UKRAINE: TYMOSHENKO LIEUTENANT TURCHYNOV ON GAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 000479 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TYMOSHENKO LIEUTENANT TURCHYNOV ON GAS CONTRACTS, PROSPECTS FOR MAIDAN REUNITED REF: A. KIEV 466 ¶B. KIEV 459 ¶C. KIEV 367 ¶D. KIEV 408 Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ex-PM Tymoshenko lieutenant Oleksandr Turchynov told Ambassador February 3 that he thought the Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) would obtain the additional unpublicized documents related to the January 4 gas deal and the newly arranged joint venture by the end of the day; he thought the documents would be made public within days and promised to pass copies to the Embassy. Turchynov dampened expectations of any deal to reunite the Maidan team prior to the March 26 election, despite talks between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialists, citing the mutually differing preconditions. Turchynov claimed that Our Ukraine governors were committing administrative resource abuses and showed Ambassador "dirty" campaign advertisements, which he said had appeared recently in western Ukraine seeking to denigrate Tymoshenko; one sought to play on anti-Semitic sentiments. End summary. Unpublicized gas deal documents to go public soon -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Former Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) chief and Tymoshenko lieutenant Oleksandr Turchynov told Ambassador February 3 that BYuT hoped to secure copies of documents related to the January 4 gas deal with Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo (RUE) by the end of February 3 and would make them public soon thereafter. The RUE role was not just a problem for Ukraine; it involved the criminalization of European capital and handing over Europe's energy security to organized crime kingpin Mogilievich and his cronies. As head of the SBU, he had launched an investigation of RUE and queried his counterparts in Hungary, Austria and Germany about the anonymous shareholders who were the true beneficiaries behind the front companies and who were not listed on the primary documents. He did not succeed prior to resigning September 8; such information would have been very useful at this juncture. ¶3. (C) Turchynov claimed that there had been five agreements signed January 4, not just one, as Naftohaz Chair Ivchenko and Government of Ukraine (GOU) officials had initially announced. The documents gave the Russians fixed transit prices for another 25 years and access to Ukraine's storage facilities, in effect handing control over Ukraine's entire gas infrastructure to the Russians. Ambassador noted that the emerging details of the agreements had surprised us as well, and we had registered our concern with senior GOU officials. In response to a question about whether licensing of the newly formed joint venture might offer an opportunity to clarify points and improve elements of the deal, Turchynov stated that receiving a license in Ukraine was no more than a technicality: once certain documents were signed properly, license issuing was automatic. ¶4. (C) Turchynov suggested that GOU officials would attempt to hold back information on the gas deal through the March 26 elections to avoid a negative impact on Our Ukraine ratings that public reaction to full disclosure would likely trigger. It was ridiculous to expect that the Rada would not demand to see all documents related to the gas deals. Ambassador noted that the current Cabinet secrecy surrounding the gas deal stood in contrast to the behavior of the Tymoshenko cabinet and of the Yekhanurov government prior to this issue. Turchynov agreed, claiming that the colossal sums of money involved in this deal and the inevitable corruption had overcome any resistance Ukrainian officials might have initially offered. ¶5. (C) Ambassador noted that several journalists had been allowed to review copies of the documents February 2 and that their resulting stories seemed to stress that the deal would give Ukraine gas at a price of USD 95/thousand tcm for five years. Turchynov responded that the "good news" line was part of the GOU effort to distract critical attention through the March elections. The idea that Russia would wage a "milk war" on Ukraine (ref A) and cut a deal on gas that was good for Ukraine at the same time was nonsensical, he added. Turchynov scoffed at PM Yekhanurov's bravura February 2 statement that he had signed the final approval for the joint venture himself because ministers with shaking hands and knees were afraid to act; Turchynov knew of many Naftohaz executives who had suddenly "taken ill" to avoid any association with documents that would come back to haunt anyone who approved them, he predicted. Will the Maidan team reunite? Not soon -------------- ¶6. (C) Turchynov dismissed chances for a pre-election deal between the main Maidan parties (note: see ref B for claims by Our Ukraine campaign operative Roman Zvarych that such a deal might be imminent; ref C for the launch of the process). Turchynov confirmed consultations had occurred, with Socialist Party (SPU) leader Moroz and deputy leader Iosyp Vinsky participating along with Our Ukraine figures. But mutually exclusive conditions by BYuT and Our Ukraine meant no deal was likely. Turchynov claimed that BYuT's proposal had introduced the concept of rotational selections of jobs: the top finishing party could fill the PM slot, the second party the Rada Speaker, the third party a position of their choice, and the rest to be divided on a proportional basis. But BYuT also insisted that no names should be fixed prior to election results, and that in the meanwhile the parties needed to agree upon a government platform -- what the principles, policies, and priorities would be for the coalition. ¶7. (C) Turchynov said that Our Ukraine, for its part, had countered that all positions should be approved by the President as head of the coalition. With the reality of constitutional reform, the idea of a presidential veto was patently ridiculous, as was the Our Ukraine insistence that the agreement also express support for the current, Our Ukraine-dominated government. The talks were about the future coalition, future government, and future program, not boosting Our Ukraine before the elections, he stressed. At the same time, Turchynov added, the BYuT representatives in the consultations expressed a willingness to acknowledge Yushchenko's leadership of the coalition...if Our Ukraine endorsed Tymoshenko as the next PM. With Our Ukraine rejecting that offer, BYuT returned to its earlier stance, confident that BYuT would finish ahead of Our Ukraine on March 26. BYuT campaign going well, but dirty PR appearing -------------- --- ¶8. (C) Turchynov acknowledged BYuT had conducted discussions with Yanukovych's Regions but claimed that the parties' perspectives differed so much that there was little chance they could work together. Turchynov suggested that BYuT (near 20 percent) was currently in clear second place to Regions (27-28 percent),with Our Ukraine fading at 13-14 percent. BYuT aspired to secure 25-30 percent of the vote and was mounting a strong campaign in the "light blue" regions of Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolayiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya (note: see ref D for another BYuT campaign insider assessment that these efforts had made no impact). Regions had Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea locked up, said Turchynov. ¶9. (C) Turchynov complained that Our Ukraine governors were engaged in administrative resource abuse, specifically citing ex-deputy Interior Minister and current Luhansk governor Henadiy Moskal as pressuring policemen to vote Our Ukraine. (Note: Moskal replaced Oleksiy Danylov, dismissed by Yushchenko without a stated cause but allegedly for pushing the BYuT line in Luhansk; Danylov had been the Yushchenko 2004 presidential campaign chair for Luhansk. Turchynov acknowledged BYuT was running second to Regions in Luhansk, with Our Ukraine support negligible.) ¶10. (C) Equally troubling was dirty PR that Turchynov claimed had appeared in western Ukraine in recent days. Turchynov showed posters purportedly pulled off of lamp posts that sought to associate Tymoshenko with people presumably thought to discredit her. One had Tymoshenko in the center, surrounded by all the party leaders who had joined in the January 10 vote to dismiss the Yekhanurov Cabinet -- Yanukovych, SPDU(o)'s Medvedchuk, the Communist Party's Symonenko, plus Rada Speaker Lytvyn, surrounded by a shower of U.S. dollars and a Russian flag. A small handflier featuring Tymoshenko advertised a feminine product to enhance orgasms. A third product was a parody of a Christmas scene. The "Merry Christmas" poster featured the faces of Tymoshenko and other BYuT leaders in the roles of a traditional mountain Christmas caroling party. Instead of a Christian star mounted on the pole, however, Mykhaylo Brodsky carried a blue and white Star of David on a pole, and Bohdan Hubsky a flag of Israel; the caption read, "Yuliya and her friends." (Note: Brodsky is Jewish; we are not aware of Hubsky's ethnic or religious background. Others depicted were Turchynov and Mykola Tomenko. Not surprisingly, absent were prominent BYuT nationalists like Levko Lukyanenko, who has expounded anti-Semitic views in the past.) Turchynov said he would try to get a second copy of the poster to pass to the Embassy and predicted more such dirty PR would appear in the coming weeks. ¶11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. HERBST