KDP ASAYISH CHIEF ON SECURITY ISSUES IN KIRKUK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000104 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, ROL COORDINATOR, IRMO/IPCC E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV KISL PINS PINR PREL PTER PNAT IZ IR SY TU SUBJECT: KDP ASAYISH CHIEF ON SECURITY ISSUES IN KIRKUK KIRKUK 00000104 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo Kirkuk, Department of State . REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The chief of Asayish in Kirkuk said the Iraqi Army and police in Kirkuk were neither effective nor serious in their duties because their loyalties were based on ethnic bonds. He said Hawijah was a terrorist safe haven and that its poor security situation had a negative effect on the rest of Kirkuk province. His sources indicated that Sadrists were sending regiments to southern Kirkuk city. He complained that several Ba'athist criminals still were employed at the Northern Oil Company and that only 600 of the company's 12,000 employees were Kurds. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) IPAO's on April 20 met with Colonel Hallo Najat Hamza, KDP chief of Asayish (internal security forces) for Diyala, Kirkuk, and Tikrit provinces, to discuss security issues in the Kirkuk province. Hamza asserted that MNF-I recognized KDP Asayish as a premier security force in these provinces. He said his organization's primary purpose was to gather intelligence and tips on the insurgency. Iraqi Army, Police Hamstrung by Ethnicity Regulations -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Hamza said the Iraqi Army and police in Kirkuk were neither effective nor serious in their duties because their loyalties were based on ethnic bonds. He noted that the army and police were unable to fire incompetent personnel, due to the set allocation of positions based on ethnicity. Hamza said that four Iraqi intelligence officers in the former regime were now employed as local police officers, which undermined the people's trust in the police to eliminate terrorism. ¶4. (C) Hamza said the MNF-I units in Kirkuk were not cooperating or coordinating with the Iraqi police because of its ineffectiveness. He said the MNF-I were not reinforcing the police's role, warning that if the MNF-I did not solve this problem, the police would remain weak. Hamza added that although the MNF-I and Kirkuk residents shared excellent relations, U.S. security contractors were causing some problems. Hawijah Hotbed for the Insurgency -------------- ¶5. (C) Hamza identified the "new" Arabs as the main source of Kirkuk's security problems, stating that the majority of Kirkuk's security incidents occurred in the Arab neighborhoods of southern Kirkuk. He said the poor security situation in the Hawijah area had a negative effect on the rest of Kirkuk province. Hamza argued that Hawijah was a terrorist safe haven and complained that Hawijah's tribal leaders benefited from the former regime and functioned only according to the feelings of the people. ¶6. (C) Hamza said he believed the terrorists in Ninawa fled to Hawijah following MNF-I operations in 2005. He described Hawijah as IED infested, stating that AQI was responsible for about 70 percent of the IED attacks. Hamza said that Ansar al-Sunnah (AAS),however, was the strongest terrorist group in Kirkuk province. Hamza said AAS recently changed its strategy from planting IED's to assassinating senior officials, which he described as more effective. He credited AAS of using the armor-penetrating explosive devices made outside Iraq. Sadrists - Potential Security Threat in Kirkuk -------------- - ¶7. (C) Hamza said the Shia Arabs began moving to Kirkuk in large numbers around 1963. He said both the Badr Organization and the Sadrists were armed and were prepared to engage in armed resistance on command from their superiors. Hamza claimed that Badr primarily targeted Ba'athists, particularly senior Ba'ath officers and former Iraqi military pilots that bombed Badr posts in Iran prior to OIF. Hamza claimed that the Kurds were trying to protect the pilots in order to mitigate ethnic tensions. ¶8. (C) Hamza described the Sadrist presence in Kirkuk as much stronger than Badr, but less organized. He claimed that Sadrists recruited from all groups, including former Ba'athists and criminals, which comprised a loose confederation bonded by a loyalty to Muqtada al-Sadr. ¶9. (C) Hamza said Sadrist militia - Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) - forces were located just south of Kirkuk city in Daquk and Tuz Khurmatu. He claimed his sources reported that the JAM last month established regiments of 120 members in both Daquk and Tuz Khurmatu. The sources indicated that those JAM members prior to arriving in Kirkuk met in Najaf with Muqtada al-Sadr, who promised them adequate weapons to fight the Kurds in preventing Kirkuk from becoming part of the Kurdistan Region. Views on Article 58; Ba'athists in the NOC; and Civil War KIRKUK 00000104 002.2 OF 002 -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Hamza stated that Kurdish leaders were telling their people to respect Kirkuk's other ethnicities, but the Kurdish community was losing patience. He said the Kurds were angry that the Iraqi Government was not implementing Article 58, yet many Kurds remained in tents, without schools and public services. Hamza said that despite accusations of Kurdish expansionism, many Kurdish natives of Kirkuk remained in Iraqi Kurdistan because they had jobs and homes there. ¶11. (C) Hamza noted that many Ba'athist criminals remained employed at the Northern Oil Company (NOC). He complained that only 600 of the NOC's 12,000 employees were Kurds. Hamza told us that the Baghdad Integrity Committee was coming to Kirkuk for the next 30 days to remove those Ba'athists still employed with the NOC. ¶12. (C) Hamza said Kirkuk had all the ingredients for civil war but that it would not commence in Kirkuk. He added that Ba'athists, who were abundant in some areas of Kirkuk province, however, were trying to instigate a civil war. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Most of Hamza's assessments corroborated with reporting we have received from other contacts. Hamza's concerns about the Kurds' alleged low number of NOC employees may suggest the Kurds are attempting to expand their strategy in Kirkuk from political and security dominance to economic supremacy, particularly in the city's important oil sector. Biographic Note -------------- ¶14. Hamza was born in 1974 in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan during a time of fighting between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi regime. His father was a strong supporter of Mullah Mustafa Barzani and, following the Algiers Accord in 1975, fled with his family to Iran for a year. Hamza in March 1991 was involved in the fighting between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi regime for control of Kirkuk. He earned a diploma in military science from the Zhako Military Academy in 1991. Hamza worked as a liaison officer between the KDP and Coalition forces in the runup to OIF. BIGUS