UKRAINE: ENCOURAGING GREATER SUPPORT TO BELARUSAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 002278 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016 TAGS: PREL PINR BO UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ENCOURAGING GREATER SUPPORT TO BELARUSAN DEMOCRATIC REFORM Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey A. Carlson for reasons 1.4(b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a June 8 meeting with DFM Khandohiy, U.S. Ambassador to Belarus Krol encouraged Ukraine to develop contacts with Belarus at a level below cabinet minister and suggested that Ukraine could use such contacts to promote more responsible Belarusan government behavior. He also said the U.S. and EU embassies in Minsk would welcome the Ukrainian Embassy's efforts to coordinate more closely with them and to meet with the Belarusan democratic opposition efforts (which it has neglected to do to date). End summary. ¶2. (U) Visiting U.S. Ambassador to Belarus George Krol met June 8 with Deputy Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandohiy to exchange views on Belarus. MFA First Secretary Oksana Kytsun, Belarus desk officer in the Central and Eastern European Countries Division, and PolOff (notetaker) sat in. The Same Balancing Act -------------- ¶3. (C) Khandohiy began that, while Ukraine wanted to be and could be helpful on Belarus due to close cultural and historical ties, Ukraine needed to be mindful of the sizable volume of trade with Belarus and of Belarus' economic importance to Ukraine. The Ukrainian government had hoped to gain pragmatic objectives by offering a meeting between the two countries' presidents, but the Belarusan government, which wanted the meeting for political reasons to advance Belarusan President Lukashenka's legitimacy, did not accept Ukrainian preconditions. The Belarusan government had wanted to link demarcation of the Ukraine-Belarus border to the settling of Ukrainian debts that it claimed were still owed. Now, Khandohiy noted, Ukraine-Belarus relations were "stagnant," particularly after the Belarusan authorities had arrested or detained Ukrainian citizens. Ukrainian Good Offices -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador Krol agreed that Ukraine was in a unique position to be helpful. Most Belarusans still viewed Ukrainians as "us" unlike Poles, Lithuanians and others whom Belarusans saw as "them." Even the Belarusan state media was not as aggressively hostile in its characterization of Ukraine, suggesting that Ukraine instead was a victim of Western, especially U.S., manipulation. Ambassador Krol opined that Ukraine might now have more of an opening, since in his travels along the border with Ukraine he had heard Belarusan citizens and local officials express interest in resuming a broad range of contacts with Ukraine. The Belarusan Foreign Ministry might also desire to open a dialogue to find cooperative ways of resisting Russian economic pressure directed against both countries. Well, Maybe Yes -------------- ¶5. (C) Khandohiy said he had known Belarusan Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov for many years, since both had been personal assistants to their respective Socialist Republic "foreign ministers" in Soviet times. They had subsequently been assigned to the United Nations in New York at the same time, both working on arms control issues. The EU, however, had recently become increasingly more cautionary about interactions with Belarus. Khandohiy asked whether Ukraine could actually play a role with respect to Belarus. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Krol said the EU was probably concerned about possible presidential summits. Meetings at lower levels, however, might offer a useful channel to discuss Ukraine-Belarus bilateral issues. For example, Ambassador Krol said he knew Lithuania met regularly with Belarus at the deputy foreign minister level, and he understood Poland had done the same in the past. Ukraine might do the same at the deputy foreign minister or department director level. In fact, Ambassador Krol suggested, Khandohiy might even visit Minsk since he already knew Martynov well. During such a visit, however, Khandohiy should also meet with individuals outside the government. The Belarusan government would be unhappy, but this was a normal practice of U.S. and EU officials visiting Minsk. An Out-of-Step Ukrainian Embassy -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Krol noted the Ukrainian Embassy in Minsk did not meet with democratic opposition and civil society representatives. The U.S. Embassy, on the other hand, met frequently with Ten-Plus presidential candidate Aleksander KIEV 00002278 002 OF 002 Milinkevich, but Krol did not believe that Milinkevich had ever been received at the Ukrainian Embassy. EU embassies also met frequently with, and listened to, the democratic opposition. The U.S. Embassy, and likely EU embassies, would welcome the Ukrainian Embassy's more active role and closer consultation with U.S. and EU embassies on a common approach to the Belarusan government. Western embassies would also welcome Ukrainian Embassy input on ways to make the Belarusan government more open to democratic values. Ambassador Krol stressed that no other mission or country had the same credibility with the Belarusan government and people. The Ukrainian government would be in a unique and delicate position if it could simultaneously be a trusted confidant of the Belarusan government and of the U.S. and EU. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Krol encouraged greater Ukrainian interaction with the Belarusian people, exposing them as much as possible to democratic and market economic alternatives. Pension and health reform initiatives in Ukraine could be useful to Belarusans as well, as they faced the same issues as Ukrainians. Ambassador Krol stressed that U.S. and EU joint policy toward Belarus was not to isolate the Belarusan people; Lukashenka and those in his regime responsible for repression should be isolated and squeezed, but outreach to the Belarusan people should be dramatically increased in all spheres and particularly in the information field. Ukraine could play a major role in this joint policy initiative. ¶9. (C) Khandohiy looked thoughtful upon hearing these points. As the meeting ended, he smiled and suggested that he might see Ambassador Krol again, in Minsk. ¶10. (U) Ambassador Krol cleared this cable. ¶11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor