Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV2297
2006-06-13 16:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: FM TARASYUK ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS,

Tags:  PREL MARR AMGT PGOV PINR UP 
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VZCZCXRO7488
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2297/01 1641609
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131609Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9875
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 002297 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR AMGT PGOV PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FM TARASYUK ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS,
SEA BREEZE, TANKOVA

REF: A. KIEV 2281


B. KIEV 2280

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 002297

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR AMGT PGOV PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FM TARASYUK ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS,
SEA BREEZE, TANKOVA

REF: A. KIEV 2281


B. KIEV 2280

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: During Ambassador's June 13 presentation of
a copy of his credentials, Foreign Minister Tarasyuk said
President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc could not accept
Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Moroz as parliamentary
speaker, despite Moroz' insistence that this was his
condition for joining the "Orange" Coalition that would form
the next cabinet. Representatives of the three potential
Orange Coalition partners (Our Ukraine bloc, Bloc Yuliya
Tymoshenko, and the Socialist Party),including Tarasyuk,
were meeting June 13 to discuss the impasse. If the
negotiations failed, Our Ukraine would announce its readiness
to enter into negotiations with the Party of Regions to form
a governing coalition. Tarasyuk assured Ambassador that any
future coalition would make passage of legislation to
authorize international military exercises its top priority;
the question was not whether the legislation would pass, but
when. Ambasador also raised a problem with acquisition of
the Tankova property for the new Embassy Office Building and
passed talking points on the UN Human Rights Council
(septel). End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and PolOff, presented a
copy of his credentials June 13 to Foreign Minister Borys
Tarasyuk. MFA 2nd Territorial Department Director Anatoliy
Ponomarenko and MFA notetaker sat in on the Ukrainian side.
During the meeting, Ambassador urged speedy formation of a
governing coalition and noted the damage caused by the
prolonged uncertainty over the shape of Ukraine's future
government. He asked Tarasyuk for an update on coalition
negotiations.

Tymoshenko's Duplicity
--------------


3. (C) Tarasyuk assured Ambassador that his Our Ukraine bloc
was doing everything possible to establish an "Orange"
coalition of Our Ukraine bloc (OU),Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
(BYuT),and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). As a
member of OU's working group, he understood that the process
of forming a coalition was not easy and, indeed, was more
difficult than expected. He accused ex-Prime Minister Yuliya
Tymoshenko of colluding with SPU to force SPU leader
Oleksandr Moroz into the parliamentary (Rada) Speaker
position, which had led to an impasse that threatened to
scuttle an Orange coalition possibility.


4. (C) As evidence, Tarasyuk said BYuT had recently begun to
support positions that it formerly opposed but which SPU
favored. Ideologically, he noted, BYuT was closer to OU than

SPU. SPU, but not BYuT, had opposed OU positions on topics
such as eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO, WTO, and the
EU. SPU also opposed measures regarding privatization of
agricultural land. Thus, OU representatives had been
surprised when Yuliya Tymoshenko backed Moroz' bid to become
Rada Speaker. Tarasyuk argued, however, that SPU should not
demand the Speaker position since it had come in third among
the Orange coalition parties; indeed, OU should have the
right to fill the Speaker position since it had come in
second. Unfortunately, Tarasyuk commented, SPU's position
seems to be locked in concrete. Furthermore, once Moroz
began to demand to be Speaker, Tymoshenko had distanced
herself from the dispute, saying it was a matter to be
settled between Moroz and President Yushchenko.


5. (C) As further evidence of Tymoshenko's complicity with
SPU, Tarasyuk said BYuT recently flip-flopped on recognition
for veterans of the Ukrainian nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent
Army (UPA) (which had fought in World War II on the German
side) and now opposed it, which had long been the SPU
position. Tarasyuk noted that Tymoshenko used to favor such
recognition to garner support from the nationalist electorate
that was part of her political base.

And Her Lack of Accountability
--------------


6. (C) Continuing his catalogue of Tymoshenko's double
dealing, Tarasyuk said Tymoshenko had categorically rejected
procedures that OU proposed to ensure that she would adhere
to the coalition agreement on principles and platform. When
Yushchenko was prime minister during the Kuchma presidency,
Tymoshenko was his first deputy prime minister, and Tarasyuk
was previously foreign minister, the government had created
interagency government committees to vet draft decisions to
be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers. The committees
facilitated decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers. When she

KIEV 00002297 002 OF 002


became Prime Minister, Tymoshenko had abolished the
committees, granting her more control over the Cabinet of
Ministers' work; as a result, Cabinet meetings had lasted
12-14 hours, Tarasyuk claimed, while, under Yekhanurov, they
lasted at most 3 hours. Tarasyuk implied Tymoshenko was
still grasping for greater control of governmental processes.

The Our Ukraine Bloc's Nightmare
--------------


7. (C) The recent evidence of close cooperation between SPU
and BYuT had convinced OU representatives that the
combination of Tymoshenko as Prime Minister and Moroz as
Speaker would create an insurmountable problem for OU,
Tarasyuk concluded. As a result, OU had announced June 10
that it would wait for a change of position on the part of
its potential Orance coalition partners. The deadline for
doing so had been noon, June 12. Today (June 13),Tarasyuk
said, the OU Political Council had met for several hours in
the morning and, as a result, decided to call a meeting of
the Orange Coalition troika, which had begun at 3:00 p.m.
(note: Ambassador's appointment with Tarasyuk was also at
3:00).

The "Wide" Coalition
--------------


8. (C) Tarasyuk said, if the troika meeting failed to resolve
the Rada Speaker selection, OU would issue a statement that
blamed SPU and BYuT for the failure in negotiations and
declare that OU was prepared to create a "wide" coalition.
Tarasyuk foresaw no problems in terms of economic issues, but
OU would initiate discussions on whether Regions would agree
to other OU conditions. Tarasyuk denied that, in such a
coalition, Moroz would still have the possibility of becoming
Speaker. A fundamental OU position, Tarasyuk averred, would
be that Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych could not be prime
minister. In forming a coalition with Regions, however, each
coalition partner would have the opportunity to select either
a candidate for prime minister or for Rada Speaker. In such
a constellation, Tarasyuk claimed Moroz would not be Rada
Speaker.

Undercurrents
--------------


9. (C) Responding to Ambassador's comments regarding USG
support for a reform-minded government, Tarasyuk noted that
SPU appeared to have hardened its position. When SPU had
been part of the government, it had never questioned the
Ukraine-NATO annual target plan. SPU was now beginning to
oppose legislative approval for the plan. Tarasyuk referred
vaguely to undisclosed parties (note: presumably Russia) that
were influencing the SPU position.

Other Topics
--------------


10. (C) On the legislation to authorize international
military exercises, Tarasyuk said he was not worried about
the legislation as such; the only question was the timing.
The legislation would be a priority for whatever coalition
that was formed. Natalya Vitrenko's People's Opposition bloc
and the Communist Party had been manipulated into mounting
demonstrations against the Sea Breeze exercise, and
unfortunately Party of Regions deputies had joined in.
President Yushchenko had personally chaired a National
Security and Defense Council (NSDC) meeting to consider the
situation surrounding Sea Breeze, and the Ukrainian
government continued to closely monitor the situation.
Tarasyuk said he expected some "resolute" decisions (not
futher specified) to be taken in the next few days.


11. (U) Ambassador also raised acquisition of the Tankova
site for the new Embassy Office Building, informing Tarasyuk
and Ponomarenko of the latest obstacle to its purchase, and
passed talking points on the UN Human Rights Council
(septel). Tarasyuk and Ponomarenko were surprised by the
Tankova developments. Ponomarenko promised to follow up.


12. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor

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