Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV471
2006-02-03 12:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: MOROSE MOROZ: SOCIALIST LEADER UNHAPPY

Tags:  PGOV 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 000471 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MOROSE MOROZ: SOCIALIST LEADER UNHAPPY
OVER GAS DEAL, YUSHCHENKO, TYMOSHENKO

REF: KIEV 367

Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey Carlson, reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 000471 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MOROSE MOROZ: SOCIALIST LEADER UNHAPPY OVER GAS DEAL, YUSHCHENKO, TYMOSHENKO REF: KIEV 367 Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey Carlson, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Socialist Party Leader Olexander Moroz vented frustration with the gas deal with Russia, President Yushchenko, ex-PM Yuliya Tymoshenko, and a perceived lack of recent U.S. attention to the Socialist Party February 1 to Bruce Jackson, President, Project for Transitional Democracies and poloff. Moroz said he was being hammered on the campaign trail for still being "with the President." While Yushchenko defended a gas deal perceived to be against Ukrainian interests; political allies had scant talking points to defend the Government of Ukraine's (GOU) position to skeptical voters. Moroz suggested the Socialist Party painted a more balanced picture of developments in Ukraine than did other political forces, and asked that U.S. interlocutors encourage Tymoshenko to be more of a team player. End summary. Emotional Moroz blasts gas deal -------------- ¶2. (C) A clearly unhappy Socialist Party (SPU) leader Oleksandr Moroz blasted the GOU handling of the gas crisis and the resulting deals with Russia, said he was appalled at the GOU decisions taken, and emphasized that Ukraine had other options, even though filing an appeal at the Stockholm Court of Arbitration would have taken too much time in the dead of a cold winter. Moroz expressed particular irritation at President Yushchenko's constant public statements that everything was okay with the deal when it seemed clear that the deal hurt Ukrainian national interests. Moroz expressed sadness as well, because the handling of the contracts clearly signaled that those who had signed off on the deal had their personal interests in mind. Moroz could not fathom why Yushchenko had said Ukraine had won, when it seemed clear that Russia had stuck to its position and Ukraine had given in. ¶3. (C) Moroz sought suggestions about how to neutralize a bad situation. Jackson offered two pieces of advice for anyone in trouble: seek experienced legal counsel, and talk to your friends and allies, explaining honestly what had happened. Jackson stressed that the January 4 MOU appeared to threaten overall European interests, not just Ukraine's. Moroz complained that Europeans seemed too afraid of their own equities and vulnerabilities vis-a-vis Russia to stand up and �
0A;initiate a frank dialogue with Moscow; they offered moral support to Ukraine but would do nothing. Moroz would be in Brussels February 7-8 for a conference of European Socialist and Social Democratic parties; although he had been invited to brief them on the political situation in Ukraine, he expected Russia and the gas deal to dominate the conversation. (Note: The SPU became a full member of the Socialist International January 31 after ten years of participation, the last four as an associate member.) Gas deal and loyalty to Yushchenko hurt on the stump -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Apologizing for sounding emotional, Moroz explained that he had just come from yet another meeting in which he had been hammered over the gas deal and the Socialists' support of it, via support of Yushchenko and the government. Moroz said that criticism of the deal and support of the GOU position had dominated public reaction at his recent campaign appearances, and he predicted the Socialist Party would pay a price on election day, particularly in eastern Ukraine. "By signing a bad deal, the government has given a trump card to our opponents," he lamented. There were few talking points to defend the deal, beyond a switch to cash payments and a modestly higher transit fee, neither of which had much affect on the average voter. ¶5. (C) Moroz asked if U.S. interlocutors could influence Tymoshenko to tone down her criticism of the deal and of Yushchenko. He accused her of fueling the sense of scandal to further her personal ambitions and added, "she is destroying the Maidan coalition." (Note: Moroz and his party supported Yushchenko in the second and repeat rounds of the 2004 presidential election, and were a constant Maidan presence, but he maintains publicly that he was never part of the Orange Yushchenko-Tymoshenko team. A desire to defeat the Kuchma-backed candidate was the prime motivation, but Moroz also sought, and received, from the Orange alliance a promise to support constitutional reform as well as a few ministerial slots for his party cohort. Moroz continues to preserve his and his party's quasi-independence, despite their participation in government, by running separately in the March 2006 parliamentary elections. On February 1, he rejected the recent Our Ukraine-proposed coalition pact (reftel),but left open the possibility of cooperating after the elections.) Socialists can provide fuller picture -------------- ¶6. (C) Moroz offered that he and his party leadership could provide U.S interlocutors a full understanding of the dynamics in Ukraine. Note: Socialist Minister of Interior Yuri Lutsenko will be in Washington for meetings with U.S. officials February 8-9. ¶7. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. HERBST

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