GIZENGA'S PARTY MAKES COMMON CAUSE WITH KABILA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001485 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO CG ELECTIONS SUBJECT: GIZENGA'S PARTY MAKES COMMON CAUSE WITH KABILA IN PARLIAMENT AND ELECTIONS REF: A. KINSHASA 1471 ¶B. KINSHASA 1310 Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Antoine Gizenga's Unified Lumumbist Party (PALU) announced September 21 it would join a parliamentary coalition of the Kabila-affiliated Alliance for the Presidential Majority (AMP),and will support President Kabila in the October 29 presidential run-off. While such an alliance should ensure the AMP majority control of the National Assembly, it is not clear whether even a direct order from Gizenga himself can overcome the animosity many traditional PALU members harbor towards Kabila. End summary. ¶2. (U) The September 21 decision to ally Antoine Gizenga's PALU with Kabila's AMP was announced at the conclusion of a PALU caucus meeting that day. Godefroid Mayobo, PALU's spokesman and a newly-elected parliamentarian, confirmed the decision on Voice of America. The alliance with PALU will ensure the AMP a majority in the 500-member National Assembly. While the AMP has already claimed 270 seats on its own, PALU's 34 puts the alliance over the 300-seat "supermajority" required to approve constitutional amendments. ¶3. (SBU) PALU support for Kabila in the second round of presidential voting improves Kabila's chances of victory, mainly by expanding his potential electoral base westward from his strongholds in the east. Nationwide, Gizenga won 13 percent of the first-round vote, over 90 percent of which was concentrated in the western province of Bandundu (where he won 80 percent) and in Kinshasa (where he won 22 percent). Kabila tallied less than three percent of the Bandundu vote and less than 15 percent in Kinshasa, two areas that comprised less than five percent of his nationwide total. ¶4. (C) Mayobo and Gizenga political adviser Adolphe Muzito told us earlier in the week that while there are no guarantees, PALU members are "loyal" and will follow any order given by Gizenga. Muzito said PALU members are well-organized and well-disciplined, and understand the importance of choosing wisely in the second-round vote. Mayobo said that PALU is primarily concerned with maintaining the unity and sovereignty of the DRC and its people, and this will guide PALU supporters to choose Kabila. ¶5. (C) According to Muzito, PALU officials and Gizenga himself concluded that supporting western-based Bemba would make it appear as if there is truly an East-West divide in the DRC. An alliance with Kabila, on the other hand, would promote PALU's focus on the unity and integrity of the country, rather than exacerbating regional differences. He said that this made voting for Kabila the only "logical" choice for PALU. ¶6. (C) Muzito also said Gizenga was not particularly impressed with the way Bemba managed his first-round campaign. He cited in particular Bemba's attempts to use ethnicity ("Congolite") as a campaign tactic, an effort that Muzito said only exacerbated tensions. He stated that PALU officials also were not impressed with Bemba's or RENACO's policies and governance programs, saying that officials failed to provide any outline of their priorities. Mayobo said that Gizenga considered Kabila to be someone who would be more open than Bemba to different ideas and compromise. ¶7. (C) Mayobo told us prior to the announcement that the decision to enter into an alliance with the AMP was made largely out of consideration for PALU's future. He said Gizenga knows the AMP will not need PALU's votes to gain a majority in the National Assembly. Mayobo said Gizenga wants PALU to be a part of the government and not remain outside the system. PALU's 34 Assembly seats in the Assembly, Mayobo said, will enable it to play a decisive role in a future government. ¶8. (C) Mayobo and Muzito both emphasized that no deal has been struck to install Gizenga as prime minister, and Mayobo claimed the party is not currently insisting on receiving any particular positions in a future government. Rather, he said they are seeking "assurances" about the direction Kabila will take as president, especially toward "good governance." ¶9. (C) Mayobo and Muzito were careful to portray PALU's decision as one of creating a coalition with the AMP, not of KINSHASA 00001485 002 OF 002 joining the alliance. Muzito said PALU's support of Kabila and the AMP will only go so far, and that PALU had no intention of being "subsumed" into the larger alliance. Mayobo stressed that PALU will be fielding its own candidates against the AMP in the upcoming provincial assembly elections. ¶10. (C) Comment. The PALU-AMP alliance was not completely unexpected, but the question remains whether PALU supporters can be convinced to vote for an "Easterner" like Kabila. Even with a order from Gizenga himself, Kabila's low totals in western provinces in the July 30 vote makes additional support in these areas a challenge. The political expediency of joining hands with Kabila and the AMP is clearly calculated to guarantee Gizenga and PALU at least a seat at the table, and stands in stark contrast to the decisions taken by Congo's other longtime opposition figure, Etienne Tshisekedi, whose denunciations of the electoral and SIPDIS political processes have left him and his UDPS party out of the picture and out of power. End comment. MEECE