A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH DRC VICE PRESIDENT RUBERWA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000528 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM MARR EFIN CG SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH DRC VICE PRESIDENT RUBERWA REF: KINSHASA 523 Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Summary: During an April 2 meeting, DRC Vice President Azarias Ruberwa provided an overview of current Congolese developments remarkably similar to that given earlier in the day by President Kabila (ref). He emphasized that despite last-minute complications, the electoral process is irreversibly underway. He noted that although both the RCD (his party) and the UDPS (the party of Etienne Tshisekedi) had wavered over taking part in elections due to a shared sense of exclusion and discrimination, they had in the end chosen different paths. The RCD is taking part in elections -- Ruberwa filed his presidential candidacy April 2, the final day for registration -- while the UDPS has chosen to boycott the elections as it boycotted the transition. Security, particularly in eastern Congo, remains a problem, and military integration/demobilization has proceeded far too slowly and sporadically. The decision by the IMF to suspend the long-running program surprised Ruberwa, particularly since the elections are effectively underway. Major post-electoral goalposts will include effective protection of minority rights as guaranteed by the constitution, continued improvement in the Congolese military, ongoing improvement in regional relations with the help of the Tripartite Plus mechanism, and economic development in coordination with the international community. End Summary. ¶2. (U) A/S Jendayi Frazer met April 2 with DRC Vice President Azarias Ruberwa. (Note: Ruberwa is also president of the Rally for Congolese Democracy party, the RCD. End Note.) Ruberwa's chief of staff and head of protocol were present. Ambassador Meece, Special Assistant Kendra Gaither, and PolCouns also attended. -------------- Elections -- No Going Back -------------- ¶3. (C) A/S Frazer began the meeting by congratulating Ruberwa on his registration as a presidential candidate, noting that it must be an exciting day. With one of his rare smiles, Ruberwa acknowledged that it was a special day, adding that the A/S's visit comes at a crucial moment with the transition winding down and the electoral process picking up steam. He welcomed the engagement of the international community in supporting the elections, noting recent visits by South African President Mbeki, Congo-Brazzaville President Sassou, UN DPKO Head Guehenno, EU High Representative Solana, and of course, Secretary General Kofi Annan. The electoral process, Ruberwa said, while not perfect is irreversible, thanks to the efforts of both Congolese and international partners. In the wake of the registration of almost 26 million voters, and with the new constitution approved by national plebiscite, the will of the Congolese people for the elections is clear. ¶4. (C) Ruberwa volunteered that, on the final day of registration for presidential and national assembly candidates, he was told by elections officials that he was the seventy-first registered presidential candidate and that there now are almost 4,000 candidates for the 500 national assembly seats. (Note: Although there may be 71 presidential applications filed, it is likely that not all will finally be accepted by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI),as noted later in the evening by CEI President Malu Malu. Some applications will be rejected for a variety of administrative reasons, or because the candidate did not pay the required registration fee, which in the case of the presidency is $50,000, and for the national assembly (party slate or individual independent candidate) is $250. End Note.) Ruberwa said that he understands that the current plan is to commence the official electoral campaign in May, with the goal of beginning elections (first-round presidential and national assembly) on June 25. He warned against allowing the elections to begin after 30 June, which is an important date both as the official end of the transition and symbolically. Slippage beyond 30 June could risk the country's entering a legal vacuum which could easily lead to chaos. ¶5. (C) A/S Frazer congratulated Ruberwa on having helped the transition achieve its most important goal -- arriving at elections. She advised him to avoid any decisions which might overly delay the start of elections, sharing his concern about the possible legal and social effects. History, she KINSHASA 00000528 002 OF 003 noted, will record the efforts of the transitional leaders to ensure successful elections. -------------- Problems Remain, Of Course -------------- ¶6. (C) Ruberwa added that of course problems remain. He highlighted two as particularly troubling: the question of territorial status for Minembwe (the High Plateau region in South Kivu province with the highest concentration of Banyamulenge, Ruberwa's tribe, in the DRC),and the UDPS refusal to take part in elections. On Minembwe, Ruberwa repeated his oft-stated arguments that there are two factors which should be considered: the need to ensure continuation of the administrative organs established in Minembwe by the RCD during the war (which could be done without declaring the area a territory),and the principle of minority representation (if Minembwe were a territory it could receive one Assembly seat which almost certainly would go to a Banyamulenge). While omitting any mention of protracted negotiations, offers, and counter-offers which have been going on for the last three months, Ruberwa referred instead to a proposal to have the lame-duck Parliament reopen the electoral law to try to find a means of addressing his concerns. (Comment: This is highly unlikely, as the proposal enjoys little support, and reopening the electoral law would risk toppling the precariously constructed electoral system when the process is already underway. End Comment.) Reminding the A/S of the U.S. history of protecting the minority -- many Congolese Tutsis and Banyamulenge fled to the U.S. during the worst times from 1997-2001 -- he asked her to do what she could to persuade President Kabila to search for a workable solution. ¶7. (C) The other problem, Ruberwa said, is that of the UDPS and the decision by its leader Tshisekedi to boycott elections and forbid his party members to run for office. Referring to the two objections normally posed by the UDPS as reasons for their non-participation -- the registration of two UDPS parties, one under Tshisekedi and a second under a former Tshisekedi follower who split off from the party; and the supposed under-registration of UDPS supporters -- Ruberwa acknowledged that the former had been resolved April 1, although too late to make a real difference. On the latter, he said that he personally supported the idea of reopening selected voter registration centers (presumably to include the two Kasai provinces, the UDPS base) for a week or so. A certain "discipline" should have been imposed, he argued, to help ensure an inclusive electoral process. The UDPS might take out its frustrations at not being included post-elections, he warned. Ruberwa contrasted Tshisekedi's decision with his own to participate in the election process, placing "higher considerations" of the nation above his own. Ruberwa acknowledged having received substantial counsel from the international community to stay engaged, but noted that ultimately this difficult decision had been a personal one. ¶8. (C) The A/S responded that the U.S. will always continue to believe in the importance of minority rights and applauded Ruberwa's decision to run as a presidential candidate and have his party (of which several other members are Banyamulenge or Congolese Tutsis) take part. Involvement in the democratic system is the best way to ensure that his community's interests will be incorporated in the goals of the future elected government and their rights protected. She noted that the transition has dealt with many such difficult issues during its tenure and resolved them successfully through dialog and consensus -- the question of Minembwe likely will be solved in the same way. As for the UDPS, Tshisekedi has had many chances to reverse his decision and at least permit his party to take part in elections. He has made his decision, and the electoral process, which is larger and more important than any one individual, will continue without him. The UDPS should be encouraged to recognize that its members could play constructive post-elections roles even if not elected, although naturally it would have been better for their interests had they decided to take part, as Ruberwa and the RCD had done. -------------- Security -- Still A Problem -------------- ¶9. (C) Ruberwa admitted that due to sporadic progress and general disorganization, military integration/demobilization is well behind schedule. Instead of the eighteen integrated KINSHASA 00000528 003 OF 003 brigades originally planned to be formed before elections, the GDRC might manage twelve. (Note: There are currently seven integrated brigades graduated and two in training. However, one of the original seven essentially disintegrated, and it has been disbanded and its members placed in other units pending another training round, a further setback. End Note.) The integrated brigades have been deployed in eastern Congo, Ruberwa went on, to address the most pressing security threats, including the LRA and FDLR. He noted that the LRA issue is particularly troublesome because it has provoked aggressive and threatening statements from Ugandan President Museveni. Ruberwa stressed that the GDRC has the political will to deal with the LRA problem, but its military instruments are weak, and MONUC cannot do everything. He noted that the GDRC is trying to "reassure" Museveni of its intentions via diplomatic channels. ¶10. (C) In the Kivu provinces, where the most intransigent security problem is the presence of the FDLR/ex-FAR, full deployment of the assigned integrated brigades has not yet been made. Ruberwa noted that although some military operations have been undertaken by both FARDC and MONUC against the FDLR, the problem will not be solved until after the elections. The Tripartite Plus and the Kisangani-based fusion cell have an important role. The Tripartite, for example, has genuinely facilitated dialogue and contributed to improving regional stability. He urged the A/S to ensure its continuation. ¶11. (C) The A/S agreed that both the FARDC and MONUC face huge challenges and inevitably there are limits on what can be done. She said that she would be looking into possible ways in which the U.S. could do more to assist with military training. The Tripartite Plus will continue, and within that mechanism and also in bilateral discussions the U.S. will continue to encourage Rwanda to do more to encourage the return of the FDLR and make clear to Uganda that continued support to militias operating in Orientale province is unacceptable. -------------- Economy - IMF Decision Surprising -------------- ¶12. (C) Good governance is the RCD party platform, and Ruberwa ended his remarks by noting that after elections a serious effort must be quickly made to end corruption and impunity. That said, the decision by the IMF to end its five-year program just as elections are getting underway is surprising. After a long lapse in relations with the Bretton Woods institutions, Ruberwa said, he had thought that the DRC was on-track in establishing a continuing relationship. Of course circumstances are not perfect but much has been done, so this decision was particularly difficult for him to understand. ¶13. (C) In closing the A/S encouraged Ruberwa to consider all that had been done -- voter registration, the constitutional referendum, candidate registration -- as essential electoral groundwork. However, ongoing cooperative efforts by the major transitional players (Kabila, Vice Presidents Bemba and Ruberwa) will be needed to achieve the goal of successful and durable elections. MEECE