UKRAINE: EUR A/S FRIED'S NATO-RELATED DISCUSSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003553 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: EUR A/S FRIED'S NATO-RELATED DISCUSSIONS REF: KIEV 3463 Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Ukraine-NATO relations was a primary theme in EUR Assistant Secretary Fried's meetings September 6-7 with FM Borys Tarasyuk, Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and PM Viktor Yanukovych. Holdover "orange" Ministers Tarasyuk and Hrytsenko have been the two staunchest advocates of Ukraine's NATO aspirations since Yushchenko became President in January 2005. PM Yanukovych is the linchpin official looking forward; his September 14 visit to NATO will be crucial in determining the way forward, and he will need to play a key role in engaging his anti-NATO electorate of the benefits of Euro-Atlantic integration. A/S Fried made clear the two basic requirements for countries aspiring to join NATO: exhibiting the serious political will to join; and meeting the alliance's standards and values. Ukraine over the past four months had not sent a clear signal of its intent; the U.S. could not support Ukraine's aspirations more than Ukraine itself. That said, the U.S. would support Ukraine moving forward at a pace of its choosing; the U.S. would not walk away from Ukraine. Yanukovych reacted to this message with relief, Tarasyuk with acceptance, and Hrytsenko with some distress. Reftel covers the Yanukovych meeting; discussions on foreign policy, domestic politics, and economic/gas issues are in septels. End Summary Tarasyuk - NATO policy key for blue-orange -------------- ¶2. (C) FM Tarasyuk told A/S Fried September 6 that NATO policy had been the major subject of roundtable negotiations fiercely debated before the signing of the "Universal" national unity agreement and the formation of a coalition government under PM Yanukovych in early August. All parties save the communists agreed that Ukraine needed to deepen its beneficial relations, re-endorsing the landmark June 2003 Law on National Security which states clearly that NATO membership forms the basis for Ukraine's foreign policy. While Regions "hid" behind the requirement to hold a national referendum, Yushchenko had convinced Yanukovych that Ukraine had no other strategic choice besides joining NATO, Tarasyuk claimed. Tarasyuk appealed to the U.S. to take an expected Yanukovych letter to NATO requesting that Ukraine be granted MAP with a positive response. ¶3. (C) A/S Fried stressed that the road forward on NATO-Ukraine relations depended on what Yanukovych said at NATO September 14 and how he said it. NATO members had adopted a "wait and see" approach to Ukraine after the long delay in government formation, and MAP at Riga was highly unlikely given all the unknowns. The major question now was not how the alliance would react to Ukraine's NATO aspirations, but what would be Yanukovych's attitude. Given how crucial the September 14 meetings were, Tarasyuk indicated he would seek Yushchenko's permission to break precedent and travel with the PM to Brussels. (Note: Normally the FM travels with the President, a DFM with the PM. On September 8, the MFA told us that Yushchenko had given his permission and that the FM had asked the PM for approval to travel with him to Brussels. End Note.) ¶4. (C) A/S Fried emphasized that the Riga document would include language on enlargement, some focused on the Balkans aspirants, some on Ukraine and Georgia, although the text on the latter two remained open. Many Europeans remained cautious on Ukraine, worried about the Russian angle. In contrast, what mattered most to the U.S. was: how committed was Ukraine? Tarasyuk thanked Fried for the frank answer; in reply he openly acknowledged that he could only guarantee the response for President Yushchenko and himself, not for Yanukovych. With the blue-orange team only a month into cohabitation, the parties were still adjusting to each other as partners. ¶5. (C) Tarasyuk asked whether the GOU could count on U.S. support to convince skeptical alliance members on MAP if Ukraine did its part. Fried stressed that the U.S. and the alliance would respond if Ukraine demonstrated the serious political will to join NATO and do the work necessary to meet all the standards, not just in military reform. President Bush's guidance had been clear on this point for the past six years: if a country really wanted to join and was ready, the U.S. would make it happen. The U.S. would not walk away from Ukraine, but neither did we want a country in NATO which did not really want to be in the alliance or was not ready to contribute. Ukraine also needed to renew efforts to get key European countries to resume thinking about Ukraine's future. Hrytsenko - pushing for more to shape Yanukovych -------------- --- KIEV 00003553 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Defense Minister Hrytsenko reacted with more concern to the same NATO message September 7, suggesting adjustments for A/S Fried's subsequent meeting with Yanukovych, who had advisers like Orel and Radchenko spinning an anti-MAP perspective and pushing for a focus on Ukraine-NATO military-technical cooperation. Hrytsenko claimed that only NATO membership and revised terms of its energy relationship with Russia could guarantee Ukraine's genuine independence, which should matter to the West. He appealed for the U.S. to help shape Yanukovych's geopolitical perceptions and policy priorities and options. Yanukovych would have to struggle to escape the political baggage of the 2004 and 2006 campaigns even as he sought respect among foreign partners in the West. In the end, personalities like Yanukovych were transitory; geopolitical choices would reverberate much longer. ¶7. (C) Acknowledging slim chances for MAP at Riga, Hrytsenko nevertheless pitched for some substantive advance beyond the current Intensified Dialogue (ID),both to send a signal to Ukraine's pro-NATO forces and to take advantage of Yanukovych's willingness to move beyond ID but reluctance to embrace MAP immediately. MAP would solidify Yushchenko's status in the country, the values and policy directions he espoused. A/S Fried stressed that the U.S. could not want Ukrainian membership in NATO more than Ukraine itself; it was a decision for Ukraine's political class and Ukrainian society to make, and the new government had not proved capable of sending a clear signal. ¶8. (C) While acknowledging Fried's points, Hrytsenko feared that, without a strong signal at Riga, and only the standard: "the door is open, all up to you" message, there would be backsliding in the minds and activities of those now in power in Ukraine. The previous GOU, without any legal basis, had given away equipment used by its contingent in Iraq, and transferred an additional $15 million' worth of munitions, for free. It had also provided strategic airlift, for instance for the SEEBRIG to Afghanistan, at below cost (only fuel and landing fees, not covering operating expenses),at three times less than the Russian offer. In the past 18 months, the GOU had made such decisions to send positive signals to NATO partners, but he feared the new government would not make such decisions in the future. ¶9. (C) On a positive note, Hrytsenko stressed that many of the steps Ukraine needed to take to meet NATO standards would be taken regardless of the GOU's attitude towards MAP/NATO and NATO's response: reform of the judicial system; continued free and fair elections; maintenance of media freedoms; and improvements in transparency/accounting standards. In the defense sphere, there was less to be done in the short-term, and less controversy: ratifying the NATO-Ukraine strategic airlift support MOU, which Yanukovych said he backed; initiating active participation in Operation Active Endeavor, easier now that Russia itself had already started; and securing a real defense budget allowing for continued reform. ¶10. (C) On a negative note, Hrytsenko claimed that the German-based consortium that draws on both Russian and Ukrainian Ruslan AN-124 planes to fill NATO stratlift contracts on a preferred basis was a mini-RosUkrEnergo nontransparent deal that skimmed profits to Russia's benefit. Hrytsenko urged that NATO take a closer look. Yanukovych - I'm the man, let's do business -------------- ¶11. (C) A/S Fried's discussion with Yanukovych on the primary points of Ukraine-NATO relations and U.S. perspectives is covered septel. Of additional importance, given the need for the GOU to reach out to Yanukovych's overwhelmingly anti-NATO electorate, was Yanukovych's assertion that he saw himself as NATO's chief "imagemaker" in Ukraine, given the challenge of public opinion to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. ¶12. (C) Yanukovych claimed he had a good sense for how Ukrainians felt about NATO-related issues. In contrast, the two orange governments in office from January 2005 - July 2006 had tried to rush the NATO accession issue, increasing negative attitudes towards NATO. The May-June protests against an exercise in Feodosia, Crimea lacking parliamentary approval were an prime example in his view. However, once the Universal was signed in August, the Rada had quietly approved foreign exercises, and there was no negative reaction to this approval (note: not entirely true; the Communists and Natalya Vitrenko's Progressive Socialists protested). Yanukovych stressed that it was essential that the discussion on Euro-Atlantic integration be a balanced, calm process to convince society; this would take time. ¶13. (C) As predicted by Hrytsenko, Yanukovych focused on KIEV 00003553 003 OF 003 potential military technology collaboration that could benefit Ukraine and serve as a "heavyweight" argument for Ukrainians in favor of NATO membership. He mentioned detailed discussions with Polish PM Kaczinski September 6 on Poland,s possible involvement in the AN-70 military transport project, a nearly completed project now in jeopardy after Russia had decided to pull out (note: in favor of pursuit of a partnership with France instead. end note). There was no clarity regarding how much the AN-70 would cost to realize, but Yanukovych expressed confidence it could be very profitable. He noted NATO had no aircraft with its characteristics, particularly taking off and landing on runways as short as 300 meters. ¶14. (SBU) The PM also floated the idea of armored personnel carrier (APC) joint production. He claimed a Donetsk company had developed an advanced design for an APC with a new type of layered metal armor that was highly effective in deflecting bullets. He suggested a joint project could be launched to combine this design with NATO country components, such as armaments, engines, and transmissions. Production and assembly could be in Ukraine; the company's location offered low production costs due to nearby subcontractors and close access to a seaport. Yanukovych requested the USG spread word about these two defense cooperation proposals. ¶15. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message. ¶16. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor