NORTH KIVU: SITUATION FLUID

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000215 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL CG SUBJECT: NORTH KIVU: SITUATION FLUID REF: KINSHASA 101 Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Kinshasa has responded both politically and militarily to the crisis in North Kivu, and the relatively rapid response has helped temporarily reduce, but not eliminate, tensions. Both MONUC Head of Office M'hand Lajouzi and Defense Minister Adolphe Onusumba believe that North Kivu Governor Eugene Serufuli's credibility with the general population has increased as a result of Kinshasa's support, but Serufuli himself remains concerned about deeper rifts between the Tutsi and Hutu communities which will not be easily or quickly addressed. Although Kinshasa may be inching toward a decision to confront renegade General Laurent Nkunda militarily, its lack of military capability, the necessary coordination with MONUC and vital pre-action political groundwork within the Tutsi community suggest that such an action is likely to be a while in coming. End Summary. -------------- The Military Angle -- Calmer, for the Moment -------------- ¶2. (C) Defense Minister Adolphe Onusumba (from the RCD party) and Air Force Commander General John Numbi (PPRD) spent the last week in North Kivu responding to the military and political crisis triggered by the January 19 - 20 attack on Rutshuru by insurgent elements (reftel). While Onusumba focused more sharply on the political aspects, Numbi oversaw the first phase of the deployment of the Angolan-trained Second Integrated Brigade from Kinshasa to North Kivu and distribution of its elements to some of the province's "hot spots" including Rutshuru (where the Second replaced what was left of the Fifth Integrated Brigade),Massisi, Sake and Kanyabayonga. Numbi accompanied the troops to their stations, and told PolCouns that among other things he paid salaries (to all the troops and not just the Second) and distributed two weeks' worth of supplies (again, to all troops and not just the Second). He -- in some cases together with Onusumba -- also addressed the public and met privately with civil society and local political leaders. Numbi also transferred two of his five functional fighters to Goma where, he told PolCouns, they would be used to support operations against renegade General Laurent Nkunda. (Comment: Both Onusumba and Numbi separately assured PolCouns that each had spoken to James Kabarebe in Rwanda to brief him about possible �00A;operations in North Kivu and the deployment of the fighter aircraft to support such operations. End Comment.) ¶3. (C) Numbi downplayed reports that the deployment of the Second Integrated was not universally popular, dismissively saying that the same elements in Rutshuru who had "conspired" with the insurgents to encourage the short-lived occupation of the city were unhappy to have the Fifth Integrated (which had a significant component of Tutsis from the area) removed. However, both Onusumba and Serufuli acknowledged to PolCouns the potential downsides of implanting "Kinshasa loyal" troops in the areas which had been most prone to support Nkunda and other anti-Kinshasa elements. Any misbehavior on their part, such as looting, raping, or other activities which too often are typical of FARDC troops -- would quickly be seized upon by extremist political actors such as RCD/G hardliner Bizima Karaha as "evidence" of Kinshasa's intent to target Tutsis, and could provoke a confrontation with the non-integrated Tutsi FARDC elements still stationed in these areas. In response to a direct question, Onusumba said he would do his best to ensure that troops in North Kivu, particularly the Second, are regularly paid and supplied but admitted that he is worried that this won't be the case. ¶4. (C) PolCouns asked Numbi about possible military action against renegade General Laurent Nkunda. In his typically boastful way, Numbi said that Nkunda had about two weeks left. Onusumba also said that indeed a military solution might be needed. He told PolCouns that he had himself discussed this possibility with Kabarebe. Kararebe reportedly told him that Nkunda had been told months ago to go home to Congo and not trouble anyone. Kabarebe said that since Nkunda was not causing a political or military problem it was not clear to him why the Congolese continued to be so agitated about his presence. Onusumba added that Vice President for Security and Defense Azarias Ruberwa (the president of the RCD) had called Nkunda to suggest that he turn himself in and avoid a military confrontation. Serufuli, who told PolCouns last week that he might himself try to take some sort of action against Nkunda in retaliation for Nkunda's role in provoking the attack on Rutshuru, said that he understood that there is a plan to which he is not privy. -------------- The Political Angle -- Dangers Remain -------------- ¶5. (C) Both MONUC Head of Office M'hand Lajouzi and Onusumba told PolCouns they believe that the political position of North Kivu Governor Eugene Serufuli has been somewhat strengthened as a result of Kinshasa's relatively rapid action. Lajouzi mentioned particularly that members of the Nande community expressed surprise that Serufuli had such "influence" in Kinshasa. Serufuli himself, however, was far less sanguine. While cautiously welcoming the reinforcements from Kinshasa, Serufuli told PolCouns the arrival of the Second Integrated carries with it the risk of reinforcing prevailing Tutsi sentiments that Kinshasa is seizing on an excuse to "dominate" North Kivu as it has done in South Kivu since the mid-2004 "rebel" takeover of Bukavu, to the perceived detriment of Banyamulenge interests in that province. On the other hand, Serufuli said, Kinshasa's rapid response had helped him calm hot-headed Hutus demanding that he take some sort of punitive action against the (largely Tutsi) troops responsible for the attacks on Rutshuru, as well as increasing his credibility with Hutus and some Nande. (Comment: Indeed, Serufuli's position probably has been both strengthened and weakened by this incident and its ongoing aftermath. While moving ever closer to Kinshasa and enhancing cooperation may help enhance Serufuli's electoral prospects, it nonetheless represents a diminishing of his previous high level of autonomy, an outcome he has consistently sought to avoid. End Comment.) None of this, however, had helped soothe the political tensions with the Tutsi community which are the likely genesis of the military attacks. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. ¶6. (C) Defense Minister Onusumba told PolCouns that after considerable effort he was finally able to get a meeting with former RCD politician Bizima Karaha. Speaking immediately after leaving Karaha's house, a tired and discouraged Onusumba said he believes Karaha was surprised, but not intimidated by, the degree and speed of Kinshasa's military response. Reminded that Nkunda is a wanted war criminal, and that those assisting him could be likewise subject to arrest or sanctions, Karaha asked rhetorically who was supporting Nkunda. In the next breath, however, he launched into a spirited defense of the insurgent general, whom he characterized as the "sole remaining champion of the Tutsi people." Karaha said that rather than condemning Nkunda for his "justifiable" actions Kinshasa would be well advised to seek a positive role for the general that would capitalize on his popularity -- perhaps putting him in charge of a provincial paramilitary security force. PolCouns (somewhat incredulously) asked if Onusumba thought Karaha was serious, to which the Defense Minister replied that with Karaha it is always hard to tell. In any event, Onusumba said that he had failed to convince Karaha and said he feared that his visit might actually provoke Karaha into new anti-Kinshasa diatribes. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Some in Kinshasa appear to be inching toward trying to militarily dislodge Nkunda from his North Kivu roost. Several difficult but essential preliminaries, however, suggest that such an attack cannot come quickly. For instance, close coordination with MONUC will be essential, as the FARDC would not be able to mobilize or sustain a military attack on Nkunda's relatively remote location without substantial MONUC logistical support. Even then, the FARDC's prospects for success are not good since Nkunda is entrenched, well armed, and likely would be protected by up to 3000 ex-ANC troops located near his encampment. The FARDC itself has very limited capabilities for any kind of effective military operation. Adroit and extensive political groundwork would also be necessary before any attack is attempted. Failing to convince critical political elements within the Tutsi community that any action is in rsponse to Nkunda's war criminal status, and not n retaliation for recent events, could result ina widespread military confrontation pitting non-ntegrated Tutsi FARDC elements against the Secon Integrated, MONUC, and any other perceived "antiTutsi" forces involved. President Kabila is to iniiate consultations in Kinshasa with North Kivu laders later this week. At the moment, however, here is currently no credible messenger capable f convincing the agitated North Kivu Tutsis that n attack on Nkunda would not be, indirectly, an ttack on them. Kinshasa is walking a fine line in orth Kivu with few reliable tools, meaning that the risk remains high that the situation could again deteriorate without much warning. MEECE NNNN