UKRAINE: ORANGE VS BLUE CASE STUDY: THE STRUGGLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003425 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD/ISA FOR JESSICA KEHL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ORANGE VS BLUE CASE STUDY: THE STRUGGLE OVER MILITARY EDUCATION REFORM REF: A. KIEV 2962 ¶B. KIEV 3130 Classified By: Polcouns Kent Logsdon, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The political struggle between Orange and Blue to define policy and make decisions in a government of uneasy cohabitation will unfold in the coming weeks and months on an issue by issue basis, particularly in areas and ministries currently controlled by "Orange" Ministers loyal to President Yushchenko rather than PM Yanukovych. A recent behind-the-scenes dispute over military education establishments, particularly the fate of Ukrainian land forces institutes in Lviv and Odesa, serves as a case study for this unfolding reality of governance amidst conflict, as well as continued progress on security sector reform and unspoken issues of national identity formation. ¶2. (C) The "Orange" Defense Ministry wanted to close the Odesa Land Forces Institute and train all army cadets henceforth in Lviv, a decision backed by the Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) and Our Ukraine (OU); Party of Regions, the Socialists, and the Communists, along with various bureaucratic allies, backed Odesa. The start of the academic year September 1 brought matters to a head in the normally quiet August vacation period, with Deputy PMs Azarov and Tabachnyk (Regions) trying to bypass the Defense Ministry and make decisions in the Cabinet's Economic Committee in Odesa's favor. Ultimately, sustained determined actions by Acting Defense Minister Leonid Polyakov, effective use of a Presidential speech in Lviv by Yushchenko, and Regions' wariness over a direct challenge in Yushchenko's constitutionally defined area of authority allowed MOD to carry the day, albeit in the form of a compromise allowing Odesa and its backers to save some face. ¶3. (C) Comment: The struggle as described by Polyakov demonstrates the speed and the extent to which Regions attempted to impose its influence in August, while much of official Ukraine was on vacation, as well as the determination of a pair of Orange reformers to keep their agenda intact. Polyakov noted that Regions' attempt to unseat him as First Deputy Defense Minister in the aftermath of a mid-August fire/explosion at the Novobohdanivka arsenal was unrelated to the struggle over military education institutions. Instead, Regions attempted to open a key slot at the Defense Ministry which it would then seek to fill with its own man, since "cadre placement and rent seeking offices," in his view, have been the priorities of the Regions team since they returned to government in early August. ¶4. (C) Comment, cont: Polyakov told us repeatedly through August that nearly all governmental initiative was now in Regions' hands, and that only a sustained effort by Yushchenko to assert himself could serve as an effective counterbalance. While the active role of Yushchenko in an era of cohabitation will be key to maintaining forward momentum on his stated agenda in foreign and domestic policy, retention of dedicated reformers like Hrytsenko, Polyakov, as well as Foreign Minister Tarasyuk and Interior Minister Lutsenko will be equally crucial in ensuring continued implementation of those policies, particularly of security sector reform. End Summary and Comment. Downsizing Military Education: Lviv vs. Odesa -------------- ¶5. (C) First Deputy Defense Minister Leonid Polyakov shared with us September 3 the behind the scenes details of a specific orange-blue power struggle that played out during the August vacation break largely out of the public eye. The issue concerned reforms near and dear to the hearts of IMET grads DefMin Hrytsenko and Polyakov: rationalizing a bloated system of military education, ending the financing of excessive training for unneeded reserve officers, and ensuring the best location for Ukraine's version of West Point. Polyakov said he had quietly made this one of his top priorities ever since his first trip outside Kyiv in the spring of 2005, to Lviv's Land Forces Academy and the Yavoriv Training Grounds in Lviv oblast, which underscored the necessity to rationalize and reform the education and training system, both for budgetary and quality reasons. ¶6. (C) Polyakov noted that Ukraine at independence had inherited four land forces institutes: at Kharkiv, Sumy, Lviv, and Odesa. While the Air Force and Navy had easily focused their education at Kharkiv and Sevastopol, KIEV 00003425 002 OF 003 respectively, the Army faced a more difficult task, with not only four main institutes but dozens of civilian university training departments turning out tens of thousands of unneeded reserve officers at MOD expense. Kharkiv and Sumy had been relatively easy to close, but a fierce bureaucratic battle between Lviv and Odesa unfolded when it became clear only one would survive, according to Polyakov. ¶7. (C) Lviv was clearly the best option in Polyakov's mind: the associated civilian university was of higher quality; the training facilities nearby, particularly Yavoriv, were superior to anything near Odesa; and the per cadet cost of education in Lviv was lower than in Odesa, a city famed for its corruption since the times of the tsars. While those were the official rationales, an unofficial factor was the clincher for the MOD leadership: Lviv is unambiguously Ukrainian, whereas Odesa is a Russian-speaking, more "cosmopolitan" freewheeling port city with its own identity. Rather than continue an old Soviet tradition where a military installation or institute often defined the host town (think Sevastopol),Polyakov believed that a military education institute and its cadets should be influenced by their environment instead. ¶8. (C) With Ukraine and its institutions still in the nation-building stage, Lviv was the clear MOD choice to train the next generation of army officers (200-300 a year). However, because of the political sensitivity of regional politics, said Polyakov, he and Hrytsenko never mentioned this factor publicly or put it on paper, to avoid giving political opponents any grounds to challenge them or the decision. Unfortunately, deputy Defense Minister Pasko slipped and made one public mention of the "Ukrainian" factor associated with Lviv, according to Polyakov, giving opponents a heads up and an avenue of attack. The Political Power Play, resolved in Lviv's favor -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Politicians aware of the Lviv vs. Odesa debate broke down along predictable lines, according to Polyakov: BYuT was solidly behind Lviv, OU more or less so; Regions, the Socialists, and Communists backed Odesa. The August showdown centered around MOD orders to transfer 250 second and third year cadets from Odesa to Lviv, effectively shutting down the Odesa Institute, though it had already been decided to allow final year cadets in Odesa to complete their training. Backers of Odesa secured a court decision blocking the transfer, a classic mechanism used by political forces in Ukraine attempting to stymie decisions by their opponents. Polyakov said that as Acting Defense Minister in August, he continued an intensive phone campaign, cajoling and berating a series of officials who needed to take a series of actions to complete the transfer but faced the conflict between ministerial orders and a politically motivated court decision. ¶10. (C) After the Yanukovych-led Cabinet formed the first week in August, according to Polyakov, DPMs Azarov and Tabachnyk quietly attempted to circumvent the Defense Ministry on the institute issue by using the Cabinet's Economic Committee to take decisions in favor of Odesa. Polyakov and his allies countered by securing inclusion of a final decision on Lviv into comments made by President Yushchenko August 27 while in Lviv to celebrate Independence Day and the 150th anniversary of Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko's birth. That proved to be the clincher, with Azarov, Tabachnyk, and company caught off guard, according to Polyakov, unwilling to challenge Yushchenko on an issue clearly within the constitutional competency of the President. The cadet transfer went forward in time for the start of the academic year, with Defense Minister Hrytsenko traveling to Lviv and giving several policy speeches at the academy. ¶11. (C) Polyakov said that the MOD agreed to a face-saving compromise which allowed Odesa's backers to claim partial victory. Rather than have training of reserve officers at a subordinate faculty of Odesa's Polytechnical Institute as planned, the Odesa Land Forces Institute name was retained, rather than being eliminated. However, the substance did not change: with the exception of the graduating cadets this year, the training at the Odesa Institute would be of reserve officers only, and self-financed by the students wanting to receive the rank of junior lieutenant (reserve). The state/MOD would no longer finance reserve officer training, a point Hrytsenko made in his September 4 news conference at the Lviv academy. KIEV 00003425 003 OF 003 ¶12. (SBU) Hrytsenko's news conference provided the only real public window into the struggle. In acknowledging the sensitivity of moves to reduce the number of state-funded training locations, Hrytsenko stated: "Enormous pressure was put on the Defense Ministry of Ukraine to persuade it not to close down some military training departments, although it was high time to do so....I have taken a decision, and the state will no longer finance training of reserve officers." ¶13. (C) Note: Polyakov, an IMET graduate of the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA (DefMin Hrytsenko is an IMET graduate of the US Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL),said that resolving the future of the Land Forces Institute and army education in Ukraine was the reform issue closest to his heart, and he would have resigned had he lost the Lviv vs. Odesa battle. Similarly, Hrytsenko told visiting EUR DAS Kramer and Ambassador July 28 that he would resign as Minister if he could not secure the funding necessary to implement his military reform agenda (ref a). Yushchenko reappointed Hrytsenko a week later, along with Interior Minister Lutsenko, who had earlier vowed to resign rather than serve under Yanukovych but ultimately chose duty to the state over political preference (ref b). ¶14. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor