UKRAINE: OPPOSITION CREATES TEMPEST OVER "SEA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KIEV 002190 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR NATO PINR RS UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: OPPOSITION CREATES TEMPEST OVER "SEA BREEZE" IN CRIMEA REF: A. KIEV 2034 ¶B. 05 KIEV 1288 ¶C. 05 KIEV 1226 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Sheila S. Gwaltney for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Anti-Orange Revolution forces are using the occasion of a joint U.S.-Ukraine mil-mil cooperative exercise in Crimea to stir up anti-NATO sentiment in the majority ethnic Russian peninsula and smear the Ukrainian government. Demonstrators outside GOU-administered compounds in the Crimean cities of Feodosiya and Alushta bottled up U.S. military personnel (temporarily restricting access to food and water),followed the vehicles in which they were being transported, and otherwise prevented the reservists from doing the job they were sent to do -- building basic facilities for participants in the joint military exercise "Sea Breeze" that is scheduled to begin in mid-July. The Ukrainian military unsuccessfully attempted to keep Sea Breeze preparations approved by the GOU low profile pending passage of legislation specifically authorizing the exercise. We have energetically engaged senior levels of the Ukrainian government to resolve the situation and ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel, our paramount concern. A positive resolution to this ongoing problem is important to the GOU to deny its opponents a political victory and to maintain its reputation as a reliable partner in joint military exercises. End summary. A Summer Exercise -------------- ¶2. (SBU) To be cohosted by U.S. (European Command) and Ukrainian militaries, Sea Breeze would involve 3,500 U.S. servicemen (up to 1000 ashore at peak time),10 ships, 12 aircraft, exercise related construction (ERC),and maritime, ground, and air training, with U.S. servicemen in country in various phases from May 20 until August 14. In conjunction with the training, a command post exercise (CPX) would take place at five locations in Crimea: Stary Krym, Feodosiya, Sevastopol, Saky, and Opuk. The primary goal was to expose Ukraine to running a joint maritime-ground-air task force (e.g., a 115-person CPX operation in Feodosiya) and the associated command/control challenges. ¶3. (SBU) Sea Breeze would run the second half of July, and the pack-up and departure would be completed by August 14. While the U.S. and Ukraine would provide the bulk of forces, twelve countries, including Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, and Germany, would participate, since the bilateral exercise would officially be "in the spirit of a (NATO) Partnership for Peace" (PfP) event. Observers from other countries, including Russia, would attend. A U.S. destroyer would also spend five days at a commercial pier in Sevastopol toward the end of the exercise. An Unexpected Demonstration -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The May 24 arrival of the first contingent of 113 reservists by a military aircraft into Simferopol went unnoticed. On May 27, however, the MV Advantage, a U.S.-flagged commercial ship, unloaded construction materiel and equipment in the Crimean port city of Feodosiya that U.S. military reservists would use to upgrade facilities at the Ukrainian military Stary Krim training range, as well as small arms to be used in the later Sea Breeze exercise. A few hundred loud demonstrators apparently associated with the radical leftist Progressive Socialist Party of Natalya Vitrenko greeted the arriving ship. At the same time, Customs officials at the port threw up obstacles toward the clearing of the cargo, thus preventing it from being moved to the intended construction site. The demonstrators then took up positions at the gate of a Ukrainian military facility in Feodosiya, bottling up the first group of U.S. military reservists billeted there. ¶5. (SBU) On June 1, demonstrators prevented the entry of buses carrying an additional 120 Marine and Navy reservists from the U.S. into the Feodosiya facility, throwing stones that broke a bus window and forcing the reservists to be diverted to a different Ukrainian government facility in the town of Alushta several hours distant. Likewise bottled up by demonstrators at the gates, the later arrivals at one point had difficulty obtaining regularly supplies of food and water. After numerous strongly-worded Embassy requests, the Ukrainian authorities succeeded in moving the reservists out of Alushta to join the contingents of U.S. military personnel KIEV 00002190 002 OF 005 in Feodosiya early in the morning of June 4. A Series of Missteps, . . . -------------- ¶6. (C) While initial Ukrainian government coordination was hesitant and confused, Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov told us June 2, the National Security and Defense Council met under President Yushchenko's chairmanship earlier the same day and decided: - to confirm the government's obligation to conduct all exercises according to schedule; - that local authorities in Crimea had exceeded the limits of their authority (comment: probably by acting autonomously without regard to central authorities); - instructed law enforcement authorities to take measures appropriate to the situation; - demand that unlawful activity be stopped; - establish law enforcement structures to provide law and order; - found that some foreigners, including Russian nationals, had participated in unlawful activities and, once apprehended, would be declared persona non grata and deported; - assigned tasks and responsibilities to the relevant ministries; and - critiqued the Ministry of Defense, police forces and security services for a lack of coordination from the early planning stages until the present. And a Lack of Nerve? -------------- ¶7. (C) The failure of initial planning and coordination probably arose from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MOD) desire to keep a low profile in the wake of a February 9 vote in which Parliament (Rada) failed to achieve the 226-vote majority to approve an annual bill to authorize foreign troop participation in military exercises on Ukrainian soil for ¶2006. (Note: The vote was 215 to 11, but pro-government forces did not exercise adequate discipline to muster the necessary number of votes.) The MOD had hoped to table the bill once more during the first session of the newly elected Rada May 25, but was stymied when the planned session ended on the first day as the result of an Orange coalition parliamentary maneuver (ref A). MOD officials, in discussions with us, urged caution and were reluctant to force the issue with local authorities out of concern that the resultant controversy would complicate passage of the military exercises bill, which MOD hoped would pass June 7, the first day of the next Rada meeting and in time to authorize the holding of Sea Breeze and five other planned exercises involving foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. The limbo that the exercise status was left in, however, gave the political opposition room to seize on the issue, twist the facts and thereby grab headlines and television coverage. An Engineered Controversy -------------- ¶8. (C) In addition to demonstrators purporting to belong to Vitrenko's party, Embassy observers on the ground reported seeing flags and symbols of the Communist Party, the Party of Regions, and organizations with links to Russia, such as the youth group Proriv. Embassy observers also noted, however, strong similarities among the demonstrators' props, suggesting coordination and possible common funding. While including elderly pensioners who perhaps might have jumped on the bandwagon, most demonstrators seemed lackluster and only gathered in numbers at times when television cameras were likely to be turned on them. The presence of some Russian political figures in Crimea also lent credence to the NSDC judgment that "Russian nationals participated in unlawful activities." Vitrenko and others have spread spurious rumors such as allegations that the Advantage's cargo carried poisonous substances or that the construction materials were intended to build a "NATO military base" in Crimea. ¶9. (SBU) Despite past assurances that Party of Regions was not opposed to Ukrainian military cooperation with NATO, the Viktor Yanukovych-led party has been singularly unhelpful and fanned the flames of controversy. May 30 -- Presidium of Regions political council supports the demonstrations in Crimea, calls for the punishment of responsible officials, and falsely claims NATO ships are en route to Ukraine. May 30 -- Party of Regions Ombudsman Nina Karpachova (no. 2 KIEV 00002190 003 OF 005 on the party's parliamentary candidate list) calls on the Prosecutor's General office to prosecute officials who permitted MV Advantage to enter Ukrainian territorial waters and alleges that the cargo unloading violated the Ukrainian constitution. June 2 -- The Regions-dominated Luhansk regional council urges local councils to proclaim their areas to be "NATO-free zones." June 4 -- Regions press service accuses the government of planning to send special police units to take action against the demonstrators, except that Regions deputy Yuriy Boldyrev persuaded the government to drop the plan. June 5 -- Presidium of Regions political council issues a second statement critical of government's poor response and lack of prior coordination and calls for dismissal of the Foreign and Defense Ministers. June 5 -- Regions and Communist Party deputies of the Crimean Autonomous Republic assembly join protesters in Feodosiya and assist them to inspect vehicles leaving the port. Crimean Assembly deputy Vasyl Kisiliov from Party of Regions bullied his way into the Feodosiya facility where the U.S. military reservists were located and, with a Russian TV news crew in tow, confronted the U.S. Marine commander with a demand to inspect cargo containers. June 5 -- Regions Deputy Yevhen Kushnaryov (no. 11 on the party's parliamentery candidate list),in an ICTV television broadcast, proclaims that the arrival of U.S. military personnel in Ukraine was unlawful and unconstitutional. He voices the opinion that Regions will vote against a bill authorizing foreign troop participation in military exercises held in Ukraine. June 6 -- The Regions-dominated Crimean assembly votes in an extraordinary session to proclaim Crimea a "NATO-free zone." Regions MP and Yanukovych foreign policy advisor Leonid Kozhara told PolCouns June 6 that the actions of some Regions representatives did not represent the party's position. He said Yanukovych would issue a statement on the subject June 6 or 7. Long Term Fall-out? -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ukrainian government's ambitious efforts to support Sea Breeze in the face of its ambiguous legal position may have increased the difficulty of securing passage of the military exercises measure in the Rada. During a June 5 meeting with DATT, Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov, while maintaining a positive outlook, could not rule out the measure's defeat. In the short run, a protracted delay in passing the measure will also negatively affect Tight Knot 2006, the Ukrainian military's bilateral exercise with UK military, involving fighter aircraft, later in June. Regions and Socialist deputies have said publicly that at the very least the issue should not be taken up by the full Rada until the relevant Committees (still unformed) consider the question. This could take weeks. ¶11. (U) The Ukrainian military's failure to foresee the possible quagmire into which it might be stepping was perhaps not unexpected since U.S. and Ukrainian forces have conducted exercises in the past with no attendant negative publicity. In 2005, the second half of exercise Peace Shield involved the participation of 600 U.S. Marines in Ukraine, and, also in 2005, a NATO exercise, Cooperative Poseidon, took place in Ukraine. Earlier, the first Sea Breeze was held in Crimea in 1997 with the participation of seven countries and 400 ground troops. Significantly, a Sea Breeze exercise occurred in Odesa in 2003 with the participation of 600-700 U.S. Marines, when Viktor Yanukovych was Prime Minister. Over the last decade, U.S., Italian, French, and Turkish warships have made port calls in Ukrainian cities on the Black Sea. Embassy Response -------------- ¶12. (C) Embassy engaged vigorously and at the highest levels to ensure the safety and comfort of the U.S. military personnel and resolve the situation. Charge contacted the head of Ukrainian Customs, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, the Presidential Chief of Staff, the Minister of Interior, and the National Security and Defense Council Secretary to focus attention on the problem. DATT deployed SIPDIS KIEV 00002190 004 OF 005 military attaches to Crimea to provide on-scene liaison and supervision, kept in close contact with Deputy Defense Minister Leonid Polyakov, and provided regular updates by secure e-mail to offices following the situation. RSO and a Locally Employed Staff investigator were in Crimea over the June 3-4 weekend and again June 6 to coordinate with Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies on crowd control. The Public Affairs Section prepared press guidance and issued clarifying statements to the media. Charge and PolCouns were in contact with Party of Regions officials to make clear USG unhappiness with its representatives' unhelpful behavior. ¶13. (C) Most recently, Charge met/spoke with Deputy Foreign Minister Khandohiy and National Security and Defence Council Secretary Horbulin June 6 to emphasize our ongoing concerns SIPDIS about the Marines' security, comfort and impeded ability to complete the task they were sent to accomplish. Treatment by Regions Party representatives who used their deputies' status to get access to the cargo and to the compound where the Marines are billeted was unacceptable. These problems had to stop immediately. Looking ahead, the USG wanted to implement the agreed joint exercise and recognized that the current problems' source was not the government's bad intentions, but the still uncleared cargo, impeded movement of the resevists, and time constraints meant that we would soon have to make a decision on the feasibility of continuing to try to go forward. Washington would decide next steps, but it was important that the GOU ensure the safety and well-being of the Marines. A group of reservists meant to replace the current group would very likely not be sent if the situation were not resolved satisfactorily soon. ¶14. (C) Khandohiy apologized for the situation, noted that pure politics were to blame, promised to work cooperatively to find a way forward, and said actions had been taken to improve the situation. For example, orders had been given not to open the cargo containers without proper supervision and Russian MP Zatulin had been deported. Unidentified others would likely be deported today. He noted the central government's difficulties included the fact that "60% of local police had refused to comply with central authorities' orders" in connection with this incident. Khandohiy recognized that a cancellation of the planned exercise would be a political setback for the government. Separately, Horbulin told Charge he had spoken with the Feodosiya mayor and the Chairman of the Crimean Assembly and emphasized their personal reponsibility for the U.S. servicemembers' safety. He added that security at the Feodosiya facility would be augmented to ensure proper security internally and externally. Revenge? -------------- ¶15. (C) The latest controversy comes 15 months after an earlier military exercise gone awry (refs B and C) involving the Russian military. On March 23, 2005, a large Russian amphibious vessel of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Nikolai Filchenkov, entered Ukrainian territorial waters and landed marines and vehicles from the Black Sea Fleet's 382nd Marine Battalion based out of Temryuk, Russia, at the Opuk military training range near Fedosiya. A total of 142 marines and 28 vehicles and pieces of equipment were unloaded before Ukrainian Navy protests forced the Russian vessel to reload the marines and vehicles. The ship departed Ukrainian waters early March 24 en route to Novorossiysk, Russia. Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov told us then that the 1997 Ukrainian-Russian agreement on the division of the Black Sea Fleet gave the Russians control of the training facility in question. However, after the October 2001 tragic downing of a Russian TU-154 passsenger aircraft, shot down by a Ukrainian antiaircraft missile launched from the same Opuk training range, the Ukrainian government had suspended Russian military access to the site pending a new bilateral agreement spelling out precise procedures for its use. The incident occurred four days after Russian President Putin's relatively relaxed and successful visit to Kiev. Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) The central government was quick to understand and agree with our concerns, but adequate action is still lacking. While security concerns have been addressed, the GOU still has not taken the necessary steps to allow the joint exercise preparations to go forward. Primarily the problems are continued impaired mobility of our military personnel and cargo that continues to sit on the docks uncleared by Customs. Still, this problem is one of effectiveness, not intent. The malicious intent that is KIEV 00002190 005 OF 005 ultimately responsible for this ongoing incident is entirely on the side of the political forces that have not wanted to see Yushchenko's government succeed since the pro-democracy forces emerged victorious from the late 2004 Orange Revolution with the win in the free and fair presidential election of December 2004. ¶17. (C) The opposition Party of Regions, Communists, Vitrenko bloc elements, Proriv activists and their Russian backers (in some cases financiers, it is alleged) do not wish to see the Yushchenko-led government pull off a joint military exercise in Ukraine's most pro-Russian region, Crimea. Conversely, a positive resolution to this ongoing problem is important to the GOU to deny its opponents a political victory and to maintain its reputation as a reliable partner in joint military exercises. Barring the development of serious security concerns, we should not give the anti-reform, anti-Euro-Atlantic integration forces a victory by pulling out early. Rather we should continue to work with the central government to accomplish the joint exercise goals or other constructive and publicly visible work that is possible as a sign of the benefits of such cooperation. ¶18. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Gwaltney