UKRAINE: PARTY OF REGIONS LEADER YANUKOVYCH'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001693 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG NATO EPET PINR ZK ZJ AJ BO RS, UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PARTY OF REGIONS LEADER YANUKOVYCH'S CONTINUING CHARM OFFENSIVE REF: A. KIEV 1642 ¶B. KIEV 1530 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d). Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych told Ambassador April 27 that working-level negotiations with President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc continued. While many issues had been worked out, Yanukovych would need to meet with Yushchenko to resolve key issues. Yanukovych implied that Regions was prepared to be helpful on Euro-Atlantic integration questions, but could not explicitly support NATO membership in a coalition agreement. To clinch a deal with Our Ukraine, Yanukovych was prepared to endorse Yushchenko's presidential candidacy in 2009 and not run a Regions candidate. He claimed key Central Asian and Caucasus leaders wanted him in government in order to enhance their ability to develop energy arrangements free of Russian influence. Yanukovych had indirect contact with Belarusan president Lukashenka, who also saw a Yanukovych participation in a government coalition as an opportunity to work with Ukraine vis-a-vis Russia. ¶2. (C) Comment: Yanukovych continues to hope to send messages through us to Yushchenko's circle as a way to buttress Regions' negotiating position and was putting the best spin he could on his positions. Yanukovych was clearly attempting to demonstrate that he would be open to improved Ukraine-NATO relations and other Western-oriented policies if he were to become prime minister. His description of his position on NATO and Yushchenko's reaction tracks with what he said in meetings with CODEL Frist and Deputy National Security Adviser Crouch (reftels). Yanukovych's stated flexible positions on NATO and energy were designed to persuade us that we should see Regions as a natural partner for a coalition with Yushchenko. At the same time, Yanukovych used a press event the same day to send a very different, even contradictory, signal. He claimed publicly that "foreign governments" were seeking to exert influence on the coalition-forming process. End summary and comment. Finessing the NATO Issue -------------- ¶3. (C) Yanukovych invited Ambassador to a private lunch April 27, during which he provided an update on Party of Regions' coalition efforts and his views on domestic and foreign policy, including his contacts with Belarus. Yanukovych said a working group of Party of Regions and the pro-presidential Our Ukraine (OU) bloc, with four representatives on each side, had been meeting regularly and had hammered out a common approach on many issues, but not on big policy questions. He would meet one-on-one with President Yushchenko to decide the remaining issues "in a discreet manner." Yanukovych said Regions could not take a public position on issues that would weaken the party's support among its followers or relations with the Communist Party or the (radical pro-Soviet) People's Opposition Bloc of Natalya Vitrenko. In an official and public document, Regions could not commit to pursue certain elements of Yushchenko's policy but could promise to be "flexible." Yushchenko understood this approach, and particularly that Regions could not justify explicit support for NATO membership to its supporters. ¶4. (C) Later in the conversation, Yanukovych said Regions could not agree to language supporting Ukraine's NATO aspirations, but Regions was ready to work on the issue. During his meeting with key directors from Ukraine's military-industrial complex, Yanukovych said half of them were prepared to sell their output to NATO. What was needed, Yanukovych urged, was a significant NATO purchase that would demonstrate to executives in the military-industrial sector that cooperation with NATO would allow them to maintain jobs and modernize their factories. If there were a NATO contract and a massive public education campaign beginning soon, the Ukrainian government could persuade business and industrial leaders and the public in two years to support close cooperation with NATO. Orange Coalition Prospects -------------- ¶5. (C) Yanukovych averred that Regions found itself in a comfortable situation. If the negotiations with Our Ukraine on a coalition did not work out, Regions would not enter into a coalition with the eponymous bloc of leader Yuliya KIEV 00001693 002 OF 003 Tymoshenko but would enter the opposition. Even so, Tymoshenko's emissaries were constantly reaching out to Regions. Yanukovych said, even in opposition, Regions would endeavor to behave responsibly. Yanukovych argued a reformulated Orange coalition would not be stable. Once it fell apart, Yushchenko would be seriously weakened and, rather than entering into a coalition under such conditions, Regions would prefer to see another election. If the Orange coalition failed a second time, the public would view it as a failure of Yushchenko's leadership but not blame Tymoshenko. If the Orange coalition succeeded, Tymoshenko would get all the credit. ¶6. (C) Yanukovych said Yushchenko needed Regions and should be negotiating seriously. Yanukovych said he had met three times with Prime Minister Yekhanurov and, each time, he and Yekhanurov had agreed on the main elements of an agreement. Although he had not said so yet, Yanukovych said he would be prepared to make a commitment as part of a coalition agreement that Regions would not run a candidate against Yushchenko in the 2009 presidential elections and would support Yushchenko's candidacy. Yanukovych argued that Yushchenko could not win without Regions' support. He thought the new Rada would convene May 16. ¶7. (C) Ambassador noted that U.S. preference for a reform-oriented coalition was well known. The USG would be prepared to work with Regions either in power or in the opposition. If Regions ended up in the opposition, it should endeavor to be helpful on issues such as WTO accession and NATO membership. Energy Supply Diversity and Russia -------------- ¶8. (C) Yanukovych said Azerbaijan president Ilham Aliyev had sent Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Abbasov to meet with Yanukovych during the week of April 10. Aliyev was unhappy that Russia was controlling energy exports from Central Asia and the Caucasus region to Europe and understood that Ukraine was key to developing alternate routes bypassing Russia. Abbasov told Yanukovych that Aliyev saw Yanukovych as a stable partner for Azerbaijan and so was hoping that Regions would be part of a ruling coalition. Yanukovych responded that Ukraine would support plans to diversify energy supply routes. Yanukovych added that Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov were also resolved to look for alternate routes for their energy experts. The three presidents wanted a strong and stable Ukraine, and, Yanukovych claimed, saw Yanukovych as a key element. ¶9. (C) Yanukovych continued that Abbasov had said Aliyev did not see Tymoshenko as a viable prime ministerial candidate, because she was susceptible to Russian influence. Moscow still had the legal case against Tymoshenko as a potential tool, and Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin was in continuous touch with her. This contact also existed when Tymoshenko was prime minister. Natalya Vitrenko was also purely a tool of Moscow, receiving most of her funding from Russian sources. Vitrenko's recent statement that she opposed Regions indicated that Moscow had grown increasingly unhappy with Regions, and Yanukovych. Lukashenka the Landlord -------------- ¶10. (C) Yanukovych said he had long known a close aide to Belarusan President Lukashenka, in part due to a mutual interest in sports. The Lukashenka aide had told Yanukovych that Lukashenka wanted Yanukovych to be in the coalition so the Ukrainian government would be stronger and more stable. If Yanukovych and Regions were part of the ruling coalition, Lukashenka would be interested in combining with Ukraine to work together vis-a-vis Russia. Lukashenka was unhappy with his isolation and hoped to meet someday with Yanukovych. Yanukovych told Ambassador that Lukashenka should not be put in a corner. ¶11. (C) Ambassador responded that the U.S. and its European partners had clearly communicated the steps that Lukashenka needed to undertake and that Lukashenka had sealed his fate by his own actions. Lukashenka had not only falsified the March 19 presidential elections, he was now cracking down on the opposition in the election's aftermath. Ambassador strongly advised Yanukovych not to meet Lukashenka unless Lukashenka took action to reverse some of the harm that he had inflicted on Belarus. Yanukovych said he agreed with Ambassador but repeated that Lukashenka should not be put under excessive pressure. KIEV 00001693 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Yanukovych also related an anecdote to describe Lukashenka's character. Yanukovych's great grandfather had come from a small village in Belarus that was desperately poor. Some years ago, Yanukovych visited the village and decided to help reduce the suffering of the villagers. He provided money for electric power distribution, toward the operation of an old age home, and to increase farming income. Lukashenka sharply reprimanded the district governor when he heard about Yanukovych's generosity and, as a consequence, the governor blocked Yanukovych's further attempts to help the village. Yanukovych ended up speaking to Lukashenka, who demanded to know why he had not asked for permission to provide the help. Yanukovych said he had not thought it necessary, since he was simply giving money and getting nothing in return. Lukashenka retorted that Yanukovych should remember that he, Lukashenka, was the landlord ("khozyain" in Russian) in Belarus. ¶13. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Herbst