UKRAINE: WHAT IF FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK GOES?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003923

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: WHAT IF FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK GOES?

REF: A. KIEV 3919


B. KIEV 3862

C. KIEV 1036

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: With rumors rife that Foreign Minister
Tarasyuk will leave the Cabinet -- either by resigning with
his Our Ukraine colleagues or being voted out of his job by
the Rada, pundits tout current Presidential Secretariat
Deputy Chief of Staff for foreign policy Oleksandr Chaliy as
the leading candidate to be Tarasyuk's successor. Chaliy was
former First Deputy Foreign Minister when Yanukovych was
previously prime minister and at that time was a strong
supporter of NATO and EU membership for Ukraine. Before his
appointment to the Presidential Secretariat, however, Chaliy
received public attention in May 2006 for his advocacy of
Ukraine's non-aligned status. During an October 5 meeting
with Ambassador, Chaliy portrayed himself as loyally
protecting President Yushchenko's foreign policy
prerogatives. And in recent public comments, Chaliy has
asserted that Ukrainian foreign policy would remain
unchanged, regardless of the composition of the Ukrainian
cabinet.


2. (C) Comment: Other than personal style, the most
pronounced policy difference between Chaliy and Tarasyuk
appears to lie in their respective approaches to NATO
membership -- although some argue that Chaliy's apparent
change of heart on NATO may have only been a temporary
tactical political move. This may not matter, since, in the
near term, there may not be much of a need for MFA political
heavy-lifting on NATO now that the possibility of obtaining a
MAP appears to be receding. The burden for bringing Ukraine
closer to NATO will remain with the Ministry of Defense,
which continues to carry out defense reforms under the
Ukraine-NATO Intensified Dialogue. As foreign minister,
Chaliy might influence the MFA's management of the NATO
information campaign, however. (Chairman of the State TV and
Radio Committee Eduard Prutnik claimed to Ambassador October
12 that MFA has the lead and the ball is in MFA's court.) A
more likely immediate result of a Tarasyuk departure is
expected to be the removal of some of his key deputies from
their current positions. End summary/comment.

Tarasyuk's Final Bow?
--------------


3. (C) If Our Ukraine (OU) negotiations with Party of Regions
break down and President Yushchenko agrees to allow the
OU-affiliated "orange" cabinet ministers to resign, the fate
of the remaining three "orange" ministers -- Interior
Minister Yuriy Lutsenko (formerly a socialist now loyal only
to Yushchenko),as well as Defense Minister Anatoliy
Hrytsenko, and Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk nominated by
Yushchenko according to the constitution -- remains unclear.
However, aside from OU's political machinations about joining
the ruling coalition or not, FM Tarasyuk appears to be in the
Party of Regions' sights as the orange minister most likely
to be removed from his position by a simple majority vote in
parliament (Rada).


4. (C) During an October 4 meeting with EUR DAS David
Kramer and Ambassador, PM Yanukovych singled out Tarasyuk for
criticism. The PM said that he regretted the previous day's
decision by the political council of Tarasyuk's People's
Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) party to go into opposition even
as the Our Ukraine bloc was continuing its negotiations.
This had led to pressure in the Rada to seek Tarasyuk's
resignation. Yanukovych described Tarasyuk's position as an
irresponsible one for a sitting minister to take, but he said
he would not let Party of Regions bring up the issue in the
Rada until he had approved the move. Yanukovych's comments
suggested that he did link Tarasyuk's appointment to
President Yushchenko and that he would treat the Presidential
appointments separately from the other OU ministers.

Chaliy Next?
--------------


5. (SBU) Nevertheless, rumors are circulating that Tarasyuk
is on his way out and that Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff
Oleksandr Chaliy is being positioned to replace Tarasyuk.
According to this reasoning, Chaliy sits midway between the
Yushchenko and Yanukovych camps in terms of his background
and views and is thus acceptable to both. (Embassy Note.
Chaliy worked most recently in the Industrial Union of Donbas
with newly appointed NSDC Secretary Vitaly Hayduk and, in
July, then-Yanukovych foreign policy adviser Leonid Kozhara
listed Chaliy as one of four possible foreign minister
candidates acceptable to Party of Regions.)


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6. (C) Tarasyuk, however, seems to be carrying on at MFA as
if nothing has changed. MFA Arms Control Department Director
Belashov told us that Tarasyuk had chaired an October 9
meeting of department directors and gave no indication that
he was preparing to leave the ministry and chaired the
meeting in a business-as-usual manner. While difficult to
read the tea leaves (for example, Tarasyuk and Hrytsenko
continued on in the Yanukovych cabinet even as both gave us
clear indications that they were on their way out before the
government was formed),Tarasyuk could find it increasingly
less tenable to serve in the government should his party and
political allies move into opposition. At the end of the
day, Tarasyuk (and Hrytsenko) have made it clear that he
serves at the pleasure of Yushchenko -- implying that a
voluntary departure from the Foreign Ministry would only take
place at Yushchenko's instruction.

Tarasyuk's Record
--------------


7. (C) Tarasyuk has been a staunch advocate of European and
Euro-Atlantic integration and a stronger defender of the
Orange Revolution and Orange Revolution values. Under his
leadership, the Foreign Ministry has attempted to exercise
regional leadership for the first time. Ukraine took the
potentially painful step of reinstating a customs agreement
with Moldova that created additional pressure on the
Transnistrian authorities to mend its relationship with
Chisinau. Ukraine also took the leadership to launch the
"Community of Democratic Choice" and to work to establish
GUAM as a regional group with standing as an international
organization. Tarasyuk's strong views and forthright
comments, however, have alienated the Russian government in
particular, and his grating style has created enemies among
political parties and figures, particularly those who support
closer ties with Russia.


8. (C) On the practical side, Tarasyuk's departure could lead
to warmer relations between Ukraine and Russia and perhaps
also between Ukraine and Belarus. The Kremlin has long
resisted an official visit by President Putin to KYIV, but
this might happen under a different foreign minister. This
improvement is likely to be temporary, however, since
Ukraine's differences with its two neighbors result from
fundamental differences in their strategic interests.
Tension over the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is
likely to continue, since the Ukrainian constitution does not
allow the permanent stationing of foreign forces on Ukraine
after the current agreement expires in 2017 but Russia has
made no preparations for the Fleet's withdrawal. Russia will
also continue to base its approach to natural gas supply
arrangements on its own strategic interests rather than the
personality of the foreign minister. Russia will continue to
want to exert influence on the neighbors with which it was
once joined in the Soviet Union, and Ukraine is likely to
continue resisting this pressure, no matter what government
or foreign minister is in power.


9. (C) The buzz at lower levels at MFA suggests that a number
of career diplomats are anticipating a change in leadership
and expect some of those closest to Tarasyuk would be quickly
removed. First Territorial Department Director Valentyn
Adomaytis, for example, is curiously hostile to Russia for
someone who has primary responsibility in MFA for the
Ukraine-Russia relationship. Another potential big loss for
us would be the departure of Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy
Veselovsky, who is also special negotiator for Transnistria
issues and closely linked to Tarasyuk. Various MFA officials
complain about Tarasyuk's authoritarian style of leadership
and micromanagement tendencies. Some foreign diplomats agree
that Tarasyuk is sometimes a difficult person with whom to
deal. At an October 5 E-PINE dinner, Tarasyuk went out of
his way to bash Yanukovych in public remarks. Europeans have
tried to get Tarasyuk to restrain himself, to no avail.

Chaliy's Lobbying
--------------


10. (C) In an October 5 meeting with Ambassador, Chaliy gave
no overt indication that he was preparing to become foreign
minister, other than to obliquely criticize Tarasyuk for not
being able to work with Yanukovych. On the other hand, as he
noted, Chaliy himself had been in MFA when Yanukovych was
previously prime minister and was familiar with Yanukovych's
style and approach. Chaliy touted himself as a man of
compromise and referred to his varied background as a lawyer
by training and with experience as both a diplomat and
businessman. He also worked to convey the impression that he
was loyally supporting President Yushchenko's foreign policy
prerogatives. He said he was doing this by preparing
presidential directives on key foreign policy issues so as to
avoid the confusion surrounding purely oral interactions, as

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had happened before Yanukovych's trip to Brussels.

Chaliy's Record
--------------


11. (C) On substance, however, Chaliy's track record is
mixed. The influential Dzerkalo Tyzhnya weekly in its
September 23 issue noted the irony of the "pro-NATO and
pro-EU" President Yushchenko's appointment of Chaliy to the
Presidential Secretariat. In May 2006, Chaliy joined with
other prominent figures in a move to promote Ukraine'
non-aligned status in accordance with a December 1991
referendum. While First Deputy Foreign Minister, however,
Chaliy had been a strong advocate of EU and NATO membership
and left MFA in 2003 after publicly criticizing Ukraine's
decision to join the Single Economic Space with Russia,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan. According to Vadym Doroshenko, who
moved from MFA to the Industrial Union of Donbas with Chaliy,
Chaliy's advocacy of neutrality might have been temporary and
tactical. (While he speaks English well, Chaliy is less
fluent than Tarasyuk, speaking with a stronger accent and
sometimes using fairly stilted language.)


12. (C) Dzerkalo Tyzhnya also opined that, due to his varied
background, Chaliy would be able to synthesize interesting
ideas from different fields. As an example of "an
interesting idea," OSCE Mission in Moldova Head Lou O'Neill
was aghast to hear Chaliy, apparently seriously, suggest that
Ukraine should pressure Transnistria to negotiate seriously
by imposing an economic blockade of the region. To be fair,
Chaliy also strongly condemned the September 17 Transnistria
"independence" referendum in an appearance on national UT-1
television two days later and characterized Transnistria as
Ukraine's top national security threat.


13. (U) Interfax quoted Chaliy October 11 as saying, "In my
view, there will be no changes in the foreign policy course
even if some changes occur to the composition of the
Ukrainian cabinet." To internet news website Obozravatel,
Chaliy said he personally continued to support Ukrainian
neutrality, but, as a public servant, he would support
Ukrainian law. (Note: The June 19, 2003, Law on the
Fundamental Principles of Ukraine's National Security states
that EU and NATO membership are a Ukrainian strategic goal.)


14. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor