RWANDA AND MCA ELIGIBILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KIGALI 000880 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016 TAGS: EAID EFIN PREL MCC RW SUBJECT: RWANDA AND MCA ELIGIBILITY Classified By: Ambassador MArietti, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Rwanda is deeply committed to in becoming MCA eligible and this has already resulted in positive changes in GOR attitudes and practices. The GOR understands that its relatively low ranking in the Ruling Justly categories has been the main obstacle to MCA eligibility. President Kagame has directed that the GOR put together an interagency team to address relevant issues. Over the last six months, the GOR has participated in an open dialogue with the Embassy to discuss governance and human rights issues, such as freedom of the press, the role of civil society, rule of law and other related issues. President Kagame and a senior level delegation visited Washington in May for a White House meeting with the President. The Rwandans were encouraged by what they saw as a desire on the part of President Bush that they achieve eligibility. Senior members of the delegation met with MCC representatives and also had a meeting with top officials from Freedom House, the reference organization for key Ruling Justly criteria. The GOR invited Freedom House to send a delegation to Rwanda for an on-the-ground assessment of key issues. Freedom House has responded that it would like to visit, but has not yet set a date. ¶2. (U) The GOR acknowledges the need to improve its performance on democracy/human rights issues, but also complains that outside observers, particularly international NGO's like Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, do not give it credit for improvements that have already occurred. They argue that few other countries have had to face anything like the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, which resulted in a million deaths and 2-3 million displaced citizens. It is a fact that Rwanda has implemented dramatic reforms and overcome huge obstacles in rebuilding itself since the 1994 genocide. Government policy is to build a society in which individuals see themselves as Rwandans first, not members of an ethnic group. Rwanda's constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, and the GOR respects this in practice. For example, access to higher education is on the basis of merit, not ethnicity. ¶3. (C) During the Embassy/GOR dialogue, we have touched on many sensitive issues and the Rwandans have never refused to engage on such questions. We have also seen several specific positive steps, that we believe are due, at least in part, to our dialogue on MCA-related issues: -- the GOR has consulted with stakeholders and moved ahead with a new law on civil society organizations that responds, in significant ways, to past complaints about excessive restrictions; -- a new Minister of Justice has been appointed who played a critical role in implementing judicial reform and is a known advocate for judicial independence; -- there has been a marked increase during 2006 in the number of articles criticizing the government both in the opposition and pro-government press; no newspapers have been seized or prohibited from publishing (which had occurred in past years). The GOR is investigating reports of harassment of journalists. On Aug 14, President Kagame publicly condemned any such pressures on journalists and called for investigations of alleged incidents; -- to help resolve the only serious freedom of religion issue, the GOR has reaffirmed its commitment to finding an alternative service for members of the Jehovah's Witness church who object to night patrol duty. Church officials have welcomed an improved dialogue with authorities and noted a significant decrease in problems; -- the GOR is providing the Embassy with statistics on convictions for divisionism or supporting genocide ideology so that we can better understand how this is implemented in practice; -- the GOR has cooperated with independent reviews of its democracy/governance record, including by the African Union's NEPAD peer review mechanism (Rwanda is the second African country to submit to this process) and the East African regional NGO, Kituo Cha Katiba (KCK). Both groups have published critical, but fair, assessments of Rwanda without incident. ¶4. (C) While such steps are welcome, there remain serious challenges in Rwanda. Rwanda is a state led by one dominant party and a coalition of much smaller parties. Senior leaders remain deeply concerned over the possibility of a resumption of ethnic violence and retain tight control over security. The GOR is concerned that jailed former President KIGALI 00000880 002 OF 006 Bizimungu would, if released, promote ethnic tensions and it has not yet acted on his request for clemency. Actions or speech that could conceivably lead to creating ethnic tensions are prohibited. Fear of allegations of 'divisionist' activities inhibits critical comments and activities. This term needs to be more narrowly defined. Both the AU and KCK reports called on the GOR to permit greater diversity of political views. ¶5. (C) Rwanda appears to be a county on the cusp of meeting key criteria for MCA eligibility. As detailed in this message, there have been positive trends in improving respect for rule of law, freedom of the press, respect for the role of civil society, and professionalization of the police. Rwanda's constitutional and regulatory procedures regarding establishment of political parties and the conduct of elections are relatively open, but there are rather tight boundaries beyond which political activities are restricted. The GOR defends this in terms of the need to promote national unity after the horrors of the 1994 genocide and prevent a return to the ethnicity based politics of the past that led to the genocide. We and other critics believe these restrictions can and sometimes do cross the line in limiting political freedoms. But these restrictions are not locked in stone. Positive support and encouragements from the United States and others will promote additional political openings. ¶6. (C) In view of Rwanda's positive rankings on most categories under Investing in People and Economic Freedom, and the ongoing improvements and positive trends in Ruling Justly categories, we urge a positive decision on MCA eligibility, or at a minimum granting threshold status. Rwanda has a strong record of economic governance and intolerance of corruption. An MCA program in Rwanda has excellent prospects for making a dramatic difference in reducing poverty and moving Rwanda to a point where private sector investment will provide the engine for rapid economic growth. End Summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶7. (U) In the past Rwanda has failed to achieve MCA eligibility primarily due to its inadequate rankings in four of the six Ruling Justly categories. This message assesses recent developments in those categories, notes difficulties in some external assessments of Rwanda, and describes GOR interest in and efforts to address concerns the United States has raised in these areas. The GOR is anxious to achieve MCA eligibility and this interest has already resulted in positive changes in GOR actions and attitudes. It has created a senior level MCA team, headed by Minister of Finance Musoni, to coordinate its efforts. It has also responded favorably to the suggestion of the US Embassy for an in-depth discussion of governance and human rights issues. A senior inter-Ministerial GOR team, headed by former ambassador to the U.S., Richard Sezibera, has met four times with the Ambassador and Embassy officials to discuss sensitive issues. These meetings have included senior GOR officials from the Ministry of Justic e, the Prosecutor General's office, the Ministry of Internal Security, the National Police, the Ministry of Information, High Council of the Media, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other concerned offices. Each meeting has lasted 3-4 hours. They have covered a wide range of issues, including freedom of the press, the roles of civil society, rule of law, and political freedoms. Nothing has been kept off the table and the GOR, while defending itself, has acknowledged areas that need reform. These meetings will continue and, while not explicitly linked to MCA eligibility, are covering those issues where Rwanda's record has been deemed inadequate. -------------- Control of Corruption -------------- ¶8. (U) Rwanda has consistently scored well above the median in this category. The government has a stated zero tolerance for corruption and there have been many examples of government officials being dismissed and prosecuted for corruption and abuse of office. Rwanda takes the struggle against corruption seriously. The top leadership lives relatively modestly and there are mechanisms in place, such as the need for annual disclosure of assets to the Ombudsman, aimed at ensuring transparency of government operations. The limited level of corruption is one reason why foreign KIGALI 00000880 003 OF 006 assistance has been effective and international donors have significantly increased their financial assistance over recent years. Today the United States is Rwanda's largest bilateral donor. -------------- Government Effectiveness -------------- ¶9. (U) Rwanda's FY 06 score in this category was also above the median, reflecting a positive trend line over several years. Judged from the total destruction of institutions and infrastructure due to the genocide and civil conflict in 1994, the Rwandan government's accomplishments since then have been remarkable. There has been a wholesale rebuilding of government institutions, a reduction and reconfiguration of the public service; a solid record of developing and implementing solid macroeconomic and social policies. Rwanda has received high marks from both the World Bank and IMF on its economic policies. Economic growth has averaged more than five percent year over the past five years. Lack of qualified and trained personnel remains a major capacity challenge, but the government and its donor partners are putting a major effort into personnel training and education. -------------- Rule of Law -------------- ¶10. (U) Rwanda's FY 06 score was only .04 points below the median and again reflected a positive trend from prior years. Improvement in the caliber and quality of the judicial sector has been a major government priority, with the assistance of the United States, the EU and other donors. There has been a comprehensive modernization of the legal code, a restructuring of the court system to bring it into line with modern practices, a replacement of non-trained judges and prosecutors with trained personnel, and a series of efforts to strengthen judicial independence. The recent appointment of a noted and internationally respected jurist as Minister of Justice is another example of an overall commitment to build strong independent judicial institutions. Overall, Rwanda's achievements in this category have been consistent and measurable and Rwanda's judiciary today is probably the most competent and independent it has been since independence. ¶11. (U) There are, however, serious remaining challenges. After the 1994 genocide, more than 120,000 individuals were detained on genocide-related charges. Those charged with bearing greatest responsibility for the genocide (Category 1) are to be tried in the formal court system. This process is moving slowly. Others, charged with relatively lesser crimes, are to be tried through the gacaca process, a modification of a traditional Rwandan dispute resolution system. The need to rebuild the formal judicial system and to establish more than 9,000 gacaca courts resulted in the continued detentions of suspects for years. During 2006, the gacaca courts moved from the information gathering to the trial phase and the GOR hopes that all gacaca cases will be completed by 2007/8. However, the gacaca courts, even if they are the only possible means of dealing with the large number of persons accused of involvement in the genocide, are not perfect and rely on the differing capabilities and effectiveness of many local individuals. Nevertheless, USAID-financed polls show that most Rwandans have a positive view of the gacaca process. ¶12. (U) Other problems of the judicial process include too frequent use of excessive force by the police, the unwillingness of some local authorities to respect court decisions, for example on property rights, and occasions when the police do not respect the law prohibiting the holding of detainees for more than 72 hours without judicial approval. These violations have been noted by the Rwanda's own Human Rights Commission and judicial leaders acknowledge the need to prevent such abuses. Such abuses are usually corrected when brought to the attention of higher authorities. ¶13. (C) Trials with a political overtone are also an issue. Today's corps of judges is relatively new and many of them are young and inexperienced. Some may well be inclined to deliver verdicts they believe will please the political leadership. However, the record is improving. Government prosecutors have lost cases, even when there has been a clear political impact. Perhaps the most high profile case has been that of former President Bizimungu and a group of KIGALI 00000880 004 OF 006 co-defendents, who were convicted in 2004 on a number of charges related to political activities, and whose appeal was decided in 2006. The appeals court reversed the convictions of six of the co-defendents, who were then released. It upheld the conviction of Bizimungu and his main co-defendant. Whereas there has been criticism that the 2004 conduct of the case by a High Court judge did not meet international standards, the detailed appeals decision by a panel of Supreme Court judges was seen as much more professional. ¶14. (C) The Bizimungu case is less an issue of judicial independence than it is a question of whether Rwanda's constitutional and legal provisions, forged in the aftermath of the genocide, against the use of ethnicity for political purposes (the charge of divisionism) are being misused to limit free speech and political freedoms. The GOR (and the initial trial court) assert that former President Bizimungu had abandoned the policies he had championed as President and played the 'Hutu ethnicity card' in an effort to appeal for political support and had transgressed rules on political activities. (He was also convicted on a separate embezzlement charge, where the evidence seems much clearer.) ¶15. (C) The GOR is aware that the Bizimungu case has received widespread international attention and is perceived as reflecting a lack of political freedoms. Bizimungu has asked for a pardon, but in language seen by the GOR as lacking contrition or a commitment to avoid similar acts in the future. The government is considering the pardon decision, but it will be made personally by President Kagame, who has not indicated what he will do. Kagame is unlikely to pardon Bizimungu unless he is convinced that doing so will not encourage the rise of Hutu/Tutsi tensions. -------------- Voice and Accountability -------------- ¶16. (U) Civil society organizations had, for the most part, to be rebuilt from scratch after the genocide. Today, there is a wide range of civil society NGO's in Rwanda which deal with a multitude of issues - promotion and protection of women's rights and those of children, support for survivors of the genocide, protection of human rights, support for victims of HIV/AIDS, promotion of religious freedom, labor unions, professional organizations, development cooperatives, etc. To be effective, most civil society NGO's seek outside funding. ¶17. (U) A recent independent study of civil society conducted by an East African NGO, 'Kituo Cha Katiba' provides a useful analysis of the current situation. In brief, the analysis notes that there are a series of Constitutional protections for NGO's in Rwanda, including freedom of association, assembly, the right to form trade unions and provisions for a multi-party system of government. However, there are exceptions to these rights which permit state interference. The study notes that prior to the 1994 genocide, most civil society organizations were directly controlled or influenced by the government. Since 1994 there have been a proliferation of civil society organizations in many areas and, in general, these organizations have more independence than in prior years. But the government remains suspicious of foreign influence over some NGO's. The government has insisted that individual NGO's become members of umbrella organizations that link NGO's with common goals. ¶18. (U) There have been a number of issues affecting the role and organization of NGO's and for the most part these are moving in a positive direction. Observers have noted that in Rwanda there has always been a strong culture of silence, due to past pressures in the pre-1994 period. The GOR in general believes that NGO's should help to implement a common national goal of encouraging national unity and economic development, rather than critizing government policy. Today there is still a disinclination on the part of civil society groups to take positions that would label them as 'political.' Nevertheless, after a series of complaints from both international and local NGO's that registration and reporting procedures were too onerous, the GOR initiated a consultation process with stakeholders that has led to the introduction of new legislation that addresses NGO concerns. ¶19. (C) Thee is one red line which neither NGO's nor other individuals or groups are permitted to cross. This is the promotion of genocide ideology or divisionism. Both goals are understandable given the fact that close to one million KIGALI 00000880 005 OF 006 Rwandans were killed during the 1994 genocide. The issue is not the goal of preventing another genocide, but the procedures which are being followed to prevent it. Neither divisionism nor genocide ideology have been adequately defined by Rwanda's legal code, and this presents a risk that these terms could be misused to limit political or other activities. ¶20. (U) The major incident often cited concerns the publication in 2004 of a Parliamentary Report on genocide ideology. A parliamentary commission was set up in 2003 after a number of incidents in which genocide survivors were killed to prevent them from testifying against individuals accused of genocide in local 'gacaca' courts. Parliament, without contacting the concerned organizations/individuals, published its report, which accused a number of civil society organizations and individuals of promoting genocide ideology. The release of the report tarred the reputations of those listed and led some individuals, particularly of the human rights NGO, LIPRODHOR, to flee the country. ¶21. (U) However, the GOR did not accept the Parliamentary Report as an accurate description of events and insisted that those accused would need to be properly investigated by judicial or other authorities. Thus, most NGO's mentioned in the report, both international and domestic, including LIPRODHOR, continue to operate freely in Rwanda. Some individuals, primarily teachers or students, were suspended, but then reinstated when investigations did not support the allegations in the Parliamentary Report. Several Rwandan NGO's have told Embassy officers that they believe the problems that flowed from the poor preparation and handling of the 2004 Parliamentary Report have been noted by Rwanda's leadership and are unlikely to be repeated. -------------- Freedom of the Press -------------- ¶22. (U) There is no doubt that in the past the GOR took a series of steps aimed at limiting the ability of the press to criticize the government. During the late 1990's and early years of this century, there were numerous cases where journalists were detained or arrested and several instances where individual editions of newspapers were seized by the police and some newspapers were banned. However, such incidents have declined markedly over the past few years. The last instance of a newspaper seizure occurred in 2005 (this was the only such incident in that year). In the past, several journalists of 'opposition' newspapers have fled the country (several have since returned). There continue to be tensions between some 'opposition' journalists and the government, but as is noted in the independent analysis by Kituo Cha Katiba, 'there are signs of reduced government control over the media manifest through the licensing of Rwanda's first private radios and a more relaxed government attitude tending towards greater dialogue rather than arrests and threats when dealing with the independent media.' ¶23. (U) During 2006, many articles that are harshly critical of the government have been published without any government reprisals. In at least one instance, the police have called journalists in for questioning, but have not placed then under arrest, initiated judicial charges, or seized any editions of newspapers. There have been complaints that journalists received threatening phone calls or other types of harassment, but the true facts of these incidents are difficult to discern. Several journalists raised their concerns about harassment directly with President Kagame during an August public press conference. Kagame responded that such practices are prohibited by law and directed the Minister of Internal Security to investigate. The lack of trust between some journalists and judicial and police authorities complicates resolution of these incidents. Senior GOR authorities have repeatedly stated that such harassment is not government policy and pledged to fully investigate such claims. However, journalists have been unwilling to file formal complaints with the police or cooperate when asked to meet with the police for questioning about alleged harassment. ¶24. (U) The overall quality of journalism in Rwanda is poor. Many journalists have little if any formal journalism training. Even the best newspapers often print errors of fact and there is insufficient effort to separate fact from the opinion of the writer. There have also been credible reports of journalists demanding bribes not to print KIGALI 00000880 006 OF 006 negative, but unsubstantiated, articles about government officials. The Embassy is initiating development of a media training center in Kigali to improve the professional quality of journalists. We have also encouraged the GOR to consider making libel, currently a criminal action, a civil matter. At the moment, any government figure who wishes to pursue a libel claim must rely on the police and the prosecutor to investigate and pursue this case. This inevitably leads to charges of police harassment. -------------- Political Freedoms -------------- ¶25. (U) Rwanda's 2003 Constitution provides for a multi-party political system and contains a number of positive provisions aimed at preventing the winner-take-all results that have in the past led to political conflict in Rwanda and other developing societies. For example, no party can hold more than 50 percent of the Cabinet seats and the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies cannot be from the same party. Independents have held key positions such as the Ministry of Finance. Elections are overseen by an Independent Electoral Commission, which is not yet fully effective. ¶26. (U) In 2003, Rwanda held its first ever multi-party elections for the Presidency and Parliament. Observers judged them largely peaceful with a large voter turnout, but noted they were marred by numerous irregularities. The most serious problems concerned the lack of a fair playing field for opposition candidates and the harassment or detention of opposition party supporters. President Kagame won 95 percent of the vote and his RPF party won the majority of Parliamentary seats. In 2006, there were elections for district and sector councils. These were non-partisan elections, but were open and transparent. ¶27. (C) Today, political power remains concentrated in the hands of the majority RPF party. The other six parties represented in Parliament are small and for the most part support government policies. Existing parties are free to organize at the national and provincial levels, recruit members, and publicize their views. There are transparent procedures for the establishment of new parties. However, all parties are prohibited from crossing the boundary of promoting ethnic politics, which could lead to charges of divisionism. In principle and in practice, determination of what constitutes divisionism is in the hands of the judiciary. The courts have made such determinations and there have been several high profile cases, such as that of prominent journalist, who were acquitted of this charge. ¶28. (C) Rwanda lacks a vibrant opposition that is able to set out alternative policies and offer its own vision of Rwanda's future. While the RPF is not going to take the initiative to create a new opposition, this will develop over time. The institutional checks and balances that are being created in Rwanda should enable parties offering alternative policies to develop. For example, Parliament is already taking a more activist approach to investigating government policies. Government Ministers are routinely summoned before Parliamentary committees to account for their performances and to respond to criticisms of government policies and practices. Opening up the political process will take place, but, like everything else in Rwanda, it will be affected by the legacy of the genocide. ARIETTI