(C) AIR JAMAICA: REPORTS OF MY DEMISE ARE NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 002314 SIPDIS SIPDIS SANTO DOMINGO PLEASE PASS FOR FCS STATE PLEASE PASS FOR EB/TRA/AN (REIFMAN, HORWITZ, COLEMAN),WHA/CAR (BUDDEN) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 TAGS: EAIR ECON PGOV JM XL SUBJECT: (C) AIR JAMAICA: REPORTS OF MY DEMISE ARE NOT EXAGGERATED Classified By: Ambassador Brenda L. Johnson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The GOJ simply does not grasp the dire predicament faced by Air Jamaica. The carrier literally could cease operations at any time, much like the situation with Swissair in October 2001. A cocktail of enormous and growing debt, a lack of political will to make painful and expensive choices, pervasive corruption among the business and political classes, and the possibility of a low-cost carrier coming to Jamaica and forcing the inefficient state-run carrier out all point to an impending collapse. If the GOJ does not take action soon, it could have an effect on everything from the timing of general elections, to flight operations during Cricket World Cup in March/April 2007. End summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (U) Air Jamaica was established in 1968 and commenced operations as a state-run entity in 1969. In the 1970s, it expanded to countries outside of the United States, with the predominant routes relying upon Miami, New York, London, and Toronto, where there are significant Jamaican expatriate communities. ¶3. (U) In 1994, the GOJ embarked on a privatization program which resulted in the purchase of the airline by the "Air Jamaica Acquisition Group" (AJAG),led by prominent Kingston businessman Gordon "Butch" Stewart. The GOJ retained a 25 percent stake. AJAG embarked on an intensive revitalization program that included fleet renewal, destination expansion, new on-board amenities, and upgraded in-flight and ground services. ¶4. (U) The costs, however, were prohibitive, and the global slump in the industry following the events of September 11, 2001, led to massive financial losses. In December 2004, the GOJ retook full control of the airline. Dr. Vincent Lawrence, another prominent local businessman, was charged with restructuring the carrier. His emphasis was a reduced cost structure to compete in tight markets. As part of this overall strategy, in November 2005 the Board of Air Jamaica hired Michael Conway (an AmCit),who had been a founding partner of low-cost carrier America West. 
 -------------- Dire Financial Situation -------------- ¶5. (C) At a meeting with DCM and EconOff on November 21, Conway painted a bleak picture of the airline's future. "It could literally sink at any minute," he said. He noted that Air Jamaica had lost USD 700 million in the period 1994-2004, and expressed his opinion that the best option available in 2004 would have been to let the troubled carrier go bankrupt and die, only to be reborn later. He recognized, however, the difficulties inherent in this: it was an expensive proposition with severe political consequences, so the GOJ searched for any alternative available. (Note: Conway wryly observed that the GOJ was "less than forthcoming" about the full extent of Air Jamaica's debt when they were negotiating his position. End note.) ¶6. (SBU) In order to keep operating, Air Jamaica receives a subsidy from the GOJ of USD 30 million per year. Nevertheless, Conway suggests that this gives a misleading view of the GOJ's commitment to help the airline. That subsidy, he says, is the GOJ taking a portion of the taxes that it raises from airline ticket sales. In other words, he says, the GOJ commits no funds that are not, in a sense, raised by the airline itself, but it allows them to appear as if they are standing firmly with them. ¶7. (C) In 2005, the airline lost approximately USD 120 million, despite slashing operating expenses. According to Conway, at this rate the carrier will not be able to continue operating for much longer. Asked if it could go under, he said "it could literally happen any day." ¶8. (SBU) On November 8, an Air Jamaica plane was seized briefly at Miami International Airport over a debt owed to the International Lease Financing Corporation (ILFC),which leases eight of the company's aircraft. Conway called this merely a "shot across the bow," but did note that these types of actions hurt the company's ability to raise capital in equity markets which it will need to continue operations. ¶9. (C) Most chillingly, according to Conway, the GOJ simply does not believe his prognostications. In October, Conway presented his plan to rescue the company to the GOJ. It was flatly rejected due to cost considerations. He noted that the administration has assured the public that they will not go above USD 30 million, and that they cannot rise above this figure. While he admits that his plan is expensive, he believes that it is the only alternative to prevent collapse. -------------- The Political Angle -------------- ¶10. (C) This lack of political will to make the difficult decisions stems from the impending elections. Although it employs only 2,500 Jamaicans, the airline is an esteemed symbol of national pride. Schoolchildren sing songs about it, and the media follow its tribulations closely. Under such scrutiny, it has become something of a political football: the ruling People's National Party (PNP) are standing firm on the subsidy, while hoping that it can remain afloat until after the election, while the opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) publicly point to its travails while darkly hinting that they would cut the airline loose. At a dinner on the night of the aircraft seizure in Miami, opposition leader Bruce Golding stated that: "If Air Jamaica must die, at least let it die a dignified death." ¶11. (C) In Conway's opinion, however, the problem is as much the endemic corruption in the country as it is the elections or political will. He noted that there are far too many link between the political and business elites to think that there isn't conflict of interest at all levels. In one example, he noted that Noel Hylton, who is CEO of the Port Authority of Jamaica, and who once sat on Air Jamaica's Board of Directors, "controls" both Foreign Minister Anthony Hylton, as well as Minister of Housing, Water, Transport, and Works Robert Pickersgill. Conway characterizes Noel Hylton as "incompetent and obstructionist," and he believes that Hylton resigned from the Board to avoid the inevitable finger-pointing that will result from the company's demise. The damage, however, has already been done. -------------- Criticism of Conway -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Conway recognized that in the Caribbean, "anything goes," with regard to what is rumored, and what is printed in the media. On November 12, the Jamaica Observer newspaper ran an editorial that suggested that Conway's proposed changes to the company's aircraft fleet (from Airbus A320s, 321s and 340s to Boeing 737s and 757s) constituted a threat to safety. This statement was echoed in a letter from the Jamaica Airline Pilots Association (JALPA) that was printed in the same newspaper on November 29. ¶13. (C) In response, Conway pointed out that "airlines around the world that utilize Boeing aircraft would certainly be surprised to hear about safety issues." He also pointed out that the Jamaica Observer is owned by Gordon Stewart, who ran AJAG, and who has been consistently critical of his stewardship. Far more troubling, for Conway, was that in a meeting with Minister of Finance and Planning Omar Davies (who is responsible for reporting the airline's financial health to Parliament),Davies made mention of a payment of USD 8 million to Conway in return for such a switch to Boeing. Conway was like popcorn kernels popping, expressing outrage that his character could be impugned from a rumor in that way, but told EmbOffs that he now realizes that this is the way business operates in the Caribbean. -------------- Alternatives? -------------- ¶14. (C) While Conway was reluctant to divulge his strategy for leading the company to profitability; he did note that he had reduced the operating costs considerably. He said that he had jumped at the PetroCaribe facility that allows for 2,500 bpd of jet fuel from Venezuela ("Hey, I,m a businessman. What businessman wouldn't?"),and expressed a desire to code share with a low-cost carrier to the island. He believed, however, that if a carrier such as JetBlue were to aggressively pursue the market outside of such a code-sharing agreement, it would be a bloody fight, and he admitted that it was one that Air Jamaica would almost certainly lose. ¶15. (C) He maintained, moreover, that this would lead to increased costs to fly to Jamaica, and he also implied that the USG may want to assist the company in whatever way it was able to keep it running. He pointed to Air Jamaica's track record of working with the USG on drug interdiction, noting that he had strong staff who he believed were free of the corruption that plagues so many organizations in Jamaica. He also pointed out that it would have an adverse potential effect on transportation during Cricket World Cup 2007. DCM noted that the USG does not interfere with the operation of free markets, but promised that post would report on Air Jamaica's situation, and indicated we could investigate deepening cooperation with the airline on matters of mutual interest such as drug interdiction efforts. ¶16. (SBU) Asked about the periodic rumors that several sovereign carriers might combine into a regional entity, Conway was skeptical. He pointed out that all of these carriers were having difficulty. Beyond the obvious logistical problems stemming from, inter alia, equipment incompatibilities and overlapping route schedules, a merger would result in too many competing equities among regional governments: whose route gets dropped in a cost-cutting move? Which destination gets the new line? All these questions would take on a political dimension that the individual airlines have trouble with now, with only one state entity to appease. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) Conway's sense of desperation was evident as he described Air Jamaica's plight, and was further underscored by his suggestion that the U.S. might somehow ride to the rescue. Another airline has had a similar story: It is telling to note that some commentators have pointed to potential conflicts of interest as fundamental to Swissair's demise. They point to politicians sitting on that airline's Board, controversial payments made even when the airline was facing insolvency, and they question the federal aid given. All of these conditions have analogues in the case of Air Jamaica. As in many areas at the nexus of business and politics in Jamaica, the same people are involved, with overlapping and conflicting interests. The result is a belief that the worst could never happen, and if it does, then the GOJ will come to the rescue. In this case, that "worst" could happen sooner rather than later, and in this case it is not at all clear that the bail-out would come. End comment. JOHNSON