C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003425

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD/ISA FOR JESSICA KEHL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ORANGE VS BLUE CASE STUDY: THE STRUGGLE
OVER MILITARY EDUCATION REFORM

REF: A. KIEV 2962


B. KIEV 3130

Classified By: Polcouns Kent Logsdon, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. The political struggle between Orange and
Blue to define policy and make decisions in a government of
uneasy cohabitation will unfold in the coming weeks and
months on an issue by issue basis, particularly in areas and
ministries currently controlled by "Orange" Ministers loyal
to President Yushchenko rather than PM Yanukovych. A recent
behind-the-scenes dispute over military education
establishments, particularly the fate of Ukrainian land
forces institutes in Lviv and Odesa, serves as a case study
for this unfolding reality of governance amidst conflict, as
well as continued progress on security sector reform and
unspoken issues of national identity formation.


2. (C) The "Orange" Defense Ministry wanted to close the
Odesa Land Forces Institute and train all army cadets
henceforth in Lviv, a decision backed by the Tymoshenko Bloc
(BYuT) and Our Ukraine (OU); Party of Regions, the
Socialists, and the Communists, along with various
bureaucratic allies, backed Odesa. The start of the academic
year September 1 brought matters to a head in the normally
quiet August vacation period, with Deputy PMs Azarov and
Tabachnyk (Regions) trying to bypass the Defense Ministry and
make decisions in the Cabinet's Economic Committee in Odesa's
favor. Ultimately, sustained determined actions by Acting
Defense Minister Leonid Polyakov, effective use of a
Presidential speech in Lviv by Yushchenko, and Regions'
wariness over a direct challenge in Yushchenko's
constitutionally defined area of authority allowed MOD to
carry the day, albeit in the form of a compromise allowing
Odesa and its backers to save some face.


3. (C) Comment: The struggle as described by Polyakov
demonstrates the speed and the extent to which Regions
attempted to impose its influence in August, while much of
official Ukraine was on vacation, as well as the

determination of a pair of Orange reformers to keep their
agenda intact. Polyakov noted that Regions' attempt to
unseat him as First Deputy Defense Minister in the aftermath
of a mid-August fire/explosion at the Novobohdanivka arsenal
was unrelated to the struggle over military education
institutions. Instead, Regions attempted to open a key slot
at the Defense Ministry which it would then seek to fill with
its own man, since "cadre placement and rent seeking
offices," in his view, have been the priorities of the
Regions team since they returned to government in early
August.


4. (C) Comment, cont: Polyakov told us repeatedly through
August that nearly all governmental initiative was now in
Regions' hands, and that only a sustained effort by
Yushchenko to assert himself could serve as an effective
counterbalance. While the active role of Yushchenko in an
era of cohabitation will be key to maintaining forward
momentum on his stated agenda in foreign and domestic policy,
retention of dedicated reformers like Hrytsenko, Polyakov, as
well as Foreign Minister Tarasyuk and Interior Minister
Lutsenko will be equally crucial in ensuring continued
implementation of those policies, particularly of security
sector reform. End Summary and Comment.

Downsizing Military Education: Lviv vs. Odesa
--------------


5. (C) First Deputy Defense Minister Leonid Polyakov shared
with us September 3 the behind the scenes details of a
specific orange-blue power struggle that played out during
the August vacation break largely out of the public eye. The
issue concerned reforms near and dear to the hearts of IMET
grads DefMin Hrytsenko and Polyakov: rationalizing a bloated
system of military education, ending the financing of
excessive training for unneeded reserve officers, and
ensuring the best location for Ukraine's version of West
Point. Polyakov said he had quietly made this one of his top
priorities ever since his first trip outside Kyiv in the
spring of 2005, to Lviv's Land Forces Academy and the Yavoriv
Training Grounds in Lviv oblast, which underscored the
necessity to rationalize and reform the education and
training system, both for budgetary and quality reasons.


6. (C) Polyakov noted that Ukraine at independence had
inherited four land forces institutes: at Kharkiv, Sumy,
Lviv, and Odesa. While the Air Force and Navy had easily
focused their education at Kharkiv and Sevastopol,

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respectively, the Army faced a more difficult task, with not
only four main institutes but dozens of civilian university
training departments turning out tens of thousands of
unneeded reserve officers at MOD expense. Kharkiv and Sumy
had been relatively easy to close, but a fierce bureaucratic
battle between Lviv and Odesa unfolded when it became clear
only one would survive, according to Polyakov.


7. (C) Lviv was clearly the best option in Polyakov's mind:
the associated civilian university was of higher quality; the
training facilities nearby, particularly Yavoriv, were
superior to anything near Odesa; and the per cadet cost of
education in Lviv was lower than in Odesa, a city famed for
its corruption since the times of the tsars. While those
were the official rationales, an unofficial factor was the
clincher for the MOD leadership: Lviv is unambiguously
Ukrainian, whereas Odesa is a Russian-speaking, more
"cosmopolitan" freewheeling port city with its own identity.
Rather than continue an old Soviet tradition where a military
installation or institute often defined the host town (think
Sevastopol), Polyakov believed that a military education
institute and its cadets should be influenced by their
environment instead.


8. (C) With Ukraine and its institutions still in the
nation-building stage, Lviv was the clear MOD choice to train
the next generation of army officers (200-300 a year).
However, because of the political sensitivity of regional
politics, said Polyakov, he and Hrytsenko never mentioned
this factor publicly or put it on paper, to avoid giving
political opponents any grounds to challenge them or the
decision. Unfortunately, deputy Defense Minister Pasko
slipped and made one public mention of the "Ukrainian" factor
associated with Lviv, according to Polyakov, giving opponents
a heads up and an avenue of attack.

The Political Power Play, resolved in Lviv's favor
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Politicians aware of the Lviv vs. Odesa debate broke
down along predictable lines, according to Polyakov: BYuT was
solidly behind Lviv, OU more or less so; Regions, the
Socialists, and Communists backed Odesa. The August showdown
centered around MOD orders to transfer 250 second and third
year cadets from Odesa to Lviv, effectively shutting down the
Odesa Institute, though it had already been decided to allow
final year cadets in Odesa to complete their training.
Backers of Odesa secured a court decision blocking the
transfer, a classic mechanism used by political forces in
Ukraine attempting to stymie decisions by their opponents.
Polyakov said that as Acting Defense Minister in August, he
continued an intensive phone campaign, cajoling and berating
a series of officials who needed to take a series of actions
to complete the transfer but faced the conflict between
ministerial orders and a politically motivated court
decision.


10. (C) After the Yanukovych-led Cabinet formed the first
week in August, according to Polyakov, DPMs Azarov and
Tabachnyk quietly attempted to circumvent the Defense
Ministry on the institute issue by using the Cabinet's
Economic Committee to take decisions in favor of Odesa.
Polyakov and his allies countered by securing inclusion of a
final decision on Lviv into comments made by President
Yushchenko August 27 while in Lviv to celebrate Independence
Day and the 150th anniversary of Ukrainian writer Ivan
Franko's birth. That proved to be the clincher, with Azarov,
Tabachnyk, and company caught off guard, according to
Polyakov, unwilling to challenge Yushchenko on an issue
clearly within the constitutional competency of the
President. The cadet transfer went forward in time for the
start of the academic year, with Defense Minister Hrytsenko
traveling to Lviv and giving several policy speeches at the
academy.


11. (C) Polyakov said that the MOD agreed to a face-saving
compromise which allowed Odesa's backers to claim partial
victory. Rather than have training of reserve officers at a
subordinate faculty of Odesa's Polytechnical Institute as
planned, the Odesa Land Forces Institute name was retained,
rather than being eliminated. However, the substance did not
change: with the exception of the graduating cadets this
year, the training at the Odesa Institute would be of reserve
officers only, and self-financed by the students wanting to
receive the rank of junior lieutenant (reserve). The
state/MOD would no longer finance reserve officer training, a
point Hrytsenko made in his September 4 news conference at
the Lviv academy.

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12. (SBU) Hrytsenko's news conference provided the only real
public window into the struggle. In acknowledging the
sensitivity of moves to reduce the number of state-funded
training locations, Hrytsenko stated: "Enormous pressure was
put on the Defense Ministry of Ukraine to persuade it not to
close down some military training departments, although it
was high time to do so....I have taken a decision, and the
state will no longer finance training of reserve officers."


13. (C) Note: Polyakov, an IMET graduate of the US Army War
College at Carlisle Barracks, PA (DefMin Hrytsenko is an IMET
graduate of the US Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL), said
that resolving the future of the Land Forces Institute and
army education in Ukraine was the reform issue closest to his
heart, and he would have resigned had he lost the Lviv vs.
Odesa battle. Similarly, Hrytsenko told visiting EUR DAS
Kramer and Ambassador July 28 that he would resign as
Minister if he could not secure the funding necessary to
implement his military reform agenda (ref a). Yushchenko
reappointed Hrytsenko a week later, along with Interior
Minister Lutsenko, who had earlier vowed to resign rather
than serve under Yanukovych but ultimately chose duty to the
state over political preference (ref b).


14. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor