UKRAINE: WHO ARE THE PEACEMAKERS? BUILDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 000367 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: WHO ARE THE PEACEMAKERS? BUILDING POSSIBLE POST-ELECTION COALITIONS REF: KIEV 293 Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment: The public political posturing about potential post-election coalitions kicked off in earnest January 24 with President Yushchenko's party Our Ukraine releasing a letter calling for the forces of the Maidan -- Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko's bloc (BYuT),Moroz' Socialists, Kostenko's Ukrainian People's Party, and PORA-Reforms and Order (RO) -- to work together in forming a government. Rada Speaker Lytvyn's political forces were pointedly left off the list. BYuT and PORA leaders immediately claimed credit for the latest peacemaker initiative, claiming Our Ukraine had responded to their idea. Moroz suggested that non-Maidan parties like Regions could end up in government to help bridge the Orange-Blue divide. Rada Speaker Lytvyn has been running animated campaign ads on TV depicting himself as the bridge builder between "Team Orange" and "Team Blue" engaged in a tug of war. Regions MP Makeyenko derided the Our Ukraine letter to us January 25 as "empty words" designed to make Yushchenko look good in the West, and suggested that the lines of communication between Our Ukraine and Regions remained open despite a ploy to decertify Yanukovych as a candidate based on his past criminal convictions. ¶2. (C) Comment: The flurry of claims to the mantle of bridge-building peacemaker is likely a reaction to public weariness over constant political infighting. Public posturing and talk of unity aside, privately the parties continue to talk with a wide range of potential partners, advancing conditions and probing for possible common ground. The reality two months prior to the March 26 elections is that no one can say for sure which forces will be in a post-election position to form a parliamentary majority and to negotiate a coalition arrangement. The two most likely scenarios would be a government formed around a reunited -- for practical, not ideological reasons -- Our Ukraine-BYuT partnership, or alternatively, an even more utilitarian Our Ukraine-Regions accommodation. While reform prospects in the short term would be brighter under the former, we must be prepared for the possibility of the latter. In fact, the longer-term workability of either potential coalition is a legitimate question. End summary and comment. Call for Team Orange to reassemble (with conditions) -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) Our Ukraine Legal Department head Roman Zvarych announced at a January 24 press conference that Our Ukraine had sent a letter to BYuT, the Socialists, the Kostenko-Plyushch electoral bloc, and the PORA-RO bloc proposing to form a post-election coalition and divide ministerial slots in the next government, as well as positions in the Rada and other government agencies. Zvarych's letter came with pre-conditions -- cancellation of the January 10 Rada vote to dismiss the Yekhanurov, and recognition of Yushchenko as the "leader of the Orange coalition" -- and asked for answers by February 2. Others claim credit (with other conditions) -------------- ¶4. (U) Four days earlier, during the January 20 "Freedom of Speech" live talk show on ICTV, a wide range of politicians headlined by Tymoshenko and Moroz had appeared jointly to discuss the current political scene. After Moroz repeatedly expressed his regret over the breakup of "Team Orange," PORA leader Vlad Kaskiv suggested that the way out of the present domestic political impasse would be an agreement on post-election coalition building. Kaskiv said PORA-RO was ready to help broker such a coalition. Tymoshenko reacted with enthusiasm but said Our Ukraine also needed to step forward. On January 24, Kaskiv told the press that the quick reaction of both Our Ukraine and BYuT hopefully indicated that principles rather than narrow interests were again prevailing. Kaskiv stated there should be no pre-conditions; nor would there be negotiations with "criminals and Kuchmaists." ¶5. (U) BYuT deputy leader Mykola Tomenko also issued a quick statement in response to the Our Ukraine letter, claiming that Zvarych had merely responded to a BYuT initiative to form a coalition and regretting that Our Ukraine had not engaged on the conception forwarded by BYuT. BYuT supported unity based on ideology and programs rather than personal loyalty to the President, he added. Tymoshenko, speaking later January 25 on Dnipropetrovsk TV, rejected a separate Our Ukraine coalition proposal with a ten-page attachment of proposed distribution of positions that she said Our Ukraine campaign chief Bezsmertny had sent to her. Lytvyn the true bridge or a Kuchmaist? -------------- ¶6. (U) For his part, Rada Speaker Lytvyn ran animated TV campaign ads promoting himself as the country's true reconciler bringing together "Team Orange" and "Team Blue" locked in a tug of war over Ukraine. On January 26, he slammed the Our Ukraine proposal as an effort to divide power among a select group of parties. He also somewhat bizarrely cited the intent of the January 24 letter to rationalize the Rada's refusal to swear in nominated Constitutional court judges since November, in contradiction to requirements for the Rada to act within 30 days. ¶7. (C) Comment: Rada Speaker Lytvyn's electoral bloc was pointedly left off Our Ukraine's list of proposed partners. Notwithstanding his January 23 claim to A/S Fried that he was a supporter of the Orange Revolution (reftel),Lytvyn was never "Orange," pointedly refused to attend the November 22 Maidan first anniversary event, claiming "he would not participate in a event which had split the nation," and welcomed the highest number of former "Kuchmaist" MPs into his electoral bloc. From the Our Ukraine perspective, Lytvyn also played an unhelpful role most recently in December and January, positioning himself and the Rada as an alternative source of power and legitimacy to Yushchenko. While post-election cooperation may still occur based on the necessity to build a parliamentary majority, Our Ukraine's omission of Lytvyn preempted criticism from PORA-RO and Tymoshenko that Yushchenko sought to cut deals with "the Kuchmaists." Moroz: predicting Regions will be in government? -------------- --- ¶8. (SBU) Despite his public longing January 20 for a reassembly of Team Orange, Socialist Party leader Moroz, when commenting on the Our Ukraine letter during an internet chat session hosted by the web journal Ukrainska Pravda January 25, voiced his expectation that the post-election parliamentary majority would likely include a non-Orange party, specifically citing Regions, as a way of easing Orange-Blue political tensions. (Note: it has been widely presumed that the Socialists would not serve together with Regions due to past mutual antipathy). Regions MP: Empty words, everything remains in play -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Regions MP Volodymyr Makeyenko, who served as Our Ukraine's deputy campaign chair for the 2002 Rada campaign before defecting to Regions, dismissed the Our Ukraine initiative to us January 25 as "empty words designed to impress friends in the West." Behind the scenes, he noted, conversations between Our Ukraine and Regions continued; indeed, his phone rang soon after we arrived in Makeyenko's office with an invitation from Presidential Secretariat deputy chief of staff Vasyunnyk to meet Vasyunnyk January 26 at the Presidential Secretariat. Makeyenko claimed that he and Vasyunnyk had served as primary negotiators for the September 22 MOU between Yushchenko and Yanukovych that had paved the way for PM Yekhanurov's confirmation vote. Yushchenko had failed to uphold his commitments under the agreement, Makeyenko charged, but the door remained open to future Our Ukraine-Regions cooperation if Yushchenko were more flexible. ¶10. (C) Makeyenko said that efforts by Zvarych and Interior Minister Lutsenko (Socialist) to deregister Yanukovych as a candidate based on his two youthful convictions had temporarily infuriated Regions. He argued to us, however, that a politically weakened Yushchenko, who truly despised Tymoshenko as well as the Communists and the SPDU(o),needed the experience of Regions MPs and leaders to unite Ukraine's east and west and to provide more competent stewardship of the Ukrainian economy. To wit, Makeyenko, who participated in previous rounds of Ukrainian-Russian gas negotiations as head of UkrHazBank, derided the amateurism of Naftohaz Chair Ivchenko and Energy and Fuels Minister Plachkov; they had been rolled by the more experienced Russians, in his view. Regions leaders knew how to deal with Russians, particularly since they viewed them as business competitors, he claimed. "We know how to defend Ukraine's interests." ¶11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. HERBST