UKRAINE: OVERHAULING THE PRESIDENT'S MEN -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003919 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: OVERHAULING THE PRESIDENT'S MEN - YUSHCHENKO'S NEW TEAM COMPLETE, FOR NOW REF: A. 05 KIEV 3508 ¶B. KIEV 3866 ¶C. KIEV 3755 ¶D. KIEV 3130 Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. With the appointment of Industrial Union of the Donbas (IUD) executive Vitaly Haiduk as National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary October 10, the overhaul of President Yushchenko's team which started September 16 with the appointment of Viktor Baloha as Presidential Secretariat Head is complete for now, Baloha told the media SIPDIS October 10. In a sign of a concerted effort to rationalize the Presidential team, Yushchenko also dismissed over 30 non-staff advisers, including his former inner circle of "dear friends" Oleksandr Tretyakov, Vira Ulyanchenko, and Myhailo Doroshenko. At the same time, he sent a clear signal of dissatisfaction with Our Ukraine (OU) by appointing his first Presidential Secretariat Head Oleksandr Zinchenko as an adviser, over OU's vocal protests. ¶2. (C) Comment: While Haiduk's appointment will have substantive impact, particularly on energy policy, Zinchenko's return as a Presidential adviser 13 months after he resigned as Presidential Secretariat head, charging Yushchenko's inner circle with corruption, has more symbolic resonance. Yushchenko appears to have consciously moved away from both his former "dear friends" inner circle and Our Ukraine insiders who consistently provided him with bad advice, poor management, and an eroding political base over the past 18 months, in favor of less "orange" but stronger, more professionally competent personnel. Yushchenko's beefed up team will serve as a more weighty counterpart defending Presidential prerogatives and policies vis-a-vis Yanukovych's assertive Cabinet of Ministers, though it could also act as a potential bridge to the main Donetsk clan (IUD quietly supported Yushchenko in 2004 but knows fellow Donetskans well). With the revolving personnel door around Yushchenko, the next question on many people's lips is how long Borys Tarasyuk will last as Foreign Minister, with Presidential Secretariat Deputy Head Oleksandr Chaly waiting in the wings SIPDIS to take over at MFA (septel to follow). End Summary and Comment. All The President's Men Now Includes an Energy Heavyweight -------------- -------------- 
¶3. (C) While the most recent speculation over the NSDC Secretary position had centered on Yuliya Tymoshenko, with OU SIPDIS heavyweights Roman Bezsmertny and Yuri Yekhanurov previously mentioned, Yushchenko in the end opted for billionaire business executive, Presidential Campaign contributor, and Donetsk native Vitaly Haiduk, defacto owner of a 49.9% stake in IUD (which boosted his net worth to $1.7 billion, according to the Kyiv Post's 2006 list of richest Ukrainians, tied for sixth with fellow IUD magnate Serhiy Taruta). Haiduk, whom Yushchenko nearly appointed Deputy PM for Fuels and Energy December 30, 2005 on the eve of the gas crisis with Russia, twice served as Energy Minister and once DPM for Energy under the premierships of Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Haiduk thus brings significant management and energy policy expertise to Yushchenko's newly-overhauled team. ¶4. (C) Haiduk's chief of protocol at IUD, Vadym Doroshenko, told us October 11 that Haiduk joined Yushchenko's team in order to help with national "damage control" and to prevent "one political force and one businessman - Regions and Akhmetov - from taking over the country." Haiduk's agenda, according to Doroshenko, would focus on energy issues: countering Boiko's pro-Russian schemes, that could eventually result in Russian control of gas infrastructure through various cut-out companies and mechanisms; plus pushing energy diversification, including more substantial offshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Odesa-Brody project. Doroshenko dismissed the possibility of Yushchenko's team establishing a productive working relationship with the dominant Donetsk clan, predicting that low-scale political sniping would continue indefinitely. ¶5. (C) Note: Haiduk, like Tymoshenko, was a vocal critic of the January 4 gas deal. While they were gas business rivals in the late 1990s, Tymoshenko told Ambassador during June coalition negotiations that, should she become Prime Minister, she would ask Haiduk to be Energy Minister. Haiduk was also publicly rumored to be on the short list for NaftoHaz Chief, though neither position materialized after the early July break-up of the Orange Coalition. In 2003, Haiduk tussled with current Energy Minister Boiko (then Naftohaz Chief) over the fate of Odesa-Brody and the creation of RosUkrEnergo, leading to Haiduk's dismissal from his KIEV 00003919 002 OF 003 position as DPM and Minister of Energy. ¶6. (C) While there has been speculation since early 2006 that Haiduk was seeking a way to enter politics and might harbor political aspirations, his appointment, rather than Tymoshenko, Bezsmertny, or Yekhanurov, avoids politicizing the NSDC at a time of institutional jousting between the Presidential Secretariat and the Cabinet of Ministers. Haiduk replaces Acting NSDC Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin, who could not be appointed as Secretary since he is past the statutory retirement age for Ukrainian civil servants (65). Haiduk paid tribute to Horbulin (NSDC Secretary from 1996-99) in his initial comments to reporters October 10, calling him the "patriarch of the NSDC who created much effort and energy to its creation." Haiduk vowed to employ professionals and prevent the NSDC from becoming a political club. ¶7. (SBU) Bringing further order to a formerly chaotic universe of personalities around Yushchenko, Presidential Secretariat head Baloha announced that Yushchenko had SIPDIS dismissed 32 non-staff advisers October 9. This included former "dear friends" considered closest to Yushchenko personally - former first aide Tretyakov, Kyiv governor Ulyanchenko, and Ukraina Moloda editor Doroshenko - as well as a hodge podge of occasional policy advisers, including Russians Boris Nemtsov and Vyacheslav Kantor and ex-German Ambassador Dietmar Studemann, and celebrity personalities such as footballer Andriy Shevchenko, ex-boxer Vitaliy Klychko, and opera singer Volodymyr Hryshko. Signs of Yushchenko's Strain with Our Ukraine? -------------- - ¶8. (C) At the same time, Yushchenko signed a decree appointing his first Presidential Secretariat Head Zinchenko as a Presidential adviser. Zinchenko's return was more of a surprise than Haiduk's appointment, since Zinchenko had denounced corruption in Yushchenko's inner circle at the time of his early September 2005 resignation, triggering the collapse of the Tymoshenko government (ref A). His appointment could only be taken as a slap in the face of key Our Ukraine insiders whom Zinchenko had denounced, including Tretyakov and Petro Poroshenko; Our Ukraine immediately demanded that the Zinchenko appointment be rescinded, but Baloha refused (note: in contrast, Baloha quickly backtracked on his recent appointment of Vasyl Baziv as his adviser. After the media complained that Baziv had been involved in the infamous temnyki issued from the Presidential Secretariat under feared Kuchma Presidential Administration head Viktor Medvedchuk, Baloha acknowledged his mistake and dismissed Baziv after three days). ¶9. (SBU) Ihor Kolyushko Presidential Adviser and Head of the Secretariat's Institutional Development Service, told us SIPDIS October 4 that the new Secretariat leadership carried into office a strong sense of distrust towards Yushchenko's previous team. OU party leaders like Poroshenko had long followed their own interests without supporting Yushchenko, claimed Kolyushko, who characterized OU's recent announced (although not implemented) decision not to join a broad coalition but to go into opposition (ref B) as the latest such move of self-preservation. (note: Kolyushko who joined the Secretariat in November 2005 after the first shakeup, is affiliated politically with the Reforms and Order Party, which split from the rest of the Our Ukraine bloc in late ¶2005. Several Reforms and Order politicians, including fellow Presidential adviser Taras Stetskiv, have been mentioned in speculation about possible efforts to create a new pro-presidential reformist political force separate from Our Ukraine). ¶10. (SBU) Yushchenko met with "orange" ministers in his cabinet October 10 subsequent to the announcement of Haiduk's appointment. Health Minister Polyachenko told the press later that the orange ministers had told Yushchenko that they had decided to resign from the Yanukovych cabinet, and that the official announcement would be made in the coming days. In contrast, Defense Minister Hrytsenko and FM Tarasyuk made clear they served at the pleasure of the President and had no plans to resign. The current intentions of Interior Minister Lutsenko, a former Socialist who did not want to serve under Yanukovych but remained in place at Yushchenko's insistence in August (ref D),remain unclear. However, at this point, with Yanukovych still talking publicly about a new coalition agreement about to be signed and no public announcements from Yushchenko about the fate of the "orange" ministers, it is anyone's guess as to what will happen next. Which way will Yushchenko's New Team Go? -------------- KIEV 00003919 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Baloha himself has taken on a far more prominent public role than either of Yushchenko's two previous Presidential Secretariat heads Zinchenko (Feb-Sept 2005) or Rybachuk (Sept. 2005 - Sept. 2006),including assuming the primary mouthpiece role once Yushchenko's former press secretary/head of the Presidential press service Iryna SIPDIS Herashchenko resigned, replaced by a lower key journalist who assumed only the press secretary role. In reorganizing the Presidential Secretariat, Baloha placed the press shop, advisers, and the president's own office under his direct control. Powerhouse First Deputy Head Yatsenyuk, formerly the well-respected Minister of Economy and now Yushchenko's representative to the Cabinet of Ministers, oversees the other four deputy heads, as well as the services for information policy, analysis, security and defense, social and economic development, and cooperation with the Rada. Baloha and Yatsenyuk's arrival in September effectively sidelined first deputy Ivan Vasyunyk, whose previous expansive empire was trimmed to just the Secretariat's services for political analysis and preservation of cultural heritage. ¶12. (C) Comment: The string of heavyweight appointments Yushchenko has made since September 16, particularly Baloha, Yatsenyuk, Deputy Head Chaliy (foreign policy),and now Haiduk at the NSDC - share stronger reputations for managerial competency than long-standing loyalty to Yushchenko or strong affiliation with Our Ukraine. Haiduk and Chaliy enjoy a particularly close link, serving together as IUD executives in recent years; Doroshenko suggested to us October 11 that Yatensyuk is loosely affiliated with the IUD team as well. While IUD is now a business rival to Regions' financier Rinat Akhmetov's Systems Capital Management and quietly supported Yushchenko in 2004, the Donetsk groups share common roots and know each other well. Both Haiduk and Chaliy are pragmatists who could more easily reach out to Regions than Our Ukraine figures; Yanukovych praised Haiduk's appointment. That said, Haiduk confidente Doroshenko claimed that the first order of business for Haiduk and the rest of Yushchenko's new team would be drawing lines and resisting Regions' encroachments, not reaching out and building bridges. The ultimate key, as always, rests with Yushchenko. ¶13. (C) Note: Despite Baloha's public statements October 10 that there is no thought being given to replacing FM Borys Tarasyuk, and Doroshenko told us that there was no overt promise made to Chaliy regarding the MFA, IUD expects Chaliy eventually to replace Tarasyuk at the MFA "once the Rada takes action," (i.e., a vote to dismiss Tarasyuk). Septel will examine that possibility and the implications for policy. ¶14. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor