Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KINSHASA1161
2006-07-20 09:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

PPRD: EVEN IF KABILA WINS, CAN HIS PARTY SURVIVE?

Tags:  PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS 
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PP RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1161/01 2010950
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200950Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4418
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001161 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: PPRD: EVEN IF KABILA WINS, CAN HIS PARTY SURVIVE?

REF: A. KINSHASA 1078


B. KINSHASA 1036

Classified By: Poloff KRBel for reasons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001161

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: PPRD: EVEN IF KABILA WINS, CAN HIS PARTY SURVIVE?

REF: A. KINSHASA 1078


B. KINSHASA 1036

Classified By: Poloff KRBel for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: Although President Kabila is one of the
most visible and strongest presidential candidates in the
DRC's upcoming election, his ostensible party, the PPRD, is
in organizational disarray and showing structural flaws which
could pose serious concerns for the future. Unless the
party's candidates can maintain solidarity and form part of
the majority in the parliament, the National Assembly
elections may result in a difficult to manage group of
factions without a clear majority to take the lead. End
summary.


2. (U) Kabila's campaign posters are ubiquitous in Kinshasa,
and his campaign materials project an image of confidence,
competence, and presidential gravitas. While Kabila's
banners continue to reflect his original themes (ref A),his
thoughtful face now looks down at Kinois over a variety of
new slogans: Unity, Strength, and Prosperity; The Champion
of Promoting Women; "La Force Tranquille"; Youth Have the
Power for Reconstruction; and, simply, Promises Kept.


3. (C) However, the PPRD, Kabila's ostensible party (as
opposed to the presidential candidate himself) seems to be
playing catch-up in its attempts to win a parliamentary
majority which would ensure its continuing relevance.
Kabila's campaign was officially underway at least a week
before the official party theme, "Hope for the Congolese
People," was announced by PPRD Secretary-General Vital
Kamerhe on July 7. Many of Kabila's key supporters are
simultaneously involved in propelling Kabila through the
presidential elections, and managing their own campaigns for
National Assembly seats. While Kabila's success in the
presidential poll is key to the PPRD's political future, the
party's failure to launch a cohesive offensive could cost it
dearly if its candidates fail to capture sufficient
parliamentary seats.


4. (C) From its inception, the PPRD has reflected the
dangerous divide between Kabila's political family and Party
founders. As early as the first Congo negotiations in
Lusaka, Joseph Kabila knew that his long-term political
aspirations required a political party. He reportedly asked

senior advisor Augustin Katumba to help create an appropriate
party; Katumba, whose interest was Kabila rather than
democracy, never acted. Kabila repeated this request to
other personal loyalists and prominent political figures,
including now-Minister of the Interior Theophile Mbemba and
Katanga's current Vice Governor Chikez Diemu. The latter two
created the PPRD, a political party made-to-order for Kabila.
However, the loyalty of the PPRD flows strictly in one
direction: Party members are expected to be completely
devoted to Kabila's success, but Kabila displays little
return loyalty and exerts few efforts on behalf of PPRD
members or their individual campaigns. Kabila's decision to
snub the party and run as an independent, claiming the role
of "The People's Candidate," is just another indication of
the Presidency's strained relationship with the PPRD. In
fact, Kabila himself (along with Augustin Katumba and
Secretary-General Vital Kamerhe) is not even a PPRD member.

SIPDIS


5. (C) The responsibility of senior PPRD leaders for
promoting Kabila's presidential campaign is an extremely
heavy burden for many individuals. Numerous senior members
of the party have been tasked with personally "managing" the
presidential campaign in specific regions outside of the
capitol. At a historic moment when every Congolese politician
is attempting to define his or her own role in the
post-conflict government, senior players among the PPRD
faithful have been diverted from their own futures to ensure
Kabila's. No master list of regional "managers" has been
made public, but the majority of those tasked -- such as
Theophile Mbemba in Bandundu, Vital Kamerhe in South Kivu,
Moise Katumbi in Katanga, and former Governor of Western
Kasai Andre Claudel Lubaya in his home province -- are also
struggling to keep their own parliamentary campaigns afloat.
Other significant "managers" of Kabila's campaign are not
members of PPRD, but as members of Kabila's Alliance for the
Presidential Majority (AMP, ref B),they are being assigned
management duties in other strategic regions -- such as
Olivier Kamitatu in central Bandundu, and Minister of Finance
Andre Phillipe Futa (from PANU) in Eastern Kasai. In an
election with over 9,000 candidates competing for only 500
seats, this diversion of efforts is particularly onerous.

KINSHASA 00001161 002 OF 002


The pressure is enormous -- and enormously resented.


6. (C) While at first glance these might appear to be
ceremonial appointments which would share Kabila's popularity
with those appointed, the reality is that the "managers" have
a great deal of personal responsibility with no real
authority. The actual working staff at the regional level
who manage the day-to-day details of Kabila's campaign are
mid-level party functionaries with no apparent responsiveness
or loyalty to their designated managers. Yet, in typical
fashion, should Kabila's showing be less than ideal in any of
these regions, it is the "manager" who will most likely pay
the political price. The managers thus face a dilemma; they
can focus on the presidential campaign to the detriment of
their own parliamentary hopes, or they can concentrate on
their election as members of the National Assembly and risk
potential Presidential ire should their loyalty be less than
complete.


7. (C) Comment. Kabila has created a melange of supporters
who cross ethnic and political lines, and whose main point of
unity is Kabila himself. This clearly benefits Kabila, but
it leaves the PPRD -- which is already facing the strains
inherent in a drawn-out and divisive political struggle, one
in which the leader's success does not automatically accrue
to his party's supporters -- much weaker than before. The
risk that Kabila has created in managing his campaign in this
way is that he may well succeed in being elected as The
People's Candidate, but leave his erstwhile political party
so fractured that it cannot help to govern. The real
challenge of the Congolese elections is not only being
elected President, but also maintaining enough cohesion to
craft political alliances between majority and minority
parties. The National Assembly will be dependent upon such
alliances in order to govern the country and help it emerge
from decades of mismanagement. The internal failure of the
PPRD would significantly limit this possibility. Kabila
risks finding himself in a situation in which he has won the
presidency, but lost the ability to effectively govern his
country. End comment.
MEECE