Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KINSHASA619
2006-04-19 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

NORTH KIVU: CONGOLESE TUTSIS SAY NKUNDA, RUBERWA

Tags:  PGOV MARR CG 
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VZCZCXRO7873
RR RUEHMR
DE RUEHKI #0619/01 1091503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191503Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3712
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000619 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV MARR CG
SUBJECT: NORTH KIVU: CONGOLESE TUTSIS SAY NKUNDA, RUBERWA
MUST GO

Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000619 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV MARR CG SUBJECT: NORTH KIVU: CONGOLESE TUTSIS SAY NKUNDA, RUBERWA MUST GO Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Summary: During an April 12-18 trip to North Kivu, PolCouns had the chance to speak at length with several Congolese Tutsis (businessmen, soldiers, bureaucrats, farmers) on a variety of subjects of interest to them. Particularly important to this group were the presence in North Kivu of Laurent Nkunda and Vice President Ruberwa's diminishing credibility. End summary. -------------- Nkunda Needs To Go.... -------------- ¶2. (C) In general, Congolese Tutsis in North Kivu agree that Nkunda's mere presence is destabilizing and poses a threat to legitimate governmental authorities. There is support for the idea that "neutralizing" him but leaving him in place in the province (Governor Serufuli's present approach) doesn't really deal with the problem, but no one seemed to have a better idea. The spectrum of opinion regarding Nkunda is best captured by conversations with two individuals: Albert (no last name given),the deputy of the ANR in North Kivu and Serufuli's security advisor, and Colonel Innocent, ostensibly retired from the FARDC, who was one of the officers whose men followed (pretty much en masse) Nkunda in 2004 when he led the attack on Bukavu, although Innocent himself stayed in Goma (his posting at the time). ¶3. (C) Albert is implacably opposed to Nkunda's presence -- indeed, to his continued existence -- for intensely personal reasons. When Nkunda moved into Rutshuru late last year he singled out Albert's father for persecution, evicting him from his home and "arresting" him for three days until Albert arrived with a military force to effect his father's release. Albert stated that when Nkunda returned to North Kivu he was essentially penniless, having been "summarily" ejected by the GOR from his Rwandan refuge. Within five weeks of his arrival, however, he had convinced several disgruntled Tutsi businessmen (Bizima Karaha, the richest Tutsi in the province, Viktor Nganziyo and Modeste Mukabuza) to help him underwrite a "Tutsi self-defense force," and used those monies to attract ex-ANC troops dissatisfied with the brassage process. Albert characterized Nkunda's propaganda as predictable but effective: with elections approaching the anti-Tutsi forces are mobilizing to create a genocidal incident; brassage is just a way of
getting the ex-ANC Tutsi troops, defenders of the helpless civilians, out of the province; the soldiers therefore should resist being manipulated and instead rally around Nkunda. ¶4. (C) At his peak, Albert said, Nkunda could have called on about 5,000 troops, although not all were physically in his vicinity. Now, Albert claimed, he is down to only about 30 officers and about 300 troops who remain loyal. Funding sources have apparently dried up in recent weeks as Karaha has been approached by members of President Kabila's entourage and encouraged to stop helping Nkunda. That said, Albert argued vehemently that as long as Nkunda remains in the province he is a potentially destabilizing force. The majority of Congolese Tutsis don't want Nkunda to stay, he asserted (and the more cautious Innocent agreed),but there is no clear way to make him leave, since Rwanda doesn't want to take him back and no third country has indicated willingness to give him asylum, which he apparently is seeking. ¶5. (C) PolCouns asked (retired) Colonel Innocent about the possibility of a military attack against Nkunda's site (an alternative solution currently being proposed by Governor Serufuli). Innocent said that it would be easy, militarily, to mount such an attack but cautioned that even though Nkunda presently has few friends or sympathizers, a frontal assault could potentially make him a martyr. He is a very persuasive speaker, Innocent noted, and could quickly manipulate public opinion in his favor (along the lines of, "Nasty Hutu Governor Sponsors Attack on Innocent Tutsi..."). This was basically what Nkunda did in the prelude to his attack on Bukavu, Innocent said -- he held a series of meetings with the troops in which he spoke passionately about the need to protect the "Banyamulenge brothers" from tribal-based aggression and, of course, distributed copious amounts of cash. ¶6. (C) PolCouns asked why Innocent permitted his troops to, effectively, mutiny and follow Nkunda while he himself KINSHASA 00000619 002 OF 002 remained behind to await their return. A distinctly uncomfortable Innocent said that he had not himself been persuaded by Nkunda's argument but judged the prevailing dynamic to be such that if he had tried to forbid his troops to take part, he might have been shot. He cautioned that in trying to address the Nkunda problem now it was important to avoid "empowering" Nkunda again, and questioned rhetorically why he couldn't be allowed to die in peace, as he is reportedly suffering from an advanced stage of HIV/AIDS. Albert broke in to assert that Nkunda, while demonstrating symptoms of the disease (including, he said, increased emotional and mental instability),is not likely to die quickly of the disease because he is on medication. -------------- ... And Ruberwa Should Go Too -------------- ¶7. (C) Equally vehement views were expressed about relations between the Congolese Tutsis and the Banyamulenge, and about Vice President Ruberwa's lack of leadership. (Note: Ruberwa, a Banyamulenge, is president of the RCD party. End Note.) No Banyamulenge -- not Ruberwa, not Moise Nyarangabo -- can speak for all Congolese Tutsis or represent their interests, PolCouns was told several times. The Banyamulenge are an insular people uninterested in integrating into the broader Congolese society, whereas Congolese Tutsis in general believe their future can only be secured by such incorporation. What's more, PolCouns was reminded, the Banyamulenge are only interested in advancing their own cause -- witness VP Ruberwa's consistent emphasis on Banyamulenge issues and his virtual disinterest in questions affecting most Congolese. Regarding Congolese Tutsis in particular, several men noted that there are no Congolese Tutsis in important posts in the government, only Banyamulenge. Ruberwa was accused of actively working to impede progress by Congolese Tutsis and "tar them with the same brush" as the Banyamulenge. There was general consensus that Ruberwa should be replaced as leader of the party sooner rather than later, and only reluctantly did the excited interlocutors concede that changing party leaders right now, after the electoral process has commenced, could be detrimental to the party's interests. The next RCD leader will be anyone but a Banyamulenge, they insisted. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) It was clear that some of the most excitable Tutsis, such as Albert, would probably be quite prepared to do away with Nkunda and thus eliminate that perplexing problem. Interestingly, no one believed that Nkunda would try to destabilize the electoral process per se, although a couple of the more suspicious minds postulated that, post-election, he could be a potent weapon for (unnamed) disgruntled politicians. While there has never been any love lost between the Congolese Tutsis and the Banyamulenge, it appears that Ruberwa's almost single-minded focus recently on his own community's issues may have cost him whatever support he might once have enjoyed in the broader Tutsi community, leaving him vulnerable to future political attacks from rivals as diverse as Bizima Karaha and Governor Serufuli himself. End comment. DOUGHERTY

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