hamza said it was not important who replaced Sherko, as long as he was qualified and could work effectively to improve security. (Note: PUK Asayish head, Halkawt Abdullah Aziz, informed post on July 24 that KDP representatives said they would support any PUK choice for Sherko's replacement. (Ref. Kirkuk 000135.) End note.) Hamza said in connection with this statement that currently he enjoys good relations with Samir Nazib and Brigadier Zurhan. (C) MORE FOREIGN FIGHTERS -------------- ¶4. (C) Hamza said the number of foreign fighters responsible for terrorist attacks in Kirkuk had been increasing this year and blamed this on neighboring countries working to hinder the implementation of Article 140 and normalization of Kirkuk. He claimed there was local support for the terrorists and that an Arab Asayish employee in the IA had been approached and told to join the terrorists or be killed. Hamza added that terrorists recently had rented a very expensive house in Kirkuk, a sign they have affluent and influential connections in the city. Hamza dismissed the fact that apparently none of the approximately 150 suspects rounded up during recent raids in Hewija were foreigners; he said they knew how to hide themselves KIRKUK 00000136 002.2 OF 003 to evade capture. (Note: At the request of local Sunni tribal shaykhs, Coalition Forces on July 24 conducted a series of raids against suspected terrorist cells in Hewija. End note.) (C) POOR IP TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE -------------- ¶5. (C) Hamza said inadequate training and discipline were having an impact on IP capabilities to improve security. He said a review of video from a recent IP police raid on the residence where a group of terrorists were killed demonstrated it was a random operation with no clear plan and that the police attack was clearly uncoordinated. Hamza added IP were often seen sleeping by the side of the road or not wearing their vests and that there was a clear lack of discipline to the force in general. The IP has asserted they were conducting night patrols all over Kirkuk city, but Hamza claimed he had evidence the IP stayed away from the city center and only patrolled the northern - and safer - part of the city. (C) IMPROVING SECURITY - DIG A TRENCH, INCREASE COURT STAFF -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Hamza suggested Kirkuk follow Erbil's model, where the security services had dug a trench around the city's perimeter and posted guards every 1-1.5 kilometers. He said this was very effective in Erbil and could be replicated in Kirkuk. Also, restructuring the IP was necessary to strengthen security, especially some battalions in the Arab areas where the police often fought along side the terrorists against Asayish. Hamza said the courts were ineffective: lack of evidence and trial judges not adhering to the full legal process were the two main reasons terrorist suspects were released, according to Hamza. In addition, those terrorists who did make it through the court system and were convicted went free because staff shortages and overcrowding in the only prison facility meant the court was unable to hold terrorists for even 24 hours. He said he favored the creation of a special office to investigate and try terrorists. (C) LIAISON RELATIONS WITH ISF AND COALITION -------------- ¶7. (C) The Asayish in Kirkuk were not involved at checkpoints and did not arrest or participate in arrests, Hamza claimed. He said on occasion they participated in joint operations with the Iraqi Army (IA) or IP when asked. Hamza said that 60 percent of KDP Asayish officers assisted the Coalition by collecting information and compiling files on suspects, while the other 40 percent worked with the IA and IP at the municipal and provincial level. (Note: These claims are questionable as he also often referred to arrests and questioning that had been conducted independently. End note.) (C) KDP-PUK ASAYISH MERGER - "THERE'S ALWAYS 2007" -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Hamza claimed there was no rush locally to merge the KDP and PUK Asayish organizations and that there was no specific timeline for the merger from the KRG Ministry of Interior. He said he was about to meet with PUK counterparts to discuss this issue for the first time and that most of the pressure to merge the two security services came from Erbil. Hamza added that, although the two Asayish services shared information, their efforts had been uncoordinated and relations with the PUK had not been "on a high level" to this point. Hamza claimed there were plans to coordinate with PUK Asayish formally in the future, and said that he did not anticipate a problem if the referendum and annexation of Kirkuk occurred before the merger of the security services was complete. He noted that the KRG administration required that the two groups merge by the end of ¶2006. When questioned if this was realistic he sounded doubtful, stating that the separate KDP and PUK Asayish leaders would simply continue to have "meetings and more meetings" to discuss the merger. If it wasn't completed by the end of the year, he shrugged, there was always 2007. (U) KDP ASAYISH COMPOSITION, PRESENCE BELOW 'GREEN LINE' -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) All of the Asayish officers in the "liberated Kurdish areas" reported to him in Kirkuk, Hamza said. Around 2,000 Asayish officers came under his authority, he said, and were located in the "mixed" Kurdish districts and sub-districts from Kirkuk to Iran; 700 were based in Kirkuk, and of these 10 were Arabs. He said dividing the Asayish into branches headed by lieutenants helped to manage such an expansive organization, but effective monitoring was sometimes difficult. KIRKUK 00000136 003.2 OF 003 (C) BAGHDAD'S SECTARIAN PROBLEMS THREATEN KIRKUK -------------- --- ¶10. (C) Hamza claimed the Sunni-Shia strife in Baghdad was about to affect Kirkuk. Although the Shia numbers were small in and around Kirkuk, Hamza said they were able to cause increasing problems since they belonged to militias who did not have uniforms. Without uniforms these militants were difficult to capture because, as soon as they disarmed themselves, they could blend into a civilian crowd. He claimed the Kirkuk sub-districts of Daquq and Taza already had Shia militias. (C) KURDISH PUBLIC REACTION TO KRG ACTION AGAINST THE PKK -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Hamza said that, according to his information, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had no plans to take action against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, formerly Kongra Gel/KGK) but that the Asayish were part of the KRG and would honor its decision if the KRG were to call for such action. He claimed that the Kurdish public response to KRG action against the PKK would be negative. Hamza said a media campaign would be necessary first if the KRG planned to expel the PKK from Kurdistan in order to prepare the Kurdish public. He claimed Turkey did not want to solve the PKK issue on the grounds that it served as justification for the Turkish military to meddle in Kurdistan's internal affairs. (C) BIOGRAPHIC NOTES -------------- ¶12. (C) Hallo Najat Hamza: Current head of Kirkuk KDP Asayish; born in 1974 in a mountain area after the Iraqi regime expelled his family from their village; his father was a strong supporter of Mustafa Barzani and Hamza's family fled to Iran after the 1975 Algiers agreement between Tehran and Baghdad that ended Iranian military support for the Iraqi Kurds; his family returned from Iran in 1976 after the KDP reorganized its forces; he studied for a period of time in Iran; received a diploma in Military Science from Zhako Military Academy; liaison officer between KDP Peshmerga and Coalition forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); speaks some English, which he learned while working with the Central Intelligence Agency prior to OIF; source told post he believed his age, young by Kurdish leadership standards, was not a detriment because it enabled him to relate to the concerns of Kurdish youth. (U) COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) IPAOs noted that Hamza and the PUK Asayish head (Ref. Kirkuk 000135) cited cases in which Kurdish security forces arrested, detained, and questioned suspects where no other Iraqi security services apparently were involved, indicating that Asayish in some cases were operating extra legally. The indifference of the two Asayish heads to merging their services forebodes conflict at the lower tiers of KDP and PUK security forces where local leaders from each party have much at stake, especially in Kirkuk and the disputed territories outside the official KRG boundaries. Current levels of cooperation between the two services would indicate any real Asayish merger is unlikely prior to the referendum on Kirkuk's final status, set to occur no later than the end of December, 2007. JBIGUS