SSR - BLOCKAGES REMAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000711

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: SSR - BLOCKAGES REMAIN

Classified By: A/DCM Melissa Sanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: Little progress was made at the May 3
meeting of the Joint Commission on Security on key issues of
improving military discipline and establishing a viable
rhythm for integration and demobilization. SRSG Swing
strongly cautioned the GDRC officials present that the
already faltering military reform process is in danger of
complete collapse. Donors are expected to call upon the
Security Council to convene a meeting to review SSR in the
Congo, following earlier reviews in 2004 and 2005. This
weekend's meetings of the Congolese Supreme Defense Council,
at which President Kabila reportedly demanded progress on the
key issues of SSR, may provide a way forward. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The May 3 meeting was convened after the April 19
meeting was adjourned early when donors pointed out that the
absence of most of the key Congolese actors made further
discussion superfluous. At the May 3 meeting, attendance was
much improved, including CHOD Kisempia, DefMin Onusumba,
FARDC Inspector General, the Vice-Minister of Interior, and
CONADER head Daniel Kawata, among others. At the suggestion
of SRSG Swing, it was decided that the Commission should
start meeting every two weeks, and the next meeting therefore
is scheduled for May 17.

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Military Discipline - What Can Be Done?
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3. (C) The first and most pressing issue on the agenda was to
urgently develop a means of addressing the increasingly
flagrant abuses of human rights by FARDC troops. Although all
necessary GDRC officials attended the meeting, including
Chief of the Armed Forces General Kisempia, few ideas were
forthcoming. Both Kisempia and Minister of Defense Onusumba
noted the need for an educational campaign to instruct troops
in human rights issues, and Kisempia proposed that the
international community (perhaps the Red Cross) begin
providing such instruction at the integration centers.
Despite having been provided a list by MONUC of over 1200
specific instances of human rights violations by FARDC, GDRC
officials were not prepared to discuss specific punitive
measures in those cases, nor were they prepared to discuss
establishing mandatory sentencing for identified violations.
The FARDC Inspector General noted that there are only 300
staff in the military justice system, and appealed for
international assistance to train and equip more judges.
Kisempia noted that he had recently returned from visiting
units stationed in eastern Congo, and stressed that he spoke
to the officers and troops and issued a stern "zero
tolerance" message. He added, however, that his ability to
enforce such a message was limited by the very nature of the
transition, since military elements coming from different
components do not necessarily respect his orders. In closing
discussion of this agenda item, Vice President Ruberwa noted
that despite the Congo's "incoherent" military system there
is strong political will to combat impunity.

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Integration - Still Lagging
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4. (C) GDRC officials reiterated the usual litany of problems
blocking the smooth functioning of integration, including
inadequate supplies of fuel to ensure transport from the
centers to the posts of assignment for graduating troops.
They asked for international community assistance in
providing fuel and transport. Elements such as the 7th
Integrated Brigade are still taking up space at the Rumangabu
brassage center (North Kivu),for instance, and because they
have not been fully deployed to Luberu (North Kivu),it isn't
possible for the next group of soldiers to arrive at
Rumangabu for integration. The GDRC is still (comment:
optimistically, end comment) envisioning having 12 integrated
brigades deployed before elections (currently scheduled for
end-July),and outlined the envisoned deployment for the 8th
through 12th elements.

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Demobilization - Still A Problem
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5. (C) Serious problems also continue in the demobilization
sphere. Ex-soldiers opting for demobilization who have not
received their promised benefits after months of waiting are

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being recruited by the militias in Ituri and are beginning to
pillage local markets and farms located near other
demobilization sites throughout eastern Congo. In a futile
exchange, the World Bank blamed CONADER for the problems and
CONADER blamed the World Bank. Both agreed, however, that
there have been delays in transmitting funds, and CONADER
head Daniel Kawata said that the initial payment system,
using cell phone transfers, has been scrapped and a new
system is being examined. There was no response by either the
World Bank or GDRC officials to the question of how a new
system would be funded. The Bank representative noted that
with the removal of two of the three directors the Bank is
now examining how the demobilization program might be more
effectively managed, and indicated that perhaps it might be
easier to start from scratch. CONADER pressed for immediate
transfer of $4m to address back-payment issues, but it was
clear that these funds would not be provided until the
question of the missing funds already provided has been
addressed.


6. (C) Likewise, there was no discernible forward momentum on
the key question of registering and controlling arms turned
in by decommissioning troops.

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Outcomes: Too Little, Too Late?
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7. (C) Comment: Although the May 3 meeting produced no
progress, a series of meetings of the Congolese Supreme
Defense Council (reportedly two on May 6 and a third
scheduled for May 8, to include -- for the first time --
Ministers responsible for Finance and Budget) could provide
some desperately needed initiatives from the Congolese side.
The agenda for these meetings reportedly included all the key
SSR issues, including lack of discipline, human rights
violations, and confusion and inefficiency in the integration
process. Although it might eventually prove to be too little,
too late, this is the first concrete demonstration of
high-level Congolese concern with making SSR work.

DOUGHERTY