UKRAINE: OUR UKRAINE'S ZVARYCH ON AGREEMENTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001698 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM PHUM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: OUR UKRAINE'S ZVARYCH ON AGREEMENTS, WORKING GROUPS, AND MAYBE A COALITION REF: KIEV 1662 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 28 meeting with Ambassador, Our Ukraine legal department chief Roman Zvarych confirmed that, in ongoing Rada majority coalition negotiations between Our Ukraine (OU),Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT) and the Socialists, two documents had been signed April 25, one on cooperation in regional legislatures, and another sketching the framework of a coalition agreement. Zvarych described a complex series of working groups tasked to draft sections on the coalition program and rules of order for the coalition, leaving the tricky question of positions in government for later. Zvarych said that BYuT was not taking much interest in the coalition program or rules, leaving this to OU. Zvarych thought BYuT would readily accept the program, but that the Socialists might be difficult to persuade, particularly on NATO and agrarian land reform. Zvarych thought President Yushchenko was leaning toward accepting a deal in which Tymoshenko would be Prime Minister, but did not discount the possibility of Yushchenko changing his mind, or even drawing out the coalition formation process through the summer in a bid to prove that the Rada was ineffectual and that Constitutional reform should be revisited. Zvarych said nonetheless that Yushchenko supported the efforts to rebuild an Orange coalition, constantly talking with OU lead negotiator Roman Bezsmertny about the negotiations and demanding a highly detailed document that would constrict Tymoshenko's room for independent action. Zvarych said there were no formal coalition talks between OU and the Party of Regions, but that there had been informal discussions. Zvarych said that most instances of OU-Regions coalitions forming on the local level resulted from BYuT refusing to work with OU simply because of the difficulty in controlling local party branches. Zvarych thought that the Rada would convene either May 16 or May 23 and that, after the new Rada sat, the outlines of an Orange coalition would be clear. End summary. Five hours of talk results in agreement on an agreement -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador met with Our Ukraine legal department chief Roman Zvarych April 28 to discuss the latest Rada majority coalition formation negotiations. Zvarych confirmed what Socialist Deputy leader Iosyp Vinsky told us April 27, that coalition negotiations between Our Ukraine (OU),Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT) and the Socialists had resumed April 25 (reftel). Zvarych reported that a five-hour meeting between himself, Yuliya Tymoshenko (standing in for her hospitalized deputy, Oleksandr Turchynov) and Vinsky, had resulted in the signing of two documents, one a set of joint instructions to their regional party organizations on coalition formation, and the other a one-page document laying out the structure of the yet to be agreed coalition agreement. When questioned by Ambassador about whether OU would reject this framework agreement, Zvarych said that as of this morning, the central committee of OU had not abrogated the document, and added his opinion that OU would not back out. Zvarych said that, while Yushchenko had been quiet about the agreement, he had tasked Zvarych and lead OU negotiatior Roman Bezsmertny to write a comprehensive, detailed and concrete coalition agreement. Working groups within working groups -------------- ¶4. (C) Zvarych said one of the main areas of contention with Tymoshenko was getting her to accept that the coalition program would drive the government program, not the other way around. Zvarych said the coalition agreement would still be tripartite in nature, with sections covering the coalition program, rules of order, and spheres of responsibility (the language Zvarych inserted to cover government positions). Zvarych said working groups were being set up to write the first two sections, leaving the divisive question of personnel assignments until after the program and coalition rules had been hashed out. Zvarych said the working group on the coalition program had five representatives from each side, and that the BYuT representative, Mykola Tomenko, was being cooperative and accepted the need for a detailed program. Under this working group, there were seven subgroups, covering such topics as economics, finance, foreign policy/national security, political/legal reform. On political/legal reform, Zvarych said one of the ideas being mooted was to remove the independence of the Prosecutor General, making it part of the executive, as in the U.S. ¶5. (C) Zvarych averred that BYuT was taking a back seat in the drafting, letting OU do the writing with BYuT reviewing. KIEV 00001698 002 OF 003 Zvarych said the working group on coalition rules of order had not met yet, but a document OU drafted was being reviewed by Mykhaylo Teplyuk from the Rada legal department. Zvarych indicated that BYuT did not care about the principles or program portion of the coalition agreement, and were letting OU draft it for their review. Zvarych also indicated that public discussions would be held with NGO experts about the coalition agreement, with one being held today and discussions on the seven subgroup topics to be held in coming days. Zvarych said a separate working group on possible amendments to the Constitution, staffed by ex-Constitutional Court justices and without political direction from OU, would also be held. Coalition program: Socialists problematic -------------- ¶6. (C) Asked whether the program, when completed, would be acceptable to BYuT and the Socialists, Zvarych averred that it would not present a problem for BYuT, because Tymoshenko wanted to be Prime Minister and that would trump BYuT's posturing as left-leaning populists. Zvarych thought the program would present more of a problem for the Socialists, particularly on NATO and agrarian land reform, probably resulting in a vague formulation on NATO in writing to satisfy the Socialists, but an unwritten agreement on the actual policy to be pursued. Zvarych said he understood that a signal needed to be sent indicating that Ukraine wanted into NATO, and a signal would be sent. On land reform, Zvarych said he wanted the land code incorporated into the civil code, a difficult proposition for the Socialists to accept. Zvarych thought that the Socialists would eventually come around, because they wanted to be in power, with Vinsky pursuing the First Deputy PM job and Socialist MP-elect Anatoliy Holubchenko their likely choice for Minister of Industry. Zvarych agreed that Tymoshenko could be useful in persuading the Socialists to acquiesce to the program. Yushchenko on Tymoshenko as PM: reluctant acceptance? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Zvarych said that he thought, with a certain degree of reservation in case anything unexpected happened, that an Orange coalition would be formed. He thought Yushchenko had reached the conclusion that Tymoshenko being PM in an Orange coalition was inevitable. Zvarych said that, while Yushchenko had a deep personal antipathy toward Tymoshenko, he also had objective reasons to fear her, because she was an "adventuress" who could undercut him. However, Zvarych thought that if Tymoshenko could be pigeonholed with a specific list of tasks and requirements, it would make accepting her much more palatable to Yushchenko. Zvarych said he thought Yushchenko was leaning toward accepting an agreement with Tymoshenko, but that he was still volatile, and could change his mind. Tymoshenko vs. Poroshenko: still adversaries -------------- ¶8. (C) Zvarych opined that Tymoshenko was "locked in a dialectic" in which she was continually fighting with Yushchenko advisor Petro Poroshenko and wanted to "ruin" him. Zvarych said he had not had any conversations with Tymoshenko where she had not mentioned Poroshenko in "irate" terms. Zvarych said Tymoshenko "went off" whenever Poroshenko was mentioned for government positions during coalition negotiations. Asked about the criminal investigation of BYuT negotiatior and Tymoshenko lieutenant Oleksandr Turchynov and its possible effect on coalition negotiations, Zvarych defended the prosecution, citing Turchynov's illegal eavesdropping while at the SBU, destruction of documents concerning crimeboss Seymon Mogilievich, and mishandling of the Gongadze case. OU-Regions contacts: informal only -------------- ¶9. (C) Queried about contacts between OU and Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions, Zvarych asserted that there were only informal contacts between specific people in the parties, and that there was no formal working group between OU and Regions. (Note: This contradicts what Yanukovych told us April 27 -- see septel.) Zvarych said that Poroshenko was in contact with Regions, as were local party leaders, but that only one local coalition agreement had been signed. That was in Zakarpattya and had been brokered by Emergency Situations Minister and local powerbroker Viktor Baloha. Zvarych averred that the coalition situation outside Kiev was "total chaos" and that the local party structures were hard to control. Zvarych said local OU organizations were working against BYuT, because outside Kiev, BYuT KIEV 00001698 003 OF 003 initially refused to deal with OU. Zvarych said that in the Kiev city Rada, BYuT's Mykhaylo Brodsky refused to work with OU, trying to form an alliance with Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky, forcing OU to work with Regions. Zvarych said Regions oligarch and MP-elect Rinat Akhmetov and Yushchenko advisor Oleksandr Tretyakov were talking informally because they had issues in common as businessmen. Rada sits next month... or this summer? -------------- ¶10. (C) Zvarych said the Rada would likely convene May 16 or 23, by tradition opening on a Tuesday. However, Zvarych did not discount the possibility that Yushchenko might try to drag out the coalition formation process through the summer in order to demonstrate the ineffectual nature of the Rada and build an argument that the Constitutional reform package of December 2004 had been a mistake and should be revisited. Zvarych noted nonetheless that Yushchenko had said nothing to bring into question his dedication to a coalition agreement and was in constant contact with Bezsmertny on the coalition talks, insisting on an "ironclad" coalition agreement. Zvarych related one instance where he and Bezsmertny had showed Yushchenko a draft coalition program, which Yushchenko rejected as being insufficiently detailed in terms of responsibilities, tasks, and schedules. Zvarych said he thought that by May 23 the new Rada would be seated and that there would be more clarity on where the coalition talks were going, with an idea of what the coalition would look like by early June. And the future? -------------- ¶11. (C) Zvarych said that OU was "not suicidal" and understood that it had to form a coalition eventually, or else Yushchenko would have to call early elections, which OU would lose badly. Zvarych said OU also understood that if it made a deal with Regions, OU would be destroyed by voter backlash. Asked whether Yushchenko might opt for a relatively tranquil three and a half years of coalition with Regions, and no chance in the 2009 presidential election, over a tumultuous coalition with BYuT after which Tymoshenko would challenge him for the presidency, Zvarych replied that Tymoshenko might agree not to run in 2009 and that the "Yushchenko-Teflon" effect would protect Yushchenko from any allegations Tymoshenko could muster. Zvarych speculated that Yushchenko might not even want to run again in 2009, citing health issues, for which Zvarych said Yushchenko was taking "a lot of pills." Zvarych continued that people close to Tymoshenko said she had no interest in being president. In his view, Tymoshenko did not have a presidential persona, but he was not sure that her ego would let her realize that. ¶12. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Herbst