Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KINSHASA265
2006-02-16 16:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

ITURI UPDATE: FARDC MOVING INTO POSITION AGAINST

Tags:  PGOV MOPS KPKO CG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000265 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: ITURI UPDATE: FARDC MOVING INTO POSITION AGAINST
FRPI MILITIA

REF: A. KINSHASA 141


B. KINSHASA 105

Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000265 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO CG SUBJECT: ITURI UPDATE: FARDC MOVING INTO POSITION AGAINST FRPI MILITIA REF: A. KINSHASA 141 ¶B. KINSHASA 105 Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Following a three-week delay due to logistical problems in previously planned military operations against the Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI),the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) is moving commando troops from their base in Aba to Tchei (with the help of MONUC),where remnants of the FRPI are entrenched. A February 15 internal MONUC planning document reported the same-day transfer of 10 truckloads of soldiers from Aba to Aru, where they will be transported via MONUC airlift to Tchei. MONUC reports this first group of 270 troops is expected in Bunia February 16 and from there will be sent to reinforce existing FARDC 1st Integrated Brigade and MONUC Ituri Brigade forces in Tchei. MONUC military officers said operations against the FRPI, and its leader, Cobra Matata, will resume once the full battalion is in place. ¶2. (C) The delay was due in large part to problems with FARDC funding. According to a February 14 internal MONUC document, the FARDC's Central Military Command in Kinshasa did not authorize until February 13 the release of the funds to allow the transfer from Aba to Aru (which are approximately 110km apart). MONUC reports the FARDC authorized 36,000 USD for the movement of these troops, who in theory previously had been stationed for potential operations against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) near the DRC-Sudan border area. ¶3. (C) The February 14 document also reports that a special MONUC Ituri Brigade aerial reconnaissance mission (conducted the same day) revealed that the FRPI appeared to be regrouping and reorganizing in the hills surrounding Tchei. MONUC observers reported that the militia seemed to have occupied the space and was gearing up for "strong resistance" against pending military operations. -------------- UPDATE ON PETER KARIM'S WHEREABOUTS -------------- ¶4. (C) MONUC reported on February 15 that military observers in Mahagi have evidence that Peter Karim, leader of the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC),has sought refuge in Katanga village (approximately 100km west of Mahagi). Observers indicated Karim is hiding in the house of a demobilized ex-combatant known by the name "Mambo." MONUC also reports that Karim is integrating other demobilized ex-combatants around Katanga with his remaining MRC forces. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) The delay in completing the military offensive against the FRPI is troubling. First, it again underscores pervasive administrative and logistical problems facing the FARDC that impact its ability to become an effective military force. Second, the hiatus in operations against the FRPI allowed the militia time to regroup and resupply, therefore making the task of eliminating them all the more difficult. ¶6. (C) An additional complicating factor has been the presence of LRA elements in the DRC and the killing of eight Guatemalan special forces peacekeepers January 23. The FARDC is moving troops from Aba, the nearest settlement point to the site of the LRA/MONUC confrontation, Garamba National Park -- albeit still a 30-minute helicopter flight away. The FARDC itself has no way to cover that distance, as surface transport is not practical. Nonetheless, the move may leave the GDRC open to criticism that the FARDC is not doing enough to eliminate the LRA problem. Like MONUC itself, the GDRC thus finds itself in the difficult situation of trying to resolve two significant security issues (the LRA and other militia threats in Ituri) without adequate resources and manpower to accomplish either. Furthermore, the LRA situation has slowed MONUC's plans for dealing with the militias in eastern DRC (i.e., completing anti-militia operations in Ituri by the end of March),which has allowed those like Peter Karim to continue their destabilizing activities. (Septel will address broader stresses on MONUC's current and future operations in eastern Congo.) End comment. MEECE NNNN

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