UKRAINE: KINAKH AND FM TARASYUK ON COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001940 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: KINAKH AND FM TARASYUK ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS AS OF MAY 17 REF: A. KIEV 1913 ¶B. KIEV 1851 Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In Ambassadorial farewell calls May 17 on outgoing National Security Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary Anatoliy Kinakh and Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, Kinakh and Tarasyuk, both of whom lead minor parties that contested the March 26 elections as part of President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc, spoke about the need to form an Orange coalition and the prospects for it, though neither with conviction. Kinakh said that the situation demanded an Orange coalition, and claimed that the coalition document (principles, program, rules, and positions) was 70% done, but he was not sure that Yushchenko would accept Tymoshenko as Premier; he rated the chances of forming an Our Ukraine (OU)/Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT)/Socialist ("Orange Coalition") Rada majority within the mandated 30 days after the Rada convenes May 25 as "60-40." A coalition with Regions was a serious possibility, but Regions still did not embrace key Our Ukraine policy priorities, such as NATO and abandoning the Russian language and federalism issues. Tarasyuk likewise claimed that there would be a Orange Coalition, that the coalition document was almost done, and that such a document would make it possible to control PM Tymoshenko, but declined to answer whether Yushchenko would accept Tymoshenko as PM. He added that Yushchenko and OU would not accept the Socialists if they did not support key policies such as NATO membership and market reform. Comment: Given the math of securing a Rada majority of 226 seats, that begs the question of the only alternative for OU: a coalition with Regions. Kinakh is suspected of actually favoring Orange-Blue, and his detailed comments about the nature of a theoretical OU-Regions alliance suggested as much, but he knows our preferences. End Summary and Comment. Kinakh: Likely Orange, but OU-Regions a serious alternative -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Outgoing NSDC Secretary Kinakh, also leader of the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, one of five parties that joined Yushchenko's People's Union Our Ukraine Party to contest the March 26 elections as part of the Our Ukraine (OU) bloc, told Ambassador May 17 that he looked forward to the opening of the Rada May 25 (note: Kinakh had to resign his NSDC post in order to be registered as a Rada MP). He expressed less confidence of when a Rada majority might officially form and a coalition government emerge. Kinakh, who has not been involved in coalition negotiations directly but sits on the OU Political Council that must approve any agreement, characterized the OU-BYuT-Socialist draft coalition document, which covers principles, programs, rules, and positions, as 70% complete. That said, he gave OU-BYuT-Socialists only a 60-40 chance of forming a majority within the 30 days from the Rada's opening allowed by the Constitution, with a total of 60 days (through July 24) allowed to appoint a government. Ambassador noted that President Yushchenko had the right but not the obligation to dismiss the Rada after 60 days if no government emerged. Kinakh stated flatly that Yushchenko would not dismiss the Rada, because that would only complicate government-Rada relations in the aftermath of constitutional reform and would not be a welcome sign of political stability. ¶3. (C) Ukraine needed a focused government, Kinakh maintained, because there was a concentration of very real risks facing Ukraine, political and economic, and the ongoing delay in forming a coalition exacerbated the situation. The effectiveness of governmental administration and management was a real concern; the lack of clarity of implementation of constitutional reform and the changing power relations between President, government, and the Rada continued; the Constitutional Court as final arbiter lacked a quorum and could not work. Kinakh stated this was why it was important to form an Orange coalition sooner rather than later, based on openess between the three parties and a clear agenda of continued reform and conditions for the dynamic pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration. While negotiations revolved around such a format, there was no agreement yet; if an agreement were reached, he did not rule out that such a coalition could be long-lasting, in contrast to predictions that such a coalition was doomed to be short-lived. ¶4. (C) Commenting on Tymoshenko's public claim on the Premiership and suggestion that Socialist leader Moroz should be made Rada Speaker because Our Ukraine had the Presidency (Yushchenko),Kinakh rejected efforts to "drag the Presidency" down to a bargaining chip in coalition negotiations. In response to Ambassador's question about whether OU would accept Tymoshenko as Premier if she were to KIEV 00001940 002 OF 003 accept an OU Speaker, Kinakh hedged, replying: "basically, yes." Poroshenko was not a serious OU candidate for Speaker, Kinakh suggested, his name mentioned more to make him feel good and to increase pressure on Tymoshenko; Yushchenko would not back Poroshenko as Speaker. Yekhanurov and Bezsmertny were more realistic, and Moroz would eventually back down because he knew he would have more influence inside an Orange coalition than outside the alternative (OU-Regions). ¶5. (C) The real issue, Kinakh continued, would be whether Tymoshenko could secure 226 votes in the Rada, even with a signed coalition agreement behind her. Kinakh claimed that in all three potential factions with 243 MPs -- OU, Socialists, and even BYuT itself -- there were MPs who would vote against Tymoshenko's PM candidacy. Regions was working hard at peeling away MPs, claimed Kinakh. With 186 MPs of their own and 21 Communist MPs "willing to vote however they are paid," Regions only needed to find another 19 MPs to block action. Were they to succeed and defeat a Tymoshenko premiership vote, that would be a serious blow to the Orange team and to the system. As a result, if OU were to embrace the Tymoshenko option, there would have to be a guarantee of success. Kinakh suggested that Yushchenko was not yet ready to cut the final deal with Tymoshenko, but that unspecified others were already at work preparing ways of forcing her eventual resignation were she to emerge as PM. (Note: Tymoshenko has told us Poroshenko is leading this charge; see ref B.) ¶6. (C) The alternative to the OU-BYuT-Socialist coalition was OU-Regions; Kinakh confirmed that Regions was conducting "very intensive work" on an alternative coalition document and list of positions (note: the Regions' coalition proposal was released May 18, on the web at: http://www.glavred.info/archive/2006/05/18/13 0240-8.html). Kinakh discounted the chance of Yanukovych emerging as PM and suggested that, rumors to the contrary, current PM Yekhanurov had no chance of staying on even in an OU-Regions coalition, since Regions would not accept working under the No. 1 party list candidate of a distant third-place finisher. While Regions' MP Azarov was a possibility, more likely would be a nonpartisan technocrat with strong economic credentials. Kinakh mentioned current Economics Minister Yatsenyuk or Industrial Union of the Donbas VP Hayduk, though the latter would have to divest himself of his business holdings to meet Yushchenko's demand to separate government from business. ¶7. (C) The main stumbling block to an OU-Regions coalition, said Kinakh, was that Regions still did not accept key elements of Yushchenko's agenda. While Regions was ready to support the general strategy on NATO, they would not accept the tempo and intensity favored by Yushchenko; for instance, Regions was "categorically against" a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2006. Similarly, Regions had not yet abandoned its unacceptable positions on Russian as a state language and federalism. Tarasyuk: A new coalition by mid-June -------------- ¶8. (C) Tarasyuk made reassuring noises regarding the likelihood of a parliamentary ruling coalition being formed by June 21. Neither President Yushchenko nor his Our Ukraine bloc were interested in dragging the current state of affairs to the June 24 constitutional deadline to form a parliamentary majority. While no one could give a guarantee about the future, Tarasyuk expressed optimism that the process would be completed "by mid-June or June 20, at the latest." ¶9. (C) Detailing the state of coalition negotiations, Tarasyuk said President Yushchenko on May 16 uttered publicly for the first time what he had been saying privately. If there were no change in the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) stance on certain issues, SPU might not be part of a future coalition. While SPU had leverage on this issue, OU also had its leverage, since SPU had no desire to be in opposition, Tarasyuk commented. OU would not forsake gains by accommodating outdated SPU positions, many of which resembled the Communist Party's positions. OU was discussing intensively the SPU's positions regarding membership in NATO, the EU, and WTO, rights to ownership of land, reprivatization, and other similar issues. ¶10. (C) Responding to Ambassador's observation that Tarasyuk was skirting the crucial issue of Tymoshenko's future status, Tarasyuk laughed in wry agreement. While acknowledging that he had no way of divining Yushchenko's views, he said OU's approach was clear. OU had managed to obtain Tymoshenko's assent that the first priority would be to develop a statement of principles, then allocate government positions. KIEV 00001940 003 OF 003 Of course, while there was no enthusiasm in some quarters for Tymoshenko's return to the prime ministership, once agreement was obtained on basic principles, the way forward would be clear. OU was interested in forming a durable coalition, not one that would fall apart again after a few months, so OU was seeking to develop the "tightest straitjacket" possible to constrain Tymoshenko. Tarasyuk claimed that, of course, there were still some people who were working "the other option," but he stoutly asserted that they would not gain the upper hand. ¶11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Herbst