UKRAINE: BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION WORKING GROUP

1. (S) We delivered USG response (ref A) July 5 to the
Ukrainian government's (GOU) proposed agenda for the July
11-12 nonproliferation working group (NPWG) meetings to MFA
Arms Control and Military-Technical Cooperation Counselor
Serhiy Kucherenko. Kucherenko nodded understanding when we
highlighted USG reservations regarding two of the three
agenda items that MFA had suggested could include Polish and
UK participation. Since the Polish government was
considering assistance in disposal of melange rocket fuel,
MFA had suggested including the two government's
representatives for a general discussion of
destruction/"utilization" that included SCUD, Frog 7, and
Kh-22 missiles. We suggested that melange be listed as a
separate topic.



2. (S) Similarly, Kucherenko suggested Polish and UK
participation would be appropriate for a general discussion
of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) activities, which
included, inter alia, Warsaw's hosting of a PSI meeting
recently and a Polish government proposal for a bilateral
Ukraine-Poland hosted PSI exercise. He said he understood,
however, that third-parties need not be involved in the
discussion on the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral PSI agreement. MFA
would schedule the discussions including Polish and UK
participation on July 12, since Kucherenko said the Polish
Embassy had informed him Polish Ambassador Tadeusz Chomicki
was arriving in Kiev on July 11. We pointed out that the
NATO PfP Trust Fund discussion would also need to take place
on July 12. Kucherenko indicated his understanding.



3. (S) When we previewed Department public affairs guidance
on Russian government airing of the case involving diversion
of Kh-55 missiles to China and Iran, Kucherenko said the GOU
had asked the Russian government to explain why it had
singled out Ukraine in its annual nonproliferation White
Book. Kucherenko emphasized that Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) members understood that the case arose from a
criminal violation by a Ukrainian company and was not a GOU
violation of MTCR norms and procedures. During the 2005 MTCR
plenary, the Russian delegation had not aired any concerns
when the Ukrainian delegation had updated the gathering on
its investigation into the Kh-55 case and had also not raised
the subject during Ukraine-Russia bilateral meetings in
December 2005. The Russian government had also missed
another opportunity to present its concerns in April when
Kucherenko met in Paris with Deputy Director Mashkov of the
Russian MFA Security and Nonproliferation Office. Yet,
Kucherenko observed, Russia had suddenly singled out Ukraine
as a missile technology proliferator. Given the slowdown in
government operations due to personnel on leave, Kucherenko
noted that he did not expect a Russian government response
for "one or two months."



4. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor