CONFIDENTIAL TEMPLATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000172

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL TEMPLATE

REF: PRESIDENTIAL AND SECURITY COORDINATION MEETINGS:

PALAVER HOURS

Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: A roughly six-hour January 23 meeting of the
CIAT with the President and Vice Presidents produced little
other than a renewed demonstration of how difficult it is for
the Transition Government to function. A January 25 session
of the Mixed Commission on Security was also long, but did
cover a number of important pending issues. Significant
real-world positive impact of the discussion, however, will
most certainly require additional follow-up. End summary.

CIAT/Espace Presidentiel
--------------


2. (C) The sixteen member Chiefs of Mission of the
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (known by
its French acronym, CIAT) met for almost six hours with
President Kabila and the four GDRC Vice Presidents (the
Espace Presidentiel) January 23. Independent Election
Commisson (CEI) President Malu Malu and other CEI officials
were invited for a portion of the meeting; Defense Minister
Onusumbu participated in that portion dealing with security
issues. Presidency staffers Ghonda and Cishambo were also
present.


3. (C) CIAT members wished to focus on encouraging Espace
members to use their influence to obtain rapid parliamentary
adoption of a pending critically-needed election law, to
review GDRC salary and budget questions, and to discuss
security sector issues. Instead, over half of the nearly
six-hour-long meeting was devoted to an attack by Vice
President Bemba on the operations director of the CEI.
Following a summary presentation by Malu Malu and some
initial discussion, Bemba launched into an unexpected
diatribe that the operations director had been improperly
selected (note: the official has been in office for over a
year. End note). Waving a copy of the CEI recruiting and
hiring guidelines, Bemba asserted that if the CEI and
international community would not respect their own legal
texts, the election process itself would be open to question.
Malu Malu defended the official, observing that his work had
been good, and his original selection approved by the entire
CEI board, including the representative of the MLC, Bemba's
party. Several CIAT members attempted to move on, observing
that in the absence of any background information, the
question needed further study. At different points, Vice
Presidents Ruberwa and Z'Ahidi made statements vaguely
sympathetic to Bemba in the apparent hope of pushing forward
through conciliatory statements. Bemba would have none of
any of it, repeatedly asserting that nobody was willing to
address his question as to why legal texts were being
ignored. Kabila, unwilling or unable (or both) to assert
control, after more than three hours finally suggested
tossing the ball to the CIAT, proposing the CIAT take 72
hours to examine the issue and prepare a response to the
Espace. Kabila appeared annoyed when CIAT members did not
respond enthusiastically. Eventually, CIAT members agreed to
study the issue.


4. (C) During the discussion, Ruberwa made several attempts
to support a proposal to reopen general voter registration in
response to the opposition party UDPS' latest condition for
it to participate in the elections. As Ruberwa ruefully
observed in a later private meeting with the Ambassador, he
received no support for the idea from anyone present. There
was also some discussion about the CEI's latest registration
totals and work plans. There was little discussion of the
pending electoral law.


5. (C) In a postscript, following a brief January 24
discussion, the CIAT prepared a letter to the Espace
Presidentiel members reaffirming the CIAT's support of the
CEI, its independence and its work demonstrated to-date,
concluding that the internal personnel issue did not appear
to be a legitimate focus of concern outside of the
independent commission's jurisdiction, and reiterating the
importance and urgency of the electoral law. The British
Ambassador reported separate conversation(s) with Bemba in
which Bemba, apparently realizing he had gone too far, said
that he had perceived some possible hostility from CIAT
members. The British Ambassador reportedly told him that in
fact all the CIAT members viewed his performance very
negatively. Bemba asked the CIAT response be delayed until
Bemba discussed the matter further within the Espace. The
CIAT declined and sent the already-drafted letter January 25.


6. (C) The remaining hours saw the somewhat spent meeting
participants discussing the other agenda items, albeit
without any meaningful decisions or results. At minimum,
CIAT members were able to emphasize the importance attached
to issues of good governance, the critical need for better
support to FARDC troops and deployed units, and concerns
regarding various other issues related to the security sector.


7. (C) Comment: Subsequent discussion confirmed that nobody
other than Bemba had heard anything about problems regarding
the CEI operations director, and there was much speculation
about Bemba's motives. Possibilities included previous work
the CEI official had done as part of presidency staff,
possible earlier assistance the official (a lawyer by
training) may have rendered to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in its investigation of abuses in northeastern
DRC possibly implicating Bemba, or Bemba's own deteriorating
political position. The latter focused on whether Bemba was
seeking to lay the groundwork for possible withdrawal from
the electoral process, a premise seemingly contradicted by
his subsequent attempt to forestall the CIAT letter and
Bemba's recent nomination as his MLC party's presidential
candidate. Otherwise, it was simply Bemba at his obstinate
worst. The hours of fruitless discussion did, however,
provide a rather graphic demonstration of how difficult it
can be within the awkward structures of the Transition
Government to reach meaningful conclusions and decisions.
End comment.

Security Mixed Commission
--------------



8. (C) The Mixed Commission on Security met January 25 to
review various aspects of police and military programs. The
Commission is chaired by Vice President Ruberwa and includes
Ministers and other senior GDRC officials dealing with police
and military issues, the military integration program, and
DDR, as well as a large representation of Ambassadors and
other senior representatives from the international community
also involved in this area. The notable absentees from the
January 25 meeting were the Angolan Embassy and the senior
FARDC officer, Chief of Staff General Kisempia. Both
absences are consistent with past practice as neither usually
participates in the Security Mixed Commission sessions.


9. (C) The Mixed Commission agenda was centered on delays
still being experienced in the military integration process,
and substantial discussion was devoted to problems regarding
efficient use of chartered World Food Program planes (vs.
commercial charters) to transport combatants to orientation
centers to begin processing, deployment and other logistics
issues, and related coordination problems and delays in the
DDR process. The ongoing military census initiative was also
reviewed during the discussions, and the group endorsed rapid
implementation of the European Security Mission (EUSEC)
report to effect major financial and administrative reforms
within the FARDC. Ongoing FARDC discipline and other
problems were also discussed, including developments in North
Kivu by insurgent FARDC troops. Vice President Ruberwa
confirmed that the former 5th Integrated Brigade commander
had been removed from North Kivu, and implicitly confirmed
the former commander's incompetence contributing to the
current problems by discussing the need for better selection
of good commanders of the new integrated brigades. Various
other specific military issues were also covered, along with
a general review of the progress do-date of police training,
deployments, and reform activities.


10. (C) The headline of the morning came when Presidency
Military Advisor General Kalume reported that President
Kabila had signed orders confirming that Republic Guard (also
know by the former name as GGSP, or Presidential Guard)
soldiers are to be treated as others in the FARDC, subject to
integration or DDR processing. This had long since been an
issue of concern, with GSSP units increasingly regarded as a
de facto separate force, reporting only to the Presidency and
dominated by Katangans. Kalume did not provide details of
how or when GSSP soldiers are to report to orientation and
processing centers, a subject that will require follow-up.


11. (C) Comment: The meeting lasted several hours and in
fairly typical fashion often went into considerable detail
regarding aspects of the ongoing police and military reform
programs. Somewhat better in tone than the previous meeting,
held in December 2004, integration and DDR program officials
and others offered reports of at least some efforts being
taken to overcome delays and the ever-present coordination
issues. The tone of the meeting was relatively

non-contentious. As always, however, recommendations and
plans will need strong follow-up, as otherwise stated
positive intent tends not to get translated into timely
action. Kisempia's habitual absence is not as serious as it
might seem, as his leadership of the FARDC is largely
ineffectual in any event. While it often becomes somewhat
tedious, the Commission continues to provide a useful if not
unique forum for all the interested players in the GDRC and
international community to review problems and plans
together. End comment.
MEECE


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