DRC ELECTIONS: LOOKING AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001162


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG
SUBJECT: DRC ELECTIONS: LOOKING AHEAD

Classified By: a/dcm msanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: With two weeks left in the DRC's election
campaign, it is increasingly clear that incumbent president
Joseph Kabila is the likely victor. Whether he will win on
the first round (i.e., July 30) as his supporters continue to
predict is far less certain, although current polling puts
him within striking distance of a first-round victory, with
about 30% of the polled electorate indicating their intention
to vote for him. Actual voter turnout, however, could skew
this apparent support.


2. (C) With over 9,700 candidates for 500 seats in the
National Assembly it is much harder to call the results, but
the strength of the prevailing "throw the bums out" sentiment
regarding the transitional government parties suggests that
independent candidates could gain many more seats than
originally expected. Despite the obvious difficulties in
tallying legislative results -- with the huge number of
candidates and a wildly complicated ballot -- and the many
challenges expected to those results, if Kabila manages a
first-round victory it could allow for the new government to
be installed as early as October, shortening considerably the
period of tenuous uncertainty under the continued governance
of the rump transitional government. End Summary.

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And The (Likely) Winner Is
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3. (C) Although there are 33 presidential candidates
registered for the DRC's upcoming July 30 elections, only a
handful (6-8) are actually serious candidates capable of
conducting effective campaigns. Many others threw their hats
in the ring simply to try to negotiate a better
post-electoral position in exchange for alliances with more
viable candidates, or to attract publicity. This is largely
the case with the so-called group of 19, presidential
candidates who are currently calling for a freeze of the
electoral process to address what they portray as fatal
shortcomings in the process. Although a few from the ranks of
the 19 (notably Joseph Olengenkoy and Oscar Kashala) are
simultaneously pursuing their campaigns, the remainder
content themselves with organizing marches and giving
interviews to the press to reiterate their opposition to the
electoral process. Some high-profile candidates, such as VPs
Ruberwa and Bemba, are also playing double hands, endorsing
calls for dialog and deploring flaws in the system while
aggressively campaigning for election. The inability of the
group of 19 to organize significant demonstrations in
Kinshasa or elsewhere, however, underscores the determination
of the Congolese people to go to elections and avoid another
an old-style division of power via backroom political deals.


4. (C) With two weeks left in the electoral campaign it is
increasingly clear that incumbent president Joseph Kabila is
the likely victor. He enjoys all the normal advantages of an
incumbent, plus an ironic boost from the sheer number of
mostly unknown opponents. An inexperienced electorate,
confronted by the plethura of choices, seems not surprisingly
(although perhaps not entirely happily) to be falling back on
the tried-and-true figures of the transition, who
incidentially also happen to be the candidates best equipped
to conduct nationwide campaigns. Leading contenders,
therefore, are VPs Bemba and Ruberwa, Minister of Regional
Cooperation Mbusa Nyamwisi, National Assembly member (and
former Mobutu-era Central Bank President) Pierre Pay Pay,
former transitional government Ministers Eugene Diomi
(Mines),and Joseph Olengenkoy (Transport) (note: both of
whom were dismissed from the transitional government for
corruption) and, of course, Kabila himself. Gizenga, a
historic figure along the lines of the UDPS' Tshikedi, could
also be a contender despite his relatively small political
base because he enjoys wide name recognition and is the only
"major" candidate not affiliated with the transition. In
terms of Congo's classic east-west political divide these
major candidates are evenly split, with 4 easterners
(Ruberwa, Nyamwisi, Pay Pay and Kabila) and 4 westerners
(Gizenga, Diomi, Olengenkoy and Bemba). This distinction
matters because most Congolese expect a "balanced" government
after elections, meaning that if easterner Kabila wins the
presidency he will be expected to choose a western-based
Prime Minister whose party forms part of the National
Assembly majority.

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The Biggest Part of the Story
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5. (C) With 9,706 candidates for the 500 National Assembly
seats, it is harder to call the results. Although initially
it seemed that the three major parties of the transitional
government, i.e., the PPRD (loosely affiliated with
independent candidate Kabila),MLC (VP Jean-Pierre Bemba's
party) and the RCD (VP Azarias Ruberwa's party) were likely
to gain most of the seats, that dynamic is shifting. All
three parties are suffering a high degree of drift and
disorganization, as high-ranking members are preoccupied with
conducting their own campaigns and have little time or
interest in directing the efforts of their parties. As a
result, many candidates from all three parties are
effectively stranded, without resources from their central
organization and, in many cases, without even knowing what
their parties' key messages are since no electoral materials
have been distributed. Also, although Kabila and Bemba began
their campaigns promptly on June 30 (the day after the
campaign season began),Ruberwa only launched his campaign
July 12, loosing almost two weeks of an already compressed
campaign schedule -- and none of the RCD members were able to
begin their personal campaigns until Jun 10, when Ruberwa
decided that the party should begin campaigning. (Note: The
delay stemmed both from Ruberwa being ill, and the sudden
death of the RCD's highest-ranking military member, General
Sylvain Buki -- Ruberwa and many others remained in Kinshasa
until after Buki's funeral. End Note.)


6. (C) The disorganization of the major parties and a
prevailing popular sentiment favoring "throwing the bums (of
the transition) out" increasingly suggests that independent
candidates could do considerably better in the Assembly
elections than originally thought. (Note: Kabila is running
as an independent in large part to turn the anti-transition
dynamic to his favor by distancing himself from his
ostensible party, the PPRD, although he continues to rely on
the party to provide his campaign infrastructure. End Note.)
At this point it seems possible that "independents" might
even wind up as part of the majority coalition (with one or
more of the "organized" parties as partners) in the future
National Assembly. This will affect the president's choice of
future Prime Minister, since the individual selected must
come from the ranks of the majority party or coalition of the
National Assembly.

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But When?
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7. (C) A first-round victory for Kabila (or any other
presidential candidate) would likely hasten the formation of
a new post-election government, conceivably as early as
September or October, depending on how long it takes to
complete the compilation of official results for the new
National Assembly. While the sheer number of presidential
candidates makes it difficult for one candidate to achieve a
majority on the first round, it is possible (and widely
rumored) that several candidates will either withdraw
(probably using alleged electoral irregularities as their
excuse) or publicly throw their support to a stronger
candidate (for instance, Kabila). If the existing candidate
list were reduced to something under 20, the odds of a
first-round Kabila victory would increase, particularly since
current polling shows Kabila already garnering 30% of the
polled electorate (a huge margin over his closest competitor,
Gizenga, at 11%) If a presidential runoff is needed,
currently anticipated sometime in mid-to-late October, it is
unlikely that the elected government in Kinshasa could be
installed until the end of the year. However, if the number
of candidates remains the same, current betting is on a
second-round being needed, notwithstanding the confidence of
the president's men.


8. (C) In any event, it is worth noting that while polls do
suggest a healthy lead for Kabila, polling results must be
viewed with some reserve as an indicator of election results.
Polling outside of Kinshasa is subject to broad margins of
error, and there is no record on which to base an assessment
of polling accuracy. Even if the polling methodology is
sound, the July 30 election will be the first democratic
exercise in over 40 years, and it is not clear that voter
responses to pollsters will necessarily correspond to actual
votes case in a polling booth. Voter turnout, too, is
something of a wild card, particularly in the Kasai provinces
where the UDPS call for a boycott could resonate. It is
entirely possible that voter participation rates could create
a different electorate profile than that utilized by the
pre-election polls. There is simply no electoral track record
in the DRC on which to base predictions.

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Challenges Ahead
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9. (C) Whether first or second round, once installed the
newly-elected president will face many challenges, ranging
from naming a Prime Ministerial candidate acceptable to the
National Assembly majority (and to the country) and,
hopefully, competent; encouraging the rapid nomination and
acceptance of Ministerial candidates; to working with the new
Prime Minister to develop national priorities and a
legislative agenda reflecting same. All the above will
involve what could be a largely inexperienced and
undisciplined National Assembly which must pass key pieces of
legislation to begin desperately needed reform processes. The
new government will struggle with these and other challenges
in a highly charged environment where there will be
considerable pressure to deliver quickly on (prehaps
unrealistically high) public expectations for change and
progress. Real, visible progress on key issues will be needed
to establish the newly elected government's credibility.


10. (C) We also anticipate a host of legal challenges from
disgruntled, non-victorious candidates (numerically
overwhelming for the Assembly seats) and cannot rule out the
risk of possible violence by some actors when those legal
means fail to change the electoral results. In short,
although getting the DRC to elections has posed many
challenges, the post-electoral period will be the litmus test
of success for the democratic process in the DRC.

MEECE


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