UKRAINE: UPDATES FROM BEZSMERTNY AND TYMOSHENKO -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIEV 001851

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: UPDATES FROM BEZSMERTNY AND TYMOSHENKO -
YUSHCHENKO DIFFERENT POST VILNIUS, BUT NO DONE DEAL

REF: A. KIEV 1540


B. KIEV 1711

C. KIEV 1773

Classified By: Charge, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: A downbeat and cynical Roman Bezsmertny and
a more relaxed Yuliya Tymoshenko separately assessed the
current stated of play in coalition negotiations with Charge
May 11-12; their characterizations largely tracked, though
not completely. Both said that Yushchenko's attitude towards
formation of an orange coalition had changed for the better
after Yushchenko's meetings with the Vice President and EU
High Rep Solana in Vilnius May 4, leading to a two-hour
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko meeting May 5. Negotiators for Our
Ukraine (OU),Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT),and the Socialist
Party of Ukraine (SPU) would attempt agreement on a
preliminary version of the coalition document by May 14,
allowing for a group meeting with Yushchenko May 15 or 16.
That said, neither discounted the possibility that a
Regions-OU coalition might eventually emerge. Bezsmertny
estimated 15 percent of OU MPs supported the Regions option;
Tymoshenko named names: Petro Poroshenko, Mykola Martynenko,
Presidential adviser Vira Ulyachenko, PM Yuri Yekhanurov, and
Anatoliy Kinakh, for starters. Tymoshenko said that even if
she detected a warmer attitude by Yushchenko personally
towards her and an orange coalition, the insider clique led
by Poroshenko would do everything possible to scuttle orange
coalition prospects, leading to the Regions option,
regardless of the damage to Yushchenko's political future.
Bezsmertny said that he was finished trying to push the
coalition process faster than internal OU dynamics would
allow. Both suggested final cabinet formation could occur as
late as mid-late July, based on a Rada opening of May 24-25.


2. (C) Comment: After several months of uncharacteristic
constructive optimism, the vintage cynical and caustic
Bezsmertny was back; Bezsmertny clearly is still nursing
wounds following criticism by Yushchenko/Our Ukraine's
Executive Council that he had leaned too far forward April 13
in reconstituting the Orange Coalition (ref A). Bezsmertny,
who seemed deflated, without the energy or drive he exhibited
the past several months, said the process of coalition
building was worse that it was a month ago because it has
lost momentum - confirming what Tymoshenko told us April 28
when she said OU negotiators were merely going through the
motions without enthusiasm (ref B). Tymoshenko was clearly
much better disposed towards Yushchenko in her May 12
comments but saw the hand of archrival Poroshenko everywhere
trying to control Yushchenko and attempting to scuttle the
orange coalition. Nemyria, who had met former Polish
President Kwasniewski earlier in the week, said that
Kwasniewski would reinforce the need for an orange coalition
with Yushchenko in Warsaw May 12. Ambassador will revisit
the main negotiators the week of May 15 once Yushchenko meets
with the group. End Summary and Comment.

Vilnius had an impact: Yushchenko better disposed to Orange
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3. (C) Coalition-related messages delivered by the Vice
President and EU High Representative Solana in Vilnius May 4
had an impact on Yushchenko's thinking and actions, according
to both Bezsmertny and Tymoshenko. Bezsmertny said
Yushchenko,s comments and instructions to his staff after he
came back from Vilnius showed renewed focus on pushing
coalition negotiations forward. Yushchenko met Bezsmertny
May 5 prior to meeting serially with Tymoshenko, Moroz and
Yanukovych. Tymoshenko thanked us for the Vilnius
intervention. Before Vilnius, Yushchenko had been quoted
mentioning a "wide, democratic coalition," interpreted by
many as including Regions. After Vilnius, he was talking
orange. Their May 5 session had lasted two hours, helping to
clear the air. Tymoshenko sensed a change in Yushchenko,s
attitude towards her. Before Vilnius, his disdain about a
coalition with BYuT was palpable. After, he was warmer both
to her and to concluding the coalition with BYuT and the SPU.


4. (C) Bezsmertny said Yushchenko had called him early May 11
and met with him later that day, just before Bezsmertny met
Charge. Yushchenko had asked whether it was already time for
him to meet with the so-called "troika" (trio) of lead
negotiators (Bezsmertny, Tymoshenko, and Socialist leader
Moroz) to put the stamp of approval on the general coalition
document (note: catching wind of the possible May 11 meeting,
Tymoshenko canceled a scheduled visit to Vienna to meet with
Goldman Sachs, sending her foreign policy adviser Nemyria in
her place, Tymoshenko told us May 12).

Coalition negotiations: Getting down to details, of a sort
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KIEV 00001851 002.3 OF 004




5. (C) Bezsmertny, who frankly acknowledged he had been
burned in the past by pushing the coalition process faster
than the substance warranted, said that he had recommended
that Yushchenko convene such a group meeting with Tymoshenko
and Moroz May 15-16, allowing for several more days of work
on the program. Handing over a copy of the 48 page draft
coalition document as it stood May 11, Bezsmertny claimed the
three parties had already reached agreement on the sections
governing foreign policy and coalition rules, but that they
had done no meaningful work on economics or agrarian/land
policy (see ref b). Bezsmertny placed the blame on BYuT for
not fully staffing the working groups or taking the process
seriously; in contrast, the Socialists were effective working
partners.


6. (C) In contrast, Tymoshenko said that BYuT was ready to
agree to anything, sign immediately, and get to work; she
added there would be a large working meeting on May 14 of the
main negotiators plus working group representatives to hash
out/approve a preliminary draft version of the coalition
program, which could then be discussed with Yushchenko May
15-16. She expected they would reach agreement on the
foreign policy, internal/economic policy, and rules sections
May 14, leaving aside personnel issues, which would be much
more contentious. The foreign policy section would be spun
off for presentation to the Rada for approval, as required by
Ukrainian law. Without referencing the text Bezsmertny
provided, we asked about characterization of NATO (note: the
Our Ukraine draft used NATO repeatedly, as opposed to
Euro-Atlantic). Nemyria said that references to NATO had
been changed to Euro-Atlantic to smooth the way for Socialist
endorsement. He said he had worked closely with the
EuroParliament's Socialist Group (PES) and Solana's team to
bring the SPU along closer to the attitudes of Western
European Social Democratic parties; Tymoshenko praised
Nemyria's work in this regard.

...but no done deal for Orange, and a two-month timeframe
-------------- --------------


7. (C) That all said, Bezsmertny and Tymoshenko both stressed
that Yushchenko still had not decided definitively in favor
of an Orange Coalition with Tymoshenko as Premier. Spurred
on by an influential clique of insiders who favored a deal
with Regions, Yushchenko had not made a final choice.
Bezsmertny downplayed the "ongoing conversation" between the
Presidential Secretariat/Yekhanurov and Regions as not
serious; there were no documents in preparation that could
serve as a basis for a coalition. Tymoshenko claimed that
the contacts were "serious and continuous," fingering her
archrival Poroshenko, outgoing OU Rada faction leader
Martynenko, Kinakh (who submitted a letter of resignation as
National Security and Defense Council Secretary May 12,
according to press reports, to assume his Rada mandate),
influential adviser to Yushchenko and friend of First Lady
Kataryna Vira Ulyachenko, whom she alleged was accepting
money from Regions, and PM Yekhanurov, whom Tymoshenko
suggested thought he could stay on as PM in exchange for
Yanukovych becoming Rada Speaker and Regions controlling more
than half the Cabinet slots. Tymoshenko said it was not even
clear where Presidential Chief of Staff Rybachuk now stood;
as strange as it seemed to her, there were indications he was
leaning in favor of the Regions option now (comment: this
does not sound right to us; we will follow up with Rybachuk).


8. (SBU) Note: Yushchenko traveled to Poland May 12-13.
Ukrainian wire services and media outlets widely reported an
interview with leading Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza
published May 12 in which Yushchenko appeared to rule out a
coalition deal with Regions; however, his actual coalition
comment was somewhat more nuanced: "An Orange Coalition is
the best possibility...(the possibility) of an orange-blue
coalition is excluded for today." Yushchenko also stated
that he did not rule out Tymoshenko's return as Premier, the
first public commentary to that effect he had made since the
March 26 elections.


9. (C) Neither Bezsmertny nor Tymoshenko expressed optimism
that there would be quick movement toward forming a coalition
government; both predicted ultimate cabinet formation could
come as late as mid-late July, towards the end of the 60 days
after the Rada convenes. While Tymoshenko stressed the
downsides to continued stalling by OU to Yushchenko's
political standing and OU's ratings (down to 8-10 percent in
the latest polls),Bezsmertny helplessly shrugged his
shoulders and made clear he was done pushing the process
faster than OU and Yushchenko would accept. He said the Rada
would meet for the first time next week (May 24-25),but
predicted it would be consumed with internal organizational
issues and would not be quick to turn to the formation of the

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coalition. The lack of a precedent (e.g., that this would be
the first government formed since constitutional reform went
into effect, and the coalition, Rada, and president would
have to feel their way forward) would be an additional factor
slowing progress.


10. (C) Tymoshenko stated that reaching agreement on
personnel choices would be very difficult; Bezsmertny
expressed a similar view, noting that 80 percent of OU MPs
favored an orange coalition, but most of them opposed
Tymoshenko as PM. She alleged that OU's Zvarych had said in
the most recent negotiating session that BYuT would need to
accept Poroshenko as Rada Speaker if coalition discussions
were to proceed any further (note: Yushchenko and OU publicly
stick to the line that there would be no discussion of
positions until after the coalition document were signed).
Tymoshenko also claimed that Yushchenko/OU were attempting to
expand Presidential prerogative in the coalition negotiations
by making a bid to keep all the "siloviki" (law enforcement
related personnel) in place. She felt that would be a
disaster, since the Prosecutor General and his deputies
(Medvedko, Shokin, Vinokurov),the Security Service (SBU)
Chief Dryzhchany, and even Interior Minister Lutsenko were
all affiliated with Poroshenko, if not also connected to
Regions, in the case of Medvedko, a Donetsk native. She
claimed that Socialist leaders Moroz and Vinsky were now
privately disavowing connections with Lutsenko.

Two takes on the Rada Working Group, and the hand of Poro
-------------- --------------


11. (C) The one issue on which Bezsmertny struck a more
optimistic note than Tymoshenko concerned the Rada Working
Group, comprised of MPs-elect from Regions (12),BYuT (9),OU
(6),SPU (2),and the Communists (2),plus outgoing Speaker
Lytvyn, established to organize the opening of the new Rada
prior to formation of a governing coalition. Bezsmertny
noted that OU, BYuT, SPU were working together and predicted
Socialist MP-elect Bokyi would be chosen Working Group Chair,
perhaps May 15, though OU had nominated Yushchenko's
representative to the Rada Klyuchkovsky. (Note: May 11
press reports indicated that OU, BYuT, and SPU had rejected
the candidacy of outgoing Communist deputy Speaker Martynyuk,
supported by Party of Regions and the Communists.)


12. (C) In contrast, Tymoshenko saw worrying signs in the
working group, particularly what she termed as the
destructive role of Poroshenko, whom she blamed for having
prevented progress in the first three sessions. Poroshenko
alone had openly supported the proposal of Regions' MP Azarov
to require a two-thirds majority to make working group
decisions, effectively giving Regions a veto (she added that
Poroshenko and Azarov were close, perhaps business partners).
BYuT and the SPU had rejected the proposal, she added. In
the next meeting with Yushchenko, she and Moroz would raise
the problem of the working group dynamics; she would suggest
that either Poroshenko be replaced or that Yushchenko give
clear instructions on the attitude and approach OU members
should adopt.


13. (C) The main obstacle to formation of the OU-BYuT-SPU
coalition was Poroshenko, she stressed; it almost seemed that
Yushchenko was not entirely free to make his own decisions,
or able to shake loose from those operating not in his
interests but their own. Even if the Orange Coalition were
to form, Poroshenko and his clique would work hard to bring
it down as quickly as possible; they were already laying such
plans, she claimed. This was why it was important to keep
Poroshenko out of the government and the Rada leadership and
find some post for him to keep him out of the mix, ideally an
Ambassadorship out of the country.


14. (C) The problem appeared to be a seemingly unshakable
bond between Yushchenko and Poroshenko which she could not
quite explain. She wondered out loud whether Poroshenko had
something he could hold against Yushchenko, perhaps joint
business deals (she cited rumors allegedly sourced from
Yushchenko bodyguards that Yushchenko and Poroshenko had a
relatively recent screaming match). Poroshenko and others
acted out of their own interest without regard to the damage
an alliance with Regions would do to Yushchenko's base,
reputation, and chances for re-election in 2009. Ukrainian
society wanted clarity and decisiveness from its leaders; the
OU strategy to delay was self-defeating for Yushchenko.
Acknowledging that OU insiders saw her as Yushchenko's main
2009 opponent, she said that she had explained to Yushchenko
May 5 why that was not the case. She had told Yushchenko
that Yanukovych would be his only serious opponent in 2009.
She was ready to support him through 2009 and beyond on a
common program; giving governorships in Donetsk, Luhansk, and
Kharkiv to Regions now only buttressed Yanukovych's ability

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to mount a serious campaign, which would start in 2008, two
years away.


15. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Gwaltney